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LIABILITY, REGULATION AND POLICY
IN SURGICAL INNOVATION: THE
CUTTING EDGE OF RESEARCH AND
THERAPY
Anna C. Mastroiannil
"There is a public interest in encouraging new and more widely
available surgical technology and treatment providing that, in the
sprint to the finishing tape, scientific methods are not abused, ethical
principles are not trampled and the law is not trespassed..
INTRODUCTION
Surgeons have been at the forefront of major progress in the
treatment of diseases and other health conditions. These include
advances in all specialty areas, including gastroenterology, 2 plastic
and reconstructive surgery,3 transplantation,4 cardiology,5 infertility,
6
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C.M. Ward, Surgical Research, Experimentation and Innovation, 47 BRIT.
J. PLASTIC SURGERY 90, 90 (1994).
2 See Lawrence I. Bonchek, Are Randomized Trials Appropriate For Evalu-
ating New Operations?, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED. 44,45 (1979).
3 See Ward, supra note 1, at 90.
4 J.B. Dossetor, Innovative Treatment Versus Clinical Research: An Ethics
Issue In Transplantation, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 966, 966-67 (1990).
In the field of transplantation and its allied fields, examples of new endeav-
ors which have been introduced as 'innovations,' without initially going
through the rigorous peer review include: Kolff s early use of hemodialysis
(14 of 15 patients dying during the first period of clinical trial); early al-
logenic renal transplants, prior to immunosuppression ... in 1963.. . ; de-
velopment of surgery within the cavity of the heart by CW Lillehei includ-
ing a period where adults provided cross-circulation to children with heart
defects, prior to introduction of extracorporeal bubble oxygenation; clinical
xenogeneic renal or cardiac allografts; the worldwide 'rash' of cardiac
transplants from 1969 to 1971; early attempts in liver transplantation prior
to cyclosporine; early attempts at allogenic bone marrow engraftment for
marrow aplasia or malignancy; implantation of fertilized ova (1VF) as
treatment for infertility; early effort to use an implanted artificial heart; hu-
man fetal neural implants into the substantia nigra for advanced Parkinson's
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gynecology, 7 and orthopedics, 8 just to name a few. In addition,
surgical procedures that in the past would have required large
incisions have become less invasive through technological
advancement in surgical tools, such as the laparoscope and
arthroscope, 9 reducing recovery times and in many cases enhancing
health benefits to patients.1l At the same time, the surgical literature
disease; and ... transplantation of multiple (4 or 5) abdominal viscera.
Id. (citations omitted).
5 See Bonchek, supra note 2. See also J.P. Bunker et al., Surgical Innovation
andIts Evaluation, 200 Sci. 937, 938-39 (1978).
6 This includes the treatment of infertility by in vitro fertilization, the proc-
ess of fertilizing human ova and implanting them in a woman's uterus. See Dossetor,
supra note 4, at 967.
7 See David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of
Medical Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030, 3030 (1993) (discussing laparoscopic tubal
sterilization).
8 See John J. Callaghan et al., Symposium: Introducing Technology Into
Orthopaedic Practice. How Should It Be Done?, 87 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 1146
(2005).
9 The laparoscope is an
instrument through which structures within the abdomen and pelvis can be
seen. A small surgical incision (cut) is made in the abdominal wall to permit
the laparoscope to enter the abdomen or pelvis. A diversity of tubes can be
pushed through the same incision or other small incisions permitting the in-
troduction of probes and other instruments. In this way, a number of surgi-
cal procedures can be performed without the need for a large surgical inci-
sion.
MedicineNet.com, Definition of Laparoscope, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/
art.asp?articlekey=9931 (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). The arthroscope is a
thin flexible fiberoptic scope which is introduced into a joint space through
a small incision in order to carry out diagnostic and treatment procedures
within the joint. An arthroscope is about the diameter of a drinking straw. It
is fitted with a miniature camera, a light source and precision tools at the
end of flexible tubes. An arthroscope can be used not only for diagnostic
procedures but a wide range of surgical repairs, such as debridement, or
cleaning, of a joint to remove bits of torn cartilage, ligament reconstruction,
and synovectomy (removal of the joint lining). All are done without a ma-
jor, invasive operation, and, since arthroscopy requires only tiny incisions,
many procedures can be done on an outpatient basis with local anesthetic.
MedicineNet.com, Definition of Arthroscope, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/
art.asp?articlekey=33986 (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
10 "The risk of intraoperative and postoperative complications, the cost of
treatment, and hospitalization time are generally less with laparoscopic surgery than
with traditional open procedures." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 9666 (27th ed.
2000) (defining laparoscopy). The rapid adoption of laparoscopic procedures has been
described as an epidemic of "laparoscopic fever." Ward, supra note 1, at n.20 (citing
J.N. Baxter & P.J. O'Dwyer, Laparoscopic or Minilaporotomy in Cholecystectomy,
304 BRIT. MED. J. 559, 599 (1992). But see Steven M. Strasberg & Philip A. Lud-
brook, Who Oversees Innovative Practice? Is There a Structure That Meets the Moni-
toring Needs of New Techniques?, 196 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 938 (2003) (discussing
[Vol. 16:351
2006] LIABILITY, REGULATION & POLICY IN SURGICAL INNOVATION 353
also reveals innovations that caused harm to patients in their early
development (e.g., the use of less invasive techniques for gall bladder
removal)1" and discredited surgical innovations (e.g., routine
episiotomies, 12 certain fetal surgeries," certain approaches for
treatment of peptic ulcers 14 and correction of coronary artery
blockage). 15 Concern about harm or potential harm to patients
continues into the present, including controversy over particular
approaches to the treatment of liver tumors and liver transplantation. 6
Most new surgical techniques have developed in the surgical suite
or on simulators, while, for practical and other reasons, very few are
subjected to the rigorous evaluation of safety and effectiveness ap-
plied to most new nonsurgical therapies. 17 History has proven that
perceptions of surgeons and patients of, for example, quicker recovery
times and reduced pain, can spur rapid acceptance of a novel ap-
proach, and even prompt insurance reimbursement, while allowing
little opportunity for rigorous comparisons to standard therapies or
other outcome evaluations. 18 A formal appraisal of the technique
could have revealed its superiority or inferiority, potentially impacting
the health outcomes of many patients. 19
negative health outcomes that resulted during early adoption of laparoscopic adoption
for gall bladder removal).11 See Joel E. Frader & Donna A. Caniano, Research and Innovation in Sur-
gery, in SURGICAL ETHICS 216, 220-2 1, (Laurence B. McCullough et al. eds., 1998).
12 Id. See Grimes, supra note 7, at 3031.
13 See Angelique M. Reitsma & Jonathan D. Moreno, Maternal-Fetal Re-
search and Human Research Protections Policy, 30 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 141
(2003).
14 Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 220-21.
The history of medicine and surgery clearly demonstrates the harms done in
the name of 'treatments' of unproven worth. Surgical examples include rou-
tine episiotomy; internal mammary artery ligation for angina; gastric freez-
ing for peptic ulcer disease; initial attempts with implantable devices to
provide artificial support of circulation; indiscriminate adoption of endo-
scopic, especially laparoscopic, surgery; and various operations for dispa-
rate forms of cancer.
Id.
15 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 938 ("[slome [surgical] inno-
vations.., have been associated with unexpected harm to patients").
16 See id., at 939-41. See also David Cronin et al., Transplantation of Liver
Grafts from Living Donors into Adults-Too Much, Too Soon, 344 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1633 (2001).
17 Russell L. Gruen et al., Professionalism in Surgery, 197 J. AM. C. SUR-
GEONS 605, 607 (2003). See also Dossetor, supra note 4.
18 See Clyde F. Barker & Larry R. Kaiser, Is Surgical Science Dead?, 198 J.
AM. C. SURGEONS 1 (2004). See also Grimes, supra note 7, at 3031-32 (discussing
various hurdles to technology assessment).
19 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 938-41 (documenting harm
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Current practices in surgical innovation raise concerns about the
appropriate balancing of patient safety and medical progress. A re-
view of the surgical and bioethics literature reveals disagreement
about whether the practice of surgical innovation is in need of urgent
attention, as well as varying opinions on the appropriate characteriza-
tion of innovations.20 Calls for change predominate and are primarily
founded on claims of patient safety, i.e., that development of innova-
tions on patients outside of the research context can harm present or
future patients.2 Some commentators have suggested that the risk of
patient harm and the corresponding need for increased accountability
are significant enough that surgeons should subject their approaches
to some form of independent prior review 22 and ensure that patients
are specifically informed of the innovation 23 during the informed con-
sent process. Some proponents of this approach would suggest that
certain innovations require treating the patient as a research subject,
and submitting such innovations to the review, approval and imple-
mentation processes applicable to formal research protocols involving
human subjects.24 Other commentators are content with the status quo,
contending that innovation is, and should be, treated as part of the
routine, therapeutic practice of surgery.25 They express concerns that a
formal review process would be burdensome and slow progress in the
surgical field, resulting in its own attendant risks to patient health.26
and potential harm in surgical innovation in laparoscopic cholecystectomy, radiofre-
quency ablation of metastatic colorectal tumors in the liver, and live donor right
hemiliver transplantation).
20 See infra Part I.A. See, e.g., Bunker et al., supra note 5; David H. Spodick,
Numerators Without Denominators: There Is No FDA For the Surgeon, 232 JAMA
35 (1975); Bonchek, supra note 2.
21 Resource allocation is another issue of concern. Grimes, supra note 7, at
3030 (describing "squandered resources, wasted effort, and in some cases, harm[ing]
or kill[in] ... patients").
Such a review might take the form of the federal regulatory review of
research performed by local institutional review boards (IRBs) in the federal human
subjects protection system, as under 45 C.F.R. § 46. See discussion infra note 284.
See also Editorial, Qualms About Innovative Surgery, 1 LANCET 149 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Editorial].
23 See, e.g., Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 941-43.
24 See, e.g., Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 13.
25 George A. Gates, Letter to the Editor, Surgical Innovation and Research,
129 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1352, 1353 (2003) ("The
ad hoc process whereby technical innovations developed by one person are discussed
with colleagues, presented at meetings, and published in the literature has served the
profession well.").
26 Id; Vicki Brower, The Ethics of Innovation: Should Innovative Surgery
Be Exempt from Clinical Trials and Regulations?, 4 EMBO REP. 338, 339 (2003).
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Still others have highlighted the uniqueness of surgery relative to
other areas of medical intervention, and have suggested the need for a
dedicated system of enhanced reporting and short-term and long-term
outcome monitoring following innovative -surgical procedures.27 At
issue, thus, is whether an innovative surgical technique should be
treated as research, or as therapy, or as a distinct entity.
This article examines the implications of the foregoing competing
claims from a U.S. legal perspective, focusing particularly on how the
legal system addresses patient safety concerns and autonomous deci-
sion-making of surgeons in the context of surgical innovation. The
lack of oversight and the risks borne by patients during surgeons' de-
velopment and subsequent refinement of a novel procedure must be
balanced with the need to encourage medical progress through the
development of improved techniques designed to benefit the health of
current and future patients. This article argues that current reliance on
the medical malpractice system and the federal regulatory system of
oversight of human subjects research is inadequate in appropriately
balancing patient safety and medical progress. The deficiencies in
relying on the current approaches are further highlighted in a legal
review and case study analysis of one surgical innovation that stimu-
lated a wave of legal claims in the 1990s. A comprehensive legal
analysis ultimately leads to a critique of current policy approaches and
the recommendation of a three-pronged policy approach distinctly
tailored to surgical innovation, which includes monitoring, local insti-
tutional oversight, and educational initiatives. As will be observed,
complicating this examination is the cultural context in which surgical
innovation takes place, lack of consensus about the appropriate treat-
ment of surgical innovation, and the wide variation in procedures that
could conceivably fall within a definition of surgical innovation.
Part I of this article briefly examines the practice and culture of
surgical innovation, describing the high value placed on innovation
and professional autonomy and the definitional challenge in character-
izing innovative surgery. Part II introduces the two currently available
alternate legal pathways relevant to concerns for patient safety-the
[B]ioethicist George Agich... disagrees with the call for more control over
surgical innovation by IRBs, or others. He maintains that surgery is differ-
ent from medicine and should be treated as such, and we should not require
it to 'live' with the same safeguards that apply to drug and device develop-
ment.
Id. See also Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 943 (while advocating change in
the oversight of surgical innovation, the authors recognize that concerns about "sti-
fling innovation" must be balanced with the protection of patients).
27 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 945-46.
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medical practice pathway and the human subjects research pathway-
and describes the surgeon's critical role in determining the pathway.
Part III discusses the medical practice pathway and the conclusions
that can be drawn from the law on point, particularly in the areas of
negligence and informed consent, and analyzes their implications for
the treatment of innovative surgery. Part IV describes the human sub-
jects research pathway in detail. It begins with a discussion of the
federal system of regulatory oversight and protection, its history and
potential application to innovative surgery. It continues by examining
the potential cause of action for research negligence, followed by con-
clusions and implications for the treatment of innovative surgery. Part
V analyzes and extracts lessons from one example of surgical innova-
tion, its legal pathways and malpractice history. Lastly, this article
concludes by examining some of the legal implications of current pol-
icy approaches and ultimately recommends a distinct approach de-
signed to balance medical progress with greater accountability and
opportunities for improved patient safety.
For purposes of this article, "surgical innovation" will mean "a
novel procedure, a significant modification of a standard technique, a
new application of or new indication for an established technique, or
an alternative combination of an established technique with another
therapeutic modality that was developed and tested for the first
time. ' 8 It may also include the novel application of a previously ex-
isting surgical tool or technology, such as the arthroscope or laparo-
scope. It excludes the novel or off-label use of drugs or medical de-
vices in surgery2 9 and excludes surgical research involving placebo
control groups, commonly referred to as research involving "sham"
surgery or placebo surgery-controlled research.3 °
28 Angelique M. Reitsma & Jonathan D. Moreno, Ethical Regulations for
Innovative Surgery: The Last Frontier?, 194 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 792, 793 (2002).
29 Off-label use of drugs and medical devices by physicians may raise similar
concerns about the lack of evaluation of safety and efficacy. Indeed some commenta-
tors advocate that patients should be specifically informed of off-label prescription
and that a physician's intention to use a drug or medical device in many patients
should prompt research review by an institutional review board. John D. Casler,
Clinical Use of New Technologies Without Scientific Studies, 129 ARCHIVES
OTOLARYNGOLOGY HEAD & NECK SURGERY 674, 675 (2003).
30 In research involving a sham or placebo surgery control group, the deci-
sion has already been made that the innovation should be characterized as research
rather than medical therapy. Research involving sham surgery requires a formal re-
search protocol and may be subject to federal regulatory provisions concerning re-
search with human subjects (including regulatory provisions for independent review
and enhanced disclosure in informed consent, among other requirements). See, e.g.,
Robert M. Zwolak, Research Involving Sham Surgery, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 458 (Robert J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert
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I. UNDERSTANDING SURGICAL INNOVATION
There is considerable disagreement reflected in the surgical and
ethics literature about whether and when to characterize a surgical
innovation as: (1) research, (2) therapy, or (3) some other distinct en-
tity.31 As will be discussed throughout this article, each of these possi-
ble characterizations has potential implications for informed consent,
oversight, and review (including regulatory review), 2 with potential
effects on patient safety as well as insurance reimbursement decisions
and overall resource allocation.33 They also may involve different
understandings about the intended beneficiary of the innovation-the
present patient (therapeutic intervention), future patients (research), or
both. Further, the culture of surgery influences the context from which
such a characterization emerges. All of these factors create challenges
in evaluating and developing policy in this area.
A. The "Gray Zone" of Surgical Innovation
The ambiguity surrounding innovation's place on a continuum
from research to therapeutic practice is not unique to surgery.34 There
are vast areas in medicine where nearly all authorities can agree that
certain treatments are well established, with proven efficacy and
known risks, and constitute the standard approaches to a medical con-
dition.35 Indeed, there is little disagreement that such areas are clearly
eds., Jones and Bartlett Publishers 2002); Franklin G. Miller, Sham Surgery: An Ethi-
calAnalysis, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2003, at 41.
31 Angelique M. Reitsma & Jonathan D. Moreno, Ethics ofInnovative Sur-
gery: US Surgeons' Definitions, Knowledge and Attitudes, 200 J. AM. C. SURGEONS
103, 103-04 (2005).
32 Id.
33 Mark Bernstein & Joseph Bampoe, Surgical Innovation or Surgical Evolu-
tion: An Ethical and Practical Guide to Handling Novel Neurosurgical Procedures,
100 J. NEUROSURGERY 2, 3 (2004).
34 Jeffrey Lyon retells a real life story from Jay Katz, the preeminent Yale
professor of law and psychiatry and renowned authority on human subjects research.
A physician presents a paper at a conference that describes his use of chemotherapy in
young children suffering from leukemia. The doctor assessed the chemotherapy's
effectiveness with six bone marrow biopsies in a short period following chemother-
apy. Professor Katz asked the physician how such a protocol could be approved by an
IRB in light of the significant discomfort experienced by the children during the bone
marrow biopsies. The physician's response was that he did not subject the protocol to
review because he characterized the procedures as therapeutic interventions, designed
to aid in the clinical management of their disease. Jeffrey Lyon, Experimenting with
Humans. Part 2: Innovation or Exploitation?, 8 SECOND OPINION 10, 14 (1988).
35 David Sabiston, The Boundaries Between Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects and the Accepted or Routine Practice of Medicine, with Particular
Emphasis on Innovation in the Practice of Surgery, in NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE
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characterized as medical practice for the benefit of the individual pa-
tient.36 They constitute the majority of medical approaches that are in
use on a daily basis, including surgical approaches. 37 Similarly there
are also areas in medicine that are unmistakably characterized as re-
search, i.e., areas where there is no intention that the patient will re-
ceive any direct medical benefit from the procedure.38 Between these
extremes, there is a large "gray zone" 39 where it becomes challeng-
ing4° to define an intervention as either medical practice or research-
innovations may become assimilated into standard practice after lim-
ited formal evaluation, informal evaluation, or even no evaluation of
safety and efficacy.4' This "gray zone" of surgical innovation is the
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX II, 17-1 (1979).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28, at 796. From their recent survey of
surgeons, the authors conclude that
a large 'gray zone' exists between sound research and incrementally intro-
duced novelties, although both ultimately produce innovations. Apparently,
distinguishing between gradual implementation of minor surgical modifica-
tions and more permanent or extensive alterations of a technique is a chal-
lenge. This is especially true when modifications are made on an as-needed
basis for the benefit of the individual patient. Such distinctive modifications
have been and will always be necessary for the best possible patient out-
comes, and surgeons know best when to make them. But a surgeon may be-
gin to change his standard operating room technique more permanently
based on experiences with individual cases. If he then decides to publish re-
sults of the new technique, the line is clearly crossed and even originally
spontaneous, and patient-centered modifications become research in retro-
spect, justifying [prospective] review and sometimes informed consent of
the patients, who have now become research subjects.
Id.
40 Although surgeons and policymakers may experience these definitional
challenges, empirical research indicates that even patients have difficulty appreciating
the distinction between research and therapy. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN
RADIATIONS EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT 459-81 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (de-
scribing the results of the Subject Interview Study) [hereinafter ACHRE]; Nancy E.
Kass et al., Trust: The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research, 26
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 25, 27.
41 Strasberg and Ludbrook, both physicians, describe this as a "spectrum of
innovation" in the clinical practice of surgery. At the extremes are "minor changes
that are inherent and appropriate in individual practice" and "innovations that are
allowed into general use only after their safety and efficacy have been proven in
extensive trials using human subjects. Between these extremes are innovations, which
are permitted entry into ordinary use after much more limited evaluation, or even after
no evaluation at all." Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 938.
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particular focus of this article. Unlike standard practice, the novelty of
the procedure means that the benefits and risks are inherently uncer-
tain.42 "Unlike research, innovation always involves sick patients.
'A3
A recent survey indicates discrepancies and a lack of clarity
among U.S. surgeons about the circumstances under which a surgical
innovation should be characterized as research.44 A large number of
surveyed surgeons indicated that use of a formal protocol or asking a
patient for specific permission to perform the innovation was a sign of
research.a Other qualities that many surgeons found to be relevant in
distinguishing medical practice (surveyed as "routine variation in sur-
gical technique") from research concerned the degree of variation
from standard care, the degree of risk, and whether the innovation was
premeditated or spontaneous: a "great" degree of variation from stan-
dard care, a "great" degree of risk, and premeditation were identified
by many as hallmarks of research.46 Otherwise, the survey revealed a
vast range of opinions about exactly what constitutes research versus
practice and a deficit of knowledge about the regulatory requirements
of research.47 As one distinguished surgeon and his colleagues have
stated elsewhere, "Every surgeon has a clear idea of personal bounda-
ries, but it is safe to say that the limits of acceptable innovation are.
neither widely accepted nor closely observed by the profession at
large. 48
42 See Nancy M.P. King, The Line Between Clinical Innovation and Human
Experimentation, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 573, 574-75 (2002).
43 Id. at 574. Further, "[b]y virtue of its individualized focus, [surgical inno-
vation] lacks the theoretical and empirical preclinical groundwork that characterizes
the search for knowledge generalizeable beyond an individual patient." Id. Bioethicist
Robert Levine characterizes innovation as "nonvalidated" practices: either novel
practices (i.e., those that have not been tested enough to permit predictions of efficacy
and safety), or practices that during the course of use raise questions about safety and
efficacy. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 4 (2d
ed. 1986).
44 Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 31.
41 Id. at 108.
46 Id. at 107, tbl.3.
47 Id. See also Randi L. Rutan et al., Academic Surgeons' Knowledge of
Food and Drug Administration Regulations for Clinical Trials, 132 ARCHIVES
SURGERY 94 (1997).
48 James W. Jones et al., Ethics of Surgical Innovation to Treat Rare Dis-
eases, 39 J. VASCULAR SURGERY 918, 918 (2004) (referencing the study discussed in
Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28). See also Angelique M. Reitsma & Jonathan D.
Moreno, Surgical Research, an Elusive Entity, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov. 2003, at 49, 49
(2003) ("There appears to be a tradition in surgery that significant changes in tech-
nique are regarded as mere modifications and not as research.").
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The boundaries of research and practice were explored in the
1970s by a congressionally appointed ethics commission.49 The Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedi-
cal and Behavioral Research (National Commission) was created by
the National Research Act of 197450 and was composed of experts in
medicine, science, law, ethics, and religion.5' One of the tasks as-
signed to the commission was to "identify the basic ethical principles
that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral re-
search involving human subjects and to develop guidelines which
should be followed to assure that such research is conducted in accor-
dance with those principles. 52 The charge to the National Commis-
sion specifically requested consideration of, inter alia, "the bounda-
ries between biomedical and behavioral research and the accepted and
routine practice of medicine ... This examination was considered
critical in determining which types of activities would be subject to
the ethical principles developed by the National Commission. 54 Re-
sponding to its charge, the National Commission requested scholarly
analyses on the innovation-therapy distinction 5  and ultimately issued
a 1979 report which has become recognized as the seminal document
in research ethics, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guide-
'9 NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979) [herein-
after The Belmont Report].
50 National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
51 The Belmont Report, supra note 49.
52 Id. The National Commission had a significant impact on the development
of research policy in the United States. During its four year tenure (1975-1979), it
issued ten reports on bioethics, research ethics, and policy, including, inter alia, re-
ports on research involving vulnerable populations (the fetus, prisoners, children, the
mentally infirm, and psychosurgery research) and the oversight of research. For a list
of National Commission reports, see The President's Council on Bioethics, Former
Bioethics Commissions, http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/pastcommissions/ (last
visited Mar. 9, 2006).
53 The Belmont Report, supra note 49.
54 Id.
55 The commissioned papers on this topic include a paper by a physician who
explicitly addressed innovative surgery, and a law professor who explored the legal
implications of the research-practice distinction. See Sabiston, supra note 35; John
Robertson, Legal Implications of the Boundaries Between Biomedical Research In-
volving Human Subjects and the Accepted or Routine Practice of Medicine, in NAT'L
COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX II, 16-1 (1979).
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lines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (The Belmont
Report).56
The Belmont Report succinctly explains that the critical distinc-
tion between research and therapeutic practice rests on identification
of the intended beneficiary of the procedure. The Belmont Report de-
fined "practice" as "interventions that are designed solely to enhance
the well-being of an individual patient or client and that have a rea-
sonable expectation of success. The purpose ... is to provide diagno-
sis, preventive treatment or therapy to particular individuals." 57 "Re-
search" on the other hand, "designates an activity designed to test an
[sic] hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to de-
velop or contribute to generalizable knowledge . . . ." and is "usually
described in a formal protocol that sets forth an objective and a set of
procedures designed to reach that objective. 58 The Belmont Report
does acknowledge that innovative practices have attributes of both
practice and research. It provides some direction on the characteriza-
tion of innovation as research or practice: "When a clinician departs in
a significant way from standard or accepted practice, the innovation
does not, in and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a procedure
is ... new, untested or different, does not automatically place it in the
category of research... ,59 At the same time, the National Commis-
sion made clear that any evaluation of the efficacy and safety of a
therapeutic intervention generally falls within the realm of research
and should prompt human subjects protection review.6 °
Thus, from a bioethics perspective, 61 the fact that a surgical inter-
vention is innovative does not immediately require its classification as
research; in such a case the intended benefit from the intervention will
accrue to the individual patient, but there exists the potential for bene-
fit to future patients based on an accumulation of generalizeable
knowledge.62 For example, a surgeon's decision to perform a novel
56 The Belmont Report, supra note 49.
57 Id.
58 id.
59 Id. at Part A (emphasis added).
60 Id.
Research and practice may be carried on together when research is designed
to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy. This need not cause any
confusion regarding whether or not the activity requires review; the general
rule is that if there is any element of research in an activity, that activity
should undergo review for the protection of human subjects.
Id.
61 For a detailed examination of ethical issues in surgical innovation, see
generally Frader & Caniano, supra note 11.
62 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 942.
HEAL TH MATRIX
combination of a less-invasive surgical procedure (e.g., laparoscopy)
for removal or repair of an organ (e.g., colon, gall bladder) may be
intended to benefit the individual patient undergoing the procedure,
but repeated uses of the procedure may also result in knowledge that
can be generalized to future patients (e.g., numerous performances of
the innovation revealing risks and benefits of the surgical approach,
such as injuries to surrounding tissue or organs or quicker recovery
rates).63 In the area of innovation, as indicated above, a "significant
departure" from standard practice does not automatically trigger re-
search requirements. Indeed, The Belmont Report ultimately recom-
mends that only "radically new procedures" should prompt formal
evaluations of safety and efficacy as early as possible: once such a
procedure is incorporated into a formal research protocol, it is classi-
fied as research and subject to all of its attendant human subjects pro-
tections.64 The report suggests that medical practice committees be
responsible for triggering such a research review requirement.
65
Unlike many of the other influential recommendations of the National
Commission related to research that were incorporated into federal
regulations, this explicit classification and limited recommendation
related to the ethical treatment of innovative practices was never
promulgated as federal policy.
66
Ultimately, in the absence of explicit guidance that would aid in
deciding whether an innovation is research or practice, decision-
making responsibility falls to the individual surgeon.67 That decision
may be influenced by departmental or peer practices, but it is also set
within a culture of deference to surgeon decision-making and a culture
that highly values those who innovate.
63 See id.
64 The Belmont Report, supra note 49, at Part A.
65 id.
66 Strasberg and Ludbrook suggest three criteria for identifying "significant
innovation" which would trigger "a patient protection process" for that procedure: (1)
"the need for retraining and recredentialling [sic] of physicians in order to be allowed
to perform a new procedure"; (2) "[the innovation] provides diagnosis or treatment
for a condition for which none previously existed"; and (3) "the innovation, though
directed toward improving the health of a sick individual, would also place at risk a
healthy individual who receives no direct [physical health] benefit." Strasberg &
Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 943-44.
67 Curtis E. Margo, When Is Surgery Research? Towards an Operational
Definition of Human Research, 27 J. MED. ETHics 40, 41 (2001) ("[Tlhe responsibil-
ity for judging when a new or novel clinical practice becomes research rests solely
with the individual surgeon.").
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B. Surgical Culture and Context
Surgeons, as well as patients, place a high value on innovation
and creativity. 68 Standardization is viewed as a negative quality, one
that limits innovation and the surgeon's ability to meet the needs of
the patient.69 History has treated risk-taking in surgery favorably, e.g.,
the highly esteemed surgeon Francis Moore's decisions to test his
hypotheses, even if "dangerous or unproved,, 70 on patients who were
dying from standard treatments have been credited with advancing
surgery in numerous specialty areas and saving "tens of thousands of
lives a year.",7' Patients, some of whom are desperate because of their
illness or condition,72 seek out surgeons who are on the "cutting edge"
of knowledge 73 and skill within their specialty area and the "latest and
68 See, e.g., Ward, supra note 1, at 92.
[P]lastic surgeons are not renowned for dedication to meticulously planned
and monitored research whether it be based on animal work or the more so-
phisticated style of human research in the form of RCTs. Research is more
likely to be a chore undertaken to add a glitter to curricula vitae and to ap-
plications to higher posts .... There are, of course, notable exceptions in
plastic surgery who have not only made major contributions to the specialty
in the course of their training but continue to lead the way in research. The
rest of us, having achieved our goal, now settle down to earn a living and
indulge in what we all wanted to do in the first place-innovate.
Id. See also PETER. D. JACOBSON, MEDICAL LIABILITY AND THE CULTURE OF
TECHNOLOGY 2 (2004), http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/med-mal_092204.pdf
("American medicine thrives on the inexhaustible demand for high-technology medi-
cal interventions: a 'culture of technology.' Americans prize continued advances in
technology and widespread availability of those innovations.").
9 Yusuf N. Silk et al., A New Technique for Decompression of the Biliary
Tract, 169 SURGERY GYNECOLOGY OBSTETRICS 547, 548 (1989) ("By avoiding the
trap of standard procedures and retaining the ability to innovate, a good surgeon will
be able to work out a satisfactory solution for a difficult problem for the ultimate
betterment of the patient and self."); Gates, supra note 25, at 1353.
70 Atul Gawande, Desperate Measures, NEW YORKER, May 5, 2003, at 70,
78.
71 Id. at 73. For a discussion of what scholars Fox and Swazey have termed
"the courage to fail ethos" in the evolution of organ transplantation, see RENEE C. Fox
& JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS AND DIALYSIS 87-107 (2d ed. 1978).
72 Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 48, at 49; Nancy M. P. King & Gail Hen-
derson, Treatments of Last Resort: Informed Consent and the Diffusion of New Tech-
nology, 42 MERCER L. REv. 1007, 1007 (1991); Brower, supra note 26, at 340 ("Sur-
geons in the USA are still often characterized, not entirely negatively, as 'cowboys'-
individuals who function autonomously, with a good deal of power, and who are
subject to few controls.").
73 Gates, supra note 25, at 1353. See also JACOBSON, supra note 68 (discuss-
ing the culture of technology in the United States).
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greatest" surgical innovations for their conditions.74 Patient demand
"puts pressure on [surgeons] to adopt the latest technology," 75 and the
news media play a role in stimulating consumer demand in high pro-
file coverage of innovation.76 Professional organizations reward inno-
vation: journals dedicate sections to reports on new techniques, annual
meetings highlight innovations, and innovators receive awards.77
Medical students choosing surgery are told that innovation and crea-
tivity are sought-after qualities.78 Marketing materials from surgical
institutions and clinics routinely reference "innovation. 79 Physicians
and surgeons are keen to adopt the latest innovations. Factors that
influence such adoption include reimbursement, quality of care, pa-
tient preferences, and professional competition. 80 Whether an innova-
tive surgical procedure should be treated as research or standard
medical practice is further complicated by traditional notions of pro-
fessional autonomy and the fact that "[s]urgeons tend to view them-
selves as artists rather than scientists, custom-tailoring a treatment for
a patient's ailment.",8' All of the characteristics described shape the
74 Gates, supra note 25, at 1353 ("Patients really want the 'latest and great-
est,' i.e., the incremental improvements that result from intuitive innovation ..... );
JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 58, 61 ("Americans expect, indeed demand ... contin-
ued innovation.... Patients often want... the most cutting-edge surgical procedure
when they fall ill .. "). See also RICHARD A. DEYO & DONALD L. PATRICK, HOPE OR
HYPE: THE OBSESSION WITH MEDICAL ADVANCES AND THE HIGH COST OF FALSE
PROMISES (2005).
75 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 61.
76 King, supra note 42, at 575.
77 See generally Am. Coll. of Surgeons, http://www.facs.org/ (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006).
78 Am. Coll. of Surgeons, So You Want to Be a Surgeon: Surgical Traits,
http://www.facs.org/residencysearch/traits/traits.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
The surgical culture is one of continuous improvement.... As surgeons, we
are able to test our hypotheses and see rapid, graphic results from our work.
... The field of surgery needs a rich variety of motivated medical students
to enter surgical training to continue this good work, as well as innovate and
explore new directions.
Id.
79 See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, Center for Surgical Innovation,
http://surgery.uc.edu/csi/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); Stanford Univ., Sur-
gical Innovation Program, http://surgery.stanford.edu/innovation/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2006); Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., Urology - Research and Innovation,
http://www.stronghealth.com/services/urology/research/index.cfin (Apr. 17, 2006).
80 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 62 ("Even when the overall clinical benefits
are marginal and the incremental cost substantial, physicians will opt for new tech-
nology if there is a perceived advantage in patient comfort or safety.") (citation omit-
ted).
81 BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 291 (2d ed. 2000).
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debate about the adequacy of the current policy stance towards surgi-
cal innovation.
A potentially significant financial influence on judgments about
the appropriate characterization of innovation is the availability of
insurance reimbursement. Insurers assess reimbursement requests
according to the patient's benefits contract, basing their final decisions
on determinations of medical necessity in light of the individual pa-
tient's medical needs and treatment alternatives.82 Insurers and others
view reimbursement decisions as "validat[ion] that a technology is
standard treatment and efficacious. 83 Experimental or investigational
therapies are typically excluded from coverage as their clinical effec-
tiveness is unknown.84
An insurer would not undertake a scientific review and evaluation
for a surgical procedure that is well established with known risks and
benefits.85 If the insurer considered the basic objective of a procedure
to remain the same, it is unlikely that a variation in surgical technique
would prompt a scientific evaluation for clinical efficacy.86 For
example, one major insurer reported that it did not conduct a formal
evaluation of laparoscopic cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) or
hysterectomy (removal of the uterus) because, while the surgical
approach was novel (using the laparoscope for organ removal), the
procedures themselves (organ removal) had known risks and
82 Susan Gleeson, Paying for Innovations in Surgery, BULL. AM. C.
SURGEONS, Apr. 1996, at 10, 11. Even before medical necessity determinations are
made in a particular case, innovations involving new technology have likely under-
gone a scientific review and evaluation process for clinical efficacy, i.e., whether the
new technology improves net health outcomes. Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, for
example, are reported to rely on the findings of a scientific review process, which
include the assessment of the clinical efficacy of the technology according to five
scientific criteria designed to elicit:
[W]hether the technology in question improves net health outcomes.... : 1.
The technology must have final approval from the appropriate government
regulatory bodies. Although surgical procedures are not subject to FDA re-
view, devices or pharmaceutical agents that are employed in surgical proce-
dures would require final FDA approval. 2. The scientific evidence must
permit conclusion concerning the effect of the technology on health out-
comes. 3. The technology must improve the net health outcome. 4. The
technology must be as beneficial as any established alternatives. 5. The im-
provement must be attainable outside the investigational settings....
Id. at 11. The plan may also consider the cost-effectiveness of a procedure in their
final decision.
83 Id. at 12.
4 id
85 Id.
86 id.
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benefits.87 However, a new surgical procedure or technique presenting
substantially new or different benefits and risks would undergo such a
review, e.g., transplants of certain organs. 88 The financial incentives to
characterize innovation as practice rather than research are strong. If
the surgeon explicitly characterizes an innovation as experimental,
insurers are in good standing to deny coverage, with financial
ramifications for the institution, surgeon, and the patient.
C. Development and Diffusion of Surgical Innovations
Debates surround claims about the distinctive characteristics of
surgery and surgical innovation, in particular, during the process of
development and diffusion into standard surgical practice. The proc-
ess of development and introduction of new surgical techniques var-
ies; there appear to be no standard pathways to introduce a surgical
innovation into practice. The formal, systematic, highly regulated
environment surrounding the testing of new drugs for safety and effi-
cacy before they are ever prescribed to patients stands in stark contrast
to the highly unregulated environment and variable approaches to
establishing safety and efficacy in surgical innovation. 89 Drugs and
medical devices must go through an intensely scrutinized federal
regulatory process that requires testing for safety and efficacy in ani-
mals and humans before pharmaceutical and device manufacturers can
receive federal approval to market their products for use in patients. 90
87 Id. (discussing Blue Cross/Blue Shield's approach to coverage decisions
related to innovative surgery).
88 "For example, [the Blue Cross/Blue Shield scientific review and evalua-
tion process] has assessed major organ transplants and continues to reassess those that
have not met the [scientific] criteria, including small bowel transplants and pancreas-
only transplants." Id. at 12. See also Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research
and Experimental Therapies: Payment Due, but from Whom?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 441 (2000) (discussing the challenges and the publicity related to reim-
bursement of the clinical efficacy of high dose chemotherapy with bone marrow
transplant (known as HDC/ABMT) for the treatment of breast cancer); Gleeson,
supra note 82, at 13.
89 Commentators frequently begin their critique or defense of the current
treatment of surgical innovation by contrasting it with the highly regulated area of
medical drugs and devices. See, e.g., Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28; Casler, supra
note 29, at 675; Spodick, supra note 20, at 36; Jack W. Love, Drugs and Operations:
Some Important Differences, 232 JAMA 37, 37 (1975). For a more detailed examina-
tion of the Food and Drug Administration review and approval process see Ctr. for
Drug Evaluation & Research, Food &Drug Admin., From Test Tube to Patient: Im-
proving Health through Human Drugs (1999), http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/
whatwedo/testtube-full.pdf.
90 See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin., The New Drug Development Process:
Steps from Test Tube to New Drug Application Review, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
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The evaluation of drug efficacy typically includes, inter alia, a ran-
domized controlled trial (RCT) in order to minimize the potential for
investigator bias, evaluate results based on statistical significance, and
avoid inaccurate retrospective assessment of results. 91 This process
involves the comparison of outcomes resulting from the random allo-
cation of the new treatment and the standard treatment among human
subjects.92 The regulatory process includes oversight and implementa-
tion of human subjects protections, including prior review by an insti-
tutional review board and specific informed consent.
93
The process of introduction, development, refinement, and diffu-
sion of surgical innovations can be more "haphazard. ' '94 It may or may
not have included prior animal testing, formal protocols reflecting
experimental design, prior independent or peer review, or systematic
collection and evaluation of follow-up data.95 Indeed, the surgical
literature reflects questions and debate over the benefits to the patient
and future patients of RCTs, approaches that are considered to be the
gold standard methodology in other areas of medicine for establishing
clinical safety and efficacy.96 In practice, a surgeon may even try out
or modify a surgical technique based on anecdotal case reports dis-
cussed in meetings or in professional journals, and may do so without
institutional or peer oversight or consultation.97 In addition, profes-
handbook/develop.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
91 For a detailed discussion of the randomized controlled trial, see LEVINE,
supra note 43, at 185-212.
92 Id. at 185-89. Where there is no standard treatment available, the compari-
son groul3 receives no treatment. Id. at 185-90.
FDA Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2005).
94 Editorial, supra note 22 (citing E.A. Shinebourne, Ethics of Innovative
Cardiac Surgery, 52 BRIT. HEART J. 597 (1984)).
95 See Bunker et al., supra note 5. See also Dossetor, supra note 4, at 966
(from a transplant surgeon's perspective, opining that there are "at least six routes of
endeavour by which new modes of therapy become part of the body of established
medical treatments": (1) quackery, (2) innovative treatment, (3) inadequate uncon-
trolled clinical trials, (4) break-throughs, (5) the obvious, now become feasible, and
(6) controlled (randomized) clinical trials.); Ward, supra note 1, at 91 (describing
three phases of clinical research in surgery: (1) "anecdotal case report, providing little
more than serendipitous clinical impressions ... [with] little place in the context of
proper evaluation"; (2) "case and case series without controls, prone to selection bias
and suspect and false conclusions which can be as high as 50 [percent];" (3) "prospec-
tive randomized control trial (RCT)").
96 See, e.g., G. Gillett, Ethics of Surgical Innovation, 88 BRT. J. SURGERY
897, 897 (2001); King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1015-19; Spodick, supra note
20, at 36.
97 See Ward, supra note 1, at 92.
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sional journals report cases and case series without controls, whose
results are open to claims of experimental biases.
98
The difference in regulatory treatment can be attributed in part to
history. Stringent food and drug laws were shaped by congressional
reactions to scandals and negligence that emerged from the 1900s
on.99 Surgery, on the other hand, was often viewed as a last-resort
measure and experienced no equivalent public scandals.' 00 Other
attempts to distinguish rigorous assessments of drugs and medical
devices from surgical innovation highlight claims about the distinctive
characteristics of surgery that may independently affect patient
outcomes regardless of a patient's presentation of a disease or
condition. Skill can vary among surgeons; two surgeons performing
the same procedure under the same conditions on similarly situated
patients can have different outcomes.10' Also, the success rates and
morbidity and mortality rates of an individual surgeon are expected to
improve over time with increased experience with the procedure.
10 2
This so-called "learning curve" applies to well-established and proven
procedures, as well as innovative procedures. 10 3 The skill of a surgical
98 See id; Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 48, at 49 ("The majority of surgi-
cal publications involve interventional case reports that consist of a series of patients;
outcome measures are usually clinical parameters that are obtained during routine
clinical follow-up, without any type of formal written protocol.").
99 King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1015 (describing the harms prompt-
ing Congressional legislation in the 1930s from the drug elixir sulfanilamide that
killed 107 people and in the 1960s from birth defects arising from the use of the drug
thalidomide in pregnant women).
1OO Id. at 1019. Fox and Swazey describe efforts at professional monitoring
through voluntary suspension of an experimental technique, using the example of
heart transplants:
A clinical moratorium is the suspension of the use of a still experimental
procedure on patients, which may last for weeks, months, or years. Morato-
riums have occurred repeatedly in the history of therapeutic innovations.
Typically, a moratorium takes place when the uncertainties and risk of a
new treatment become starkly apparent and the patient mortality rate seems
unbearable or unjustifiable. Pressure for a moratorium can come from phy-
sician-investigators' own reactions to the situation, from their colleagues,
from the institution in which they work, or from patients and their families.
Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 71, at 108.
101 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 22 ("What is established and successful in a
specialist unit may be hazardous and experimental when introduced elsewhere by the
well-meaning but inexperienced."); Love, supra note 89, at 37 ("Poor results with a
new surgical procedure may indicate that the procedure is a bad one, or it may indi-
cate that it was not well performed").
102 "In general, a competent surgeon will do a better job the 100th time than
the first time he performs a given operation." Love, supra note 89, at 37.
103 Id. at 38. See also ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES
ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 25-31 (2002).
[Vol. 16:351
2006] LIABILITY, REGULATION& POLICYIN SURGICAL INNOVATION 369
team (e.g., the surgeon(s), nurses, anesthesiologists, and others) and
their experience working together may also influence outcomes from
a particular procedure.'°4
Comparatively, it is claimed that drugs may be prescribed by phy-
sicians or developed in controlled clinical trials without reference to
variable physician skill.'15 Also, it is claimed that surgical techniques
undergo rapid evolution and refinement, a process of trial and error
that cannot be accomplished by adherence to an inflexible protocol.1
0 6
Indeed, it has been suggested that the randomized study can be ren-
dered obsolete by advances in surgical technology. 0 7 In contrast, it is
argued that drug studies assess an unchanging chemical entity.0 8
These qualities of innovative surgery have been cited by some as fac-
tors that should distinguish it from other areas that require more stan-
dardized, rigorous testing before introduction into patients.
One prominent surgeon has highlighted the lack of financial sup-
port for surgical trials, in comparison to drug trials, as one reason that
surgeons have "lagged behind" other medical disciplines in conduct-
ing clinical trials, further noting that many surgeons lack the appropri-
ate training and experience to conduct clinical trials. 0 9
The previous discussion is not intended to suggest that surgeons
and others do not believe that surgical techniques should not be evalu-
ated and compared to standard treatments. The American College of
Surgeons, for example, issued a 1995 opinion that stressed the impor-
tance of evaluation and comparison of new surgical technologies
against existing and proven technologies." l0 And, a former president
104 See, e.g., Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 71, at 338-39; GAWANDE, supra note
103, at 25-31. See generally M. Leonard et al., The Human Factor: The Critical Im-
portance of Effective Teamwork and Communication in Providing Safe Care, 13
QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 85 (2004).
105 Love, supra note 89, at 38. But see Robert J. Levine, The Boundaries
Between Biomedical or Behavioral Research and the Accepted and Routine Practice
of Medicine, in NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX
I, 1-1 (1979) ("[It should be noted that personal skills and experience greatly influ-
ence the outcome of the use of drugs.... [T]hus, for example, the use of methotrexate
by an experienced oncologist may yield salutary effects with minimal risk while its
use by many other physicians may be deadly.").
106 See Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 221.
107 Bonchek, supra note 2, at 44.
108 Id.
109 R. Scott Jones, Requiem and Renewal, 240 ANNALS OF SURGERY 395, 401-
04 (2004).
110 Editorial, Statement on Issues to Be Considered Before New Surgical
Technology Is Applied to the Care of Patients, 80 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 46 (1995).
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of the American College of Surgeons has publicly stressed the impor-
tance of moving towards a system that acknowledges the value of
evidence-based practice and outcomes assessment."' Also, some have
advocated for the consideration of RCTs, and cases in the surgical
literature have documented specific instances where retrospective
review indicated that patient outcomes would have been improved
with earlier use of RCTs."12 What is at issue is how such an evaluation
and comparison should be conducted and overseen in light of the fact
that decisions on the appropriate methodology for assessing the safety
and efficacy of a particular innovation ultimately are vested in the
individual surgeon.
13
II. MEDICAL PRACTICE OR HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH? THE CHOICE OF LEGAL PATHWAY
The law recognizes that a physician must adapt treatments, in-
cluding surgical approaches, to the diverse presentations and varying
needs of individual patients. At the same time, the law imposes condi-
tions and limits on deviations from standard medical and surgical
practices. Surgical innovations will follow one of two established,
alternative legal pathways described herein as (1) the medical practice
pathway (The Practice Pathway), which allows for retrospective re-
dress of patient injury through tort liability;" 4 or (2) the human sub-
See also Gruen et al., supra note 17, at 607 (stating the stance of the American Col-
lege of Surgeons Task Force on Professionalism: "We have a professional responsi-
bility to ensure that our interventions are more effective than alternatives and, for this
reason, outcomes-based research must be supported.").
11 Jones, supra note 109, at 401.
112 E.g., shunt surgery for portal hypertension. Bunker et al., supra note 5, at
938 (advocating clinical surveillance as well as RCTs). King and Henderson describe
the first time a surgical procedure underwent a controlled comparison:
Internal mammary artery ligation was a simple, safe and easily applicable
procedure-requiring only local anesthesia-first used in 1939 to reduce
angina related to coronary artery disease. It was widely employed between
1953 and 1958, at which time reports began to emerge questioning its effi-
cacy. In 1959 two studies were carried out on patients with angina, ran-
domly assigning patients to either a treatment group or a group that received
a sham operation. The results demonstrated conclusively the existence of a
placebo effect of surgery and established the need for controlled studies to
evaluate surgical and medical procedures.
King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1020 (footnotes omitted).
113 Margo, supra note 67, at 41 (quoting Gary B. Ellis, former head of the
government oversight agency for human subject's protection: "'... the process of
protecting human study subjects essentially begins with a process of prospective self
referral by investigators of themselves and their research to IRBs..."' ).
114 Other potential but less common bases for legal action in the practice
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jects research pathway (The Research Pathway), which involves pro-
spective review and oversight and also allows for retrospective redress
of injury through federal sanctions and tort liability.
As will be discussed herein, innovative surgery does not fit com-
fortably in either the Practice Pathway or the Research Pathway. The
Practice Pathway views innovations retrospectively through the lens
of malpractice,1 15 examining and judging deviations from standards of
care that are generally accepted by the medical community. Innova-
tive surgery is by definition on the cutting edge of accepted practice
and thus challenges this understanding. Likewise, the federal regula-
tions governing human subjects research and the testing of medical
drugs and devices that require prospective review of research proto-
cols were not explicitly designed to regulate innovative surgeries. For
example, future patients are the intended beneficiaries of research, but
one could argue that innovative surgery is research based on an "N of
One,"' 16 providing primary benefit to the individual patient and then a
possible secondary benefit to future patients depending on the out-
come in one patient.
The pathway followed affects the legal analysis and has implica-
tions for judicial decision-making. It affects the liability exposure of
the surgeon and the institution where the surgery is conducted and the
potential sanctions applied to the surgeon and/or the affiliated institu-
tion. It also affects the legal rights of the patient, including the right to
consent to experimental procedures and a patient's ability to seek re-
imbursement of medical expenses.' 1
7
Since the pathway selected may have significant implications for
surgeons and their affiliated institutions and patients, how is that
pathway selected? At what point does an innovative surgical approach
become more than just individualized patient care and worthy of com-
pathway include: express promise, battery, disciplinary action, review of institutional
privileges and certificates, peer review, and constitutional claims. Those other bases
of legal action are beyond the scope of this article.
115 The use of the term "malpractice" should not be construed to mean that
practices that are not subject to prospective review constitute a form of malpractice.
Indeed, the practice pathway is only prompted when a patient alleges injury resulting
from the surgery, and the plaintiffmay ultimately fail in his allegation.
116 See, e.g., King, supra note 42, at 577 (citing Jerome Groupman, Dr. Fair's
Tumor, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 1998, at 78). For an argument that n-of-1 trials do not
need regulatory approval, see, e.g., Les Erwig et al., Ethics of n-of-i Trials, 345 LAN-
CET 469 (1995).
117 For discussion of reimbursement implications of research classification,
see supra Part I.B. See generally King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1024 (describ-
ing medicine as a "dynamic discipline, whose every encounter has been described as a
clinical trial, an experiment of one.") (footnote omitted).
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parative evaluation or even the surgical equivalent of the clinical trial,
the gold standard of research? Previous parts of this article have high-
lighted some of the policy issues and challenges in determining
whether an innovative surgical approach constitutes research.'1 8 An
examination of the legal considerations follows, focusing particularly
on tort liability and prospective regulation as moderators balancing
between medical progress and protection of the rights and welfare of
patients.
From a legal perspective, surgical innovation was historically ei-
ther treated as malpractice derived from a surgeon's harmful experi-
mentation or as a decision of medical judgment exercised as a sur-
geon's right.' 9 Dating back to at least 1871, the courts expressed a
willingness to defer to the judgment of a surgeon where no established
mode of treatment existed for the condition or injury. 20 In other cir-
cumstances, however, the legal risk associated with surgical innova-
tions was placed squarely on the surgeon and was characterized as
dangerous experimentation and a deviation from the standard of
care. 12' As the New York court in Carpenter v. Blake stated:
If the case is a new one, the patient must trust to the skill and
experience of the surgeon he calls; so must he if the injury or
the disease is attended with injury to other parts, or the dis-
eases have developed themselves, for which there is no estab-
lished mode of treatment. But when the case is one as to
which a system of treatment has been followed for a long
time, there should be no departure from it, unless the surgeon
who does it is prepared to take the risk of establishing by his
success, the propriety and safety of his experiment. 1
22
i18 See supra Part I.A.
"9 For a detailed examination of the historical relationship between medical
innovation generally and malpractice litigation, see Kenneth A. De Ville, Medical
Malpractice in Twentieth Century United States: The Interaction of Technology, Law
and Culture, 14 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 197 (1998).
120 Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871).
.21 Id. (defendant physician claimed that he used his best judgment in treat-
ment of dislocated elbow). See also Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 863 (K.B.
1767) (innovation viewed negatively as experimentation where surgeon and apothe-
cary re-broke plaintiff's leg and used metal frame during healing to lengthen it "con-
trary to the known rule and usage of surgeons.").
122 Carpenter, 60 Barb. at 523-24. The court continued:
The rule protects the community against reckless experiments, while it ad-
mits the adoption of new remedies and modes of treatment only when their
benefits have been demonstrated, or when, from the necessity of the case,
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The context of these decisions made clear that judicial concern
was focused on reigning in fraudulent practices of medicine, i.e.,
quackery, and protecting its victims by implementing "standards of
strict liability for deviations from accepted practice."1 23 As King and
Henderson have documented, this notion of strict liability has eased
considerably over time.124 Judicial acknowledgement of the impor-
tance of the physician's best medical judgment in the advancement of
medical science emerged in the 1930s, i.e., that some deviation from
the standard of care might be deemed acceptable and even important
in order to allow medicine to progress.1 25 In the 1935 case Fortner v.
Koch,126 a Michigan court appears to ease the negative treatment of
novel treatments, permitting some departures from the standard of
care that were considered to be therapeutically beneficial for the pa-
tient127 and requiring the consent of the patient. 28 This standard thus
permitted some innovation even where standard treatments were
available. It also evidenced an early adoption of some of the regula-
tory requirements that apply to human subjects research today, i.e.,
valid consent and an acceptable risk-benefit balance. 12
9
The legal pathway today is essentially dictated by the surgeon;' 30
the two pathways are ultimately defined by an affirmative decision to
subject the surgical innovation to the regulatory review and oversight
of the human subjects protection system associated with the Research
Pathway. Innovations that are not processed under this regulatory sys-
tem either escape prospective or retrospective review altogether (e.g.,
because the innovation did not result in injury or was undetected), or
the surgeon or physician must be left to the exercise of his own skill and
experience.
Id.
123 King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1024.
124 For a more detailed historical discussion of the evolution of experimenta-
tion and the law, see id. at 1024-27.
125 See, e.g., Brown v. Hughes, 30 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1934); Fortner v. Koch,
261 N.W. 762 (Mich. 1935).
126 Fortner, 261 N.E. at 762.
127 King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1026.
128 Fortner, 261 N.E. at 765.
We recognize the fact that, if the general practice of medicine and surgery is
to progress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried on;
but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and consent of the
patient or those responsible for him, and must not vary too radically from
the accepted method of procedure.
Id.; King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1027 (citing Fortner, 261 N.E. at 765).
129 King & Henderson, supra note 72, at 1027. For discussion of current regu-
lations see infra Part IV.A-C.
130 Margo, supra note 67, at 41.
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are judged under the state statutory and common law tort doctrines of
medical malpractice (the Practice Pathway). The surgeon's decision,
of course, is made within the context of his or her respective institu-
tion's organizational and legal culture.
Practically speaking, few surgeons appear to submit their innova-
tive surgical procedures to the review process of the federal regula-
tions. 131 Thus, relatively few innovative surgical procedures formally
receive prospective review and approval associated with the Research
Pathway that is envisioned by the federal regulations for human sub-
jects research. Such review and approval affords the opportunity to
prevent potential injury to patients. In contrast, the default pathway is
the Practice Pathway, which is prompted by patient injury.
Each pathway is examined below, beginning with the Practice
Pathway, and each concludes with an assessment of the pathway's
implications for the treatment of innovative surgery.
III. THE MEDICAL PRACTICE PATHWAY
Compared to other areas of medical practice, the conduct of sur-
gery is by its very nature a risk factor in the prediction of medical
malpractice claims. The number of surgical procedures conducted by
physicians has been shown to be a statistically significant factor re-
lated to malpractice claim frequency and award size. 132 One legal
131 Jones, supra note 109, at 401. No data have been collected that would
explicitly indicate the numbers of surgical innovations subjected to the IRB process.
Because the regulations are implemented at the level of the institution, only that par-
ticular institution would have any possibility of assessing how many surgical innova-
tions had been subjected to the IRB process. But there is no checkbox for surgical
innovation on IRB submission forms, and no requirement that such data be collected.
Further, because surgeons or departments self-identify, the IRB would not have an
independent way of identifying particular innovations that should have been for-
warded for review. Empirical research by Reitsma and Moreno on surgeon uncer-
tainty about the distinction between research and therapy and the applicability of
human subjects regulations supports the claim that few surgeons submit their innova-
tions to the Research Pathway. Surveys of surgeons indicate that surgeons disagree or
are uncertain about whether innovative surgical techniques fall within the realm of
acceptable variations of daily practice or are human subjects research warranting
prospective regulation and oversight. Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28. This is fur-
ther supported by another survey which reported surgeons' lack of familiarity with
human subjects regulations. Rutan et al., supra note 47.
132 Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 414-15 (1987) (Dan-
zon's study was designed to "assess the impact of tort reforms and other factors on
malpractice claim frequency and severity," using statistical methods to
analyze the average experience of physicians in different states, some with
and some without tort reforms, over the years 1975 through 1984. The unit
[Vol. 16:351
20061 LIABILITY, REGULATION & POLICY IN SURGICAL INNOVATION 375
commentator has opined that "unregulated dissemination of new tech-
nologies and techniques has resulted in a general propensity to stimu-
late malpractice liability litigation."' 33 Indeed, De Ville has described
the "ebb and flow" life cycle of malpractice suits growing out of new
technologies, and decreasing over time: 134
After a technological innovation first becomes a conventional
and widely used procedure, the profession does not fully real-
ize the degree of caution required to use it .... Through clini-
cal experience, the profession collectively discovers the types
of problems associated with a new procedure and institutes
precautions to deal with the newly discovered dangers.... As
these precautions are introduced, successes increase and
iatrogenic injuries decrease. As a result the intensity of the
suits associated with that procedure may abate. . . .In addi-
tion, physicians may institute mechanical precautions to deal
with inherent dangers that were not evident when the proce-
dure entered widespread use .... These precautions decrease
the number of untoward incidents and the resulting suits even
further.... Just as significantly, widespread and common use
of some procedures frequently moderate expectations, making
them more accurate. As the limits of the procedure become
more apparent through long-term use, both the profession,
through outcomes data and clinical experience, and layper-
sons, through informed consent, develop more realistic views
of the benefits and dangers of the procedure. As they do so,
failure, complications, and less than perfect results will be
less likely to incite dissatisfaction and lawsuits.
135
of analysis is not the individual physician or individual claim, but the aver-
age frequency of claims per 100 physicians and average severity per paid
claim in each state .... Most consistently significant was the number of
surgical procedures per capita, which is positively related to the frequency
of claims filed per physician. Claim severity is significantly higher in states
with a high ratio of surgical specialists, relative to medical specialists.
These variables may capture the general effect of more complex medical
practice, as well as the likelihood that surgical mishaps involve more seri-
ous errors and are easier to prove.
Id.
133 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 20. Other legal scholars have also explored
the relationship between medical innovation and malpractice liability. See generally
De Ville, supra note 119.
134 De Ville, supra note 119, at 204.
135 Id. at 204-05.
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The increasing complexity of innovations means that their suc-
cessful implementation requires greater surgical skill. 136 This com-
plexity also increases the likelihood of "knowledge-based, skill-based,
and attention-based mistakes,"' 137 e.g., that "momentary lapses of con-
centration" in the use of a new procedure can have significant conse-
quences for patients, even where adverse events are thought to be in-
frequent.138 This environment surrounding innovations thus raises the
prospect of potential litigation.
139
The Practice Pathway is only prompted when a patient alleges in-
jury resulting from the surgery. In the United States, legal actions for
injuries are generally based in tort law, the branch of the law that al-
lows injured persons to seek monetary compensation from those re-
sponsible for the injury. 140 Tort law is the province of state law, cre-
ated through state legislation and state judicial decisions, known as
the "common law."'14 1 Variations exist among the states, but state tort
rules are similar enough that generalized statements of liability can be
made for the purposes of this examination. 142
A. Overview of Medical Malpractice Law
Most medical malpractice actions are based in negligence, or
"conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."' 143 The plain-
tiff in these cases is the patient who is injured in the course of medical
practice. The patient's family may also bring a claim on his or her
behalf in the event of the patient's incompetency or death. 144 The de-
fendant is typically the physician who allegedly caused the injury, but
may also include the institution with which the physician is affili-
136 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 22.
137 De Ville, supra note 119, at 203.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 206 ("[Niew technologies.., are likely to contribute to an overall
increase in the number of medical malpractice cases in the system.").
140 See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1 (3d ed. 1998).
141 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 1-32 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing background and history of tort law).
142 For example, many states, through their courts and state legislatures have
adopted portions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1994) and the RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998), the American Law Institute's
synthesis of the major principles of contemporary tort law (ALl 1997).
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282.
144 Third parties may also be able to recover monetary damages for injury to a
patient caused by negligence. For example, a spouse or child may claim loss of con-
sortium, the legal term for the loss of the society and affection of the injured person.
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ated.145 A plaintiff may allege that the defendant institution is directly
liable for its own actions or vicariously liable for the actions of the
physician.
146
Negligence cannot be presumed merely by the existence of a pa-
tient's injury, but must meet particular legal requirements of proof. To
succeed in a negligence case, the plaintiff (in this case the patient)
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of four ele-
ments. 147 First, he or she must prove that the defendant had a legal
duty to the plaintiff.148 The duty owed in the medical malpractice con-
text can include any one of a number of obligations that health profes-
sionals or institutions incur upon entering into a professional relation-
ship with the patient. 149 It includes the duty to communicate certain
information to the patient before treating the patient.150 A duty may be
mandated or implied by statutes, regulations, or guidelines.' 5 ' A duty
may be shaped by whether the defendant reasonably could have fore-
seen the injury to the plaintiff. 52
Second, the existence of a duty will in turn create responsibilities
on the part of the defendant to exercise due care, and the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant breached the standard of care. 153 This ele-
ment is discussed in significant detail later in this part.
Third, the plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered a
compensable injury. In most negligence cases, only compensatory
damages 54 (to compensate the plaintiff for the actual harm suffered,
including pain and suffering) are awarded. In cases where the
145 MARK A. HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT
RELATIONSHIPS 447-48 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
146 Id. at 448.
147 KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 4.
148 DOUGLAS DANNER ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CHECKLISTS AND
DISCOVERY § 2:3 (Thomson/West 2004).
149 HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 80-85.
150 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the
principle of informed consent requires a physician to disclose information a reason-
able patient would wish to know in making treatment decisions); Truman v. Thomas,
611 P.2d 902, 906-07 (Cal. 1980) (patient must be apprised of risks of not undergoing
treatment, even if she has refused treatment).
151 See HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 81-85.
152 KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, at 393.
153 See, e.g., Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. 1994).
154 Compensatory damages include (1) economic damages, which are objec-
tively verifiable monetary losses, include items such as medical expenses (past, pre-
sent and future), lost wages, lost earning capacity, and burial costs, and (2) non-
economic damages, which are subjective non-monetary losses, include items such as
pain, suffering, and emotional distress. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 531-38 (1 1th ed. 2005).
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defendant's behavior was reckless or an extreme departure from the
standard of care, commonly known as gross negligence, some states
allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages as well. 155 Also, while it
is necessary that there be some injury in order to recover damages, the
injury need not necessarily be tangible. In some cases, for example,
patients have recovered damages for emotional distress or anxiety
caused by a fear of getting cancer.
Lastly, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's actions
caused the injury.156 Causation can be a difficult concept: the plaintiff
must show that "but for" the actions of the defendant the injury would
not have occurred. This is "cause in fact." But the plaintiff must also
establish legal cause, or proximate cause; the defendant is only re-
sponsible for the damages that are a foreseeable consequence of his or
her behavior. 5 7 It may be particularly challenging for a plaintiff to
prove that a defendant (instead of the underlying medical condition)
was the legal cause of the patient's death in cases where the patient's
condition initially presents itself as terminal or life-threatening, no
standard therapy exists, and the patient dies following a medical or
surgical intervention.1
5 8
In a medical malpractice action involving the use of an innovative
surgical procedure, an injured patient (the plaintiff) would allege,
within the framework described above, that the surgeon (the defen-
dant) breached, or rather failed to meet, the standard of care in the
selection of the surgical approach and/or performance of the sur-
gery.' 59 The patient might also, or only, again within the basic frame-
work described above, allege a failure of informed consent, i.e., that
the defendant failed to adequately inform the plaintiff regarding the
surgical procedure.' 6° The plaintiff will likely allege that the institu-
tion where the surgery was conducted is either directly or vicariously
liable.' 61 Each of these two applications of negligence is discussed
separately below.
155 KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 9 (punitive damages).
1 56 See, e.g., Locke, 446 N.W.2d at 789.
157 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999) ("[t]o succeed in a malprac-
tice claim, a plaintiff must also prove proximate cause").
158 HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 407.
159 See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992) (plaintiff sued doc-
tor alleging that injuries sustained were due to method utilized during surgery);
Locke, 446 N.W.2d at 786 (plaintiff sued surgeon for injuries sustained during surgi-
cal procedure).
160 See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992) (plaintiff
brought action against doctor alleging that he failed to inform her of risks and compli-
cations of the surgery).
161 See, e.g., Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 1010 n.16 (Ohio 1993).
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B. Breach of the Standard of Care
In a medical malpractice claim for surgical innovation based on a
breach of the standard of care, the plaintiff must prove through expert
testimony (which will be countered by testimony of expert witnesses
for the defense) that the surgeon failed to meet either of two aspects of
the standard of care: whether it was proper to do the innovative proce-
dure in the first place, and whether the chosen innovative procedure
was performed properly. A surgeon whose actions are consistent with
the standard of care will be shielded from liability for negligence,
regardless of the treatment's outcome (although the surgeon will of
course still incur the financial and emotional costs of defending
against such a claim). Innovative surgery, which by definition in-
volves novel procedures that have not been widely used, subjects the
surgeon (and potentially the institution where the surgery was per-
formed) to potential liability exposure because the novelty of the in-
novation by definition is essentially a deviation from the standard of
care.
The standard of care is determined by what the reasonable practi-
tioner would do in like circumstances. 162 The circumstances to be con-
sidered include, for example, the patient's health, the surgeon's exper-
tise, and the state of medical knowledge. The defendant-surgeon will
be found to have breached a duty if his or her behavior fell below the
standard of care. 63 Surgeons are generally required to exercise that
degree of knowledge or skill ordinarily exercised by practitioners
within their medical specialty. Most jurisdictions have moved from
basing the standard of care on practices within a specific community
(the locality rule) to a national standard for all physicians, or in this
case, surgeons within a given specialty.' 64
In general, medical standards of care emerge through a complex
interplay of professional leaders, journals, peer discussions, and meet-
ings.165 Over time, these separate professional sources may evolve
into clinical policies, and once generally accepted they become stan-
dard practice. 166 In medical malpractice litigation, the plaintiff and the
defendant hire members of the medical profession to serve as experts
who will testify as to the appropriate standard of care.
162 See, e.g., Pederson v. Durnouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (Wash. 1967).
163 KEETON ET AL., supra note 141, at 137 (standard of care).
164 See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient
by Medical Specialist as Determined by Local, "Like Community, "State, National, or
Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603 (1982).
165 See FuRROw ET AL., supra note 81, at 266.
'66 Id. at 266-67.
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As discussed supra, there is no standard pathway for the diffusion
of new surgical techniques. Without systematic evaluation and publi-
cation of the risks and benefits of a new approach, the reputation, per-
sonality, and efforts of the innovator to share the innovation with
peers may become very important influences on expert testimony and
the procedure's acceptance as the standard of care.
The defendant surgeon can avoid liability by effectively denying
any element of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 167 For example, the
defense may (1) assert that the patient's distinct or atypical anatomical
presentation made the surgery more difficult and that the plaintiff did
not meet the burden of proving proximate causation 68 or (2) argue
that the surgeon acted with reasonable care under the circumstances
where the patient's injury is established as a known complication in
the performance of the surgery that may occur without negligence.
169
Expert testimony is critical in establishing or responding to any such
defenses. Where testimony of a defense expert is able to support that
the surgeon's conduct was not negligent in direct contradiction to the
testimony of the plaintiff's experts, courts will likely conclude that the
plaintiffs burden of proof is not met, and find in favor of the
defendant. 170
One might assume that the first-time use of a surgical procedure
that results in patient injury (or even early adoption of a technique
with uncertain risks or undocumented benefits in comparison to the
standard approach) might be characterized as negligent experimenta-
tion and thus be easily characterized as an unacceptable deviation
from the standard of care. However, the law provides considerable
deference to a physician's medical judgment in individual cases and
acknowledges that physicians must tailor treatments to the individual
needs of their patients. Indeed, a deviation from the standard of care
may be legally justified by the surgeon's assertion of various addi-
tional defenses. One defense that may be available is the defense of
"therapeutic innovation" or "clinical innovation:"
167 See discussion supra Part III regarding elements of a medical malpractice
claim.
168 Phyllis M. Gillespie, Cause of Action Against a Physician for Laparo-
scopic Negligence Resulting in Injury or Death to a Patient, 18 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d
43, § 12 (2004).
169 See James Duff, Jr., Annotation, Malpractice: Surgeon's Liability for
Inadvertently Injuring Organ Other than that Intended to Be Operated on, 37 A.L.R.
3d 464, § 2 (1971) (referencing several cases that have discussed a surgeon's liability
for injuring another organ during surgery). See also Gillespie, supra note 168, § 11.
170 Duff, supra note 169, § 2 (citing as an example Roberts v. Wood, 206 F.
Supp 579 (Ala. 1962)).
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Therapeutic innovation has long been recognized as permissi-
ble to avoid serious consequences. The everyday practice of
medicine involves constant judgmental decisions by physi-
cians as they move from one patient to another in the con-
scious institution of procedures, special tests, trials and obser-
vations recognized generally by their profession as effective
in treating the patient or providing a diagnosis of a diseased
condition. Each patient presents a slightly different problem
to the doctor. A physician is presumed to have the knowledge
and skill necessary to use some innovation to fit the peculiar
circumstances of each case.
17
'
Decisions to innovate therefore may potentially be characterized
as physician "judgment" in favor of the defendant.172 However, a phy-
sician still runs the risk of being held liable if his or her therapeutic
preference is ultimately determined to fall outside the standard of
care. 
173
Case law supports that an innovative surgical approach may be
used for the first time with no other performance standard to serve as
a comparison, even with a bad outcome, at least under the following
circumstances: the patient is suffering from a life-threatening condi-
tion, no alternative therapies are available, and the patient understood
that the treatment was unproven and the risks unknown. A well-
known example is Karp v. Cooley,174 which was a medical malprac-
tice action against a chief surgeon and assistant surgeon following the
171 Brook v. St. John's Hickey Mem'l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. 1978) (a
radiologist was found not negligent in his selection of a child's calves to inject con-
trast medium, a site which differed from that recommended in the manufacturer's
directions and that resulted in injury to the child).
172 This judicial deference to physician judgment is consistent with the legal
treatment of what is commonly referred to as "off-label" uses of drugs and medical
devices. From a regulatory standpoint, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA
- the regulatory agency that oversees and approves drugs, biologics, and medical
devices in the United States) does not prohibit or discourage physicians from using
approved drugs and devices for unapproved purposes. This is because the FDA regu-
lates suppliers and not prescribers, and oversees and restricts marketing practices, not
the actual uses of the drugs or devices. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(f)(1)(B), 352(f), and 331(a-
c, g) (2001). Indeed, like surgical innovation, a novel use of a drug or device in an
off-label manner may creep into use without rigorous comparative studies and in
litigation be recognized as the standard of care even though the drug or device has not
been approved by the FDA for such use. Further examination of this issue is beyond
the scope of this article.
173 Edenfield v. Vahid, 621 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (surgeon's deci-
sion to use non-absorbable suture, instead of long term absorbable suture, fell below
applicable standard of care).
174 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974).
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first-ever use of a mechanical heart implant. In this case the mechani-
cal heart was implanted after the standard approach (ventriculoplasty)
was unsuccessful, and served as a temporary life-prolonging device
while waiting for a donor heart to become available for heart trans-
plant. The patient died thirty-two hours after transplant surgery. The
case was ultimately decided in favor of the defendant-surgeons. 17
5
The tort system also acknowledges that more than one medically
acceptable treatment alternative may be appropriate to address a pa-
tient's medical condition. It is unlikely that a physician will be held
liable for selecting one acceptable procedure over another, i.e., one
that is supported by a minority within the professional group. 17 6 Spe-
cifically, in some jurisdictions, a physician or surgeon is permitted to
prove through expert testimony that he or she used a method that was
accepted by at least a "respectable minority" of physicians or sur-
geons.177 To escape liability, of course, the selected procedure must
175 In Karp, the 5t' Circuit affirmed a district court holding that, inter alia, the
evidence did not warrant submission to the jury on issues of negligence in the per-
formance of the surgical procedure, negligence based on human experimentation, or
lack of informed consent with respect to the innovative mechanical heart implant. Id.
at 408.
176 Di Filippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 337 (Del. 1961); Miller v. Scholl, 594
S.W.2d 324, 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 381
S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (surgeon had the right to use best judgment in
selecting contrast solution used in half of all similar heart imaging procedures, which
was more toxic than the alternative and caused patient injury); Bellomy v. United
States, 888 F. Supp. 760, 765-66 (D. W. Va. 1995).
177 See, e.g., Velazquez v. Portadin, 751 A.2d 102, 107-10 (N.J. 2000) (stating
that a physician's professional conduct does not involve the exercise of medical
judgment in selecting among acceptable and medically reasonable courses of treat-
ment, but only implicates the exercise of reasonable care in the performance of a
medical procedure). See also Versteeg v. Mowery, 435 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash. 1967)
("'The testimony of other physicians that they would have followed a different course
of treatment than that followed by the defendant, or a disagreement of doctors of
equal skill and learning as to what the treatment should have been, does not establish
negligence' (quoting Richison v. Nunn, 340 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1959)). Similarly, the
Florida Supreme Court adopted the respectable minority defense in Baldor v. Rogers,
81 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1954) (holding that "[i]f the treatment used is approved by a
'respectable minority of the medical profession' that would relieve the defendant of
the charge of malpractice. The doctor is obligated only to use reasonable skill and he
fulfills his obligation if he uses methods approved by others of the profession who are
reasonably skilled."). Baldor has been cited positively by a long line of cases. See,
e.g., Campbell v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 207, 210 (Fla. 1971) (citing Baldor for
the proposition that "a disagreement among doctors of equal skill and learning as to
what the diagnosis and treatment should have been, does not establish negligence as a
matter of law"). The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that jury instructions allowing
the respectable minority defense were proper, concluding that "[s]o long as a respect-
able minority of physicians approve the disputed technique and so long as the defend-
ing doctor properly employed that technique, he has not fallen below the standard of
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also have been performed non-negligently. The respectable minority
defense thus allows for a certain amount of variation in clinical judg-
ment among respected modalities. Just how many physicians or sur-
geons qualify as a respectable minority? The number is not specified,
and jurisdictions vary in their standards. Most require that a respect-
able minority include "a considerable number of reputable and re-
spected physicians."178 Thus, a defendant will attempt to utilize this
defense by establishing that a respectable minority supports the prac-
tice in contention.
179
States that have rejected the respectable minority defense have
critiqued the standard, noting that the accepted standard of medical
practice cannot be ascertained by "counting how many physicians
follow a particular practice."' 180 These jurisdictions rely on a more
traditional evaluation of the standard of care, e.g., that the "mode or
form of treatment [must be one] which a reasonable and prudent
member of the medical profession would undertake under the same or
similar circumstances.''
If a specific medical or surgical approach, such as an innovative
surgical technique, has already been tried and discredited, then the
plaintiff will use expert testimony to prove that the defendant failed to
comply with the standard of care. 182 It is less clear whether a discred-
ited innovation breaches the standard of care if the surgeon continues
modifying it in an attempt to improve it.
The leeway afforded surgeons in exercising their professional
judgment and the limits afforded by the application of the standard of
care were explored in a 1977 case involving a novel and controversial
surgical treatment for emphysema.18 3 The surgeon first used the tech-
care." Borija v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp. Inc., 727 P.2d 355, 357-58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
Borja was cited positively on this point in Nunsuch v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1027, 1034 (D. Ariz. 2001). The respectable minority defense developed as early as
1915, and was well-established by the 1920s and 1930s. See, e.g., Dahl v. Wagner,
151 P. 1079, 1079 (Wash. 1915); Ennis v. Banks, 164 P. 58, 60 (Wash. 1917); Dish-
man v. N. Pac. Beneficial Ass'n, 164 P. 943, 950 (Wash. 1917); Swanson v. Hood,
170 P. 135, 137 (Wash. 1918); Reeves v. Wilson, 177 P. 825, 826 (Wash. 1919);
Schumaker v. Murray Hosp., 193 P. 397, 403 (Mont. 1920); Gerarty v. Kaufman, 162
A. 33, 36 (Conn. 1932); Sims v. Weeks, 45 P.2d 350, 354-5 (Cal. 1935).
178 See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992).
179 In fact, once proven, a judge may direct a verdict in favor of the defendant,
deciding in favor of the defendant and removing the opportunity for a jury to make
the determination.
180 State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194-95
(Colo. 1994).
181 Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
182 15 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 711, § 9 (2005) [hereinafter Proof of Facts].
' Hood, 554 S.W.2d at 166 (the technique involved removal of a carotid
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nique in 1962, and in the ensuing four years had performed it over a
thousand times. 184 He claimed that 85 percent of his patients were
helped by the surgery, 185 while plaintiffs experts condemned the pro-
cedure.186 Indeed, one expert for the plaintiff stated that the procedure
was developed "without much scientific rationale, tried by a number
of physicians worldwide; found ineffectual and abandoned.' 87 In
arriving at the appropriate standard to be applied in this case, the Su-
preme Court of Texas stated as follows:
[M]ost courts have not attempted to articulate a distinction
among "experimental," "outmoded," "rejected," and "ac-
cepted" surgical procedures. Instead, the majority of courts
have attempted to draw a line between the reasonable and
prudent physician who, as a last resort, turns to an "experi-
mental" or a "rejected" treatment in the hope of assisting the
patient and the individual practitioner who attempts to beguile
his patient with false or distorted promises. These courts have
recognized, as we do, that physicians should be allowed to
exercise their professional judgment in selecting a mode or
form of treatment. Further, physicians should be allowed to
experiment in order that medical science can provide greater
benefits for humankind. 1
88
In general, it appears that courts will allow greater deviation from
accepted practice without finding negligence for more severe ill-
nesses.189 In addition, innovative therapies are less likely to be found
negligent where there is no effective standard therapy' 90 or the disease
is considered terminal with the use of standard therapy, as long as
there is a reasonable basis for a rational physician to try it, and as dis-
cussed below, the patient is informed of the innovative nature of the
surgery. 191 One legal commentator suggests that for terminal medical
body from the neck, while the accepted treatment involved drugs and machines to aid
breathing).V8 Id. at 162.
185 Id. at 167.
186 Id. at 160.
187 Id. at 163.
188 Id. at 165.
189 See Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1954) (cancer); Proof of Facts,
supra note 182, § 7 n.48.
190 See Proof of Facts, supra note 182, at § 7.
191 As early as 1954, courts found that there is "no clearcut issue whether [a
surgeon] committed malpractice when he used a certain method [for treatment of
terminal cancer], for no infallible cure has been discovered." See Proof of Facts,
supra note 182, § 1 (citing Baldor, 81 So. 2d at 658).
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conditions that do not have effective standard treatments, such as
some cancers, it might even be negligent not to attempt innovation in
order to save a patient's life.192 In contrast, at least one court has re-
jected a plaintiffs novel claim that the standard of care required that
the defendant surgeon innovate rather than apply the "textbook the-
ory" to the patient's condition. In Pernia v. Trail,193 the court ob-
served that plaintiffs expert apparently "suggest[ed] that [the sur-
geon] was using bad judgment in not going through with an experi-
mental horizontal incision.. . , as the patient lay on the operating ta-
ble."'' 94 The court rejected this attempt by plaintiff to turn the "clinical
innovation" defense on its head finding instead that the doctor "per-
formed the surgery in this case well above the standards required by
the law."' 195
C. Failure to Provide Adequate Informed Consent'
96
Under common law or by state statute, a physician has a duty to
obtain a patient's informed consent before providing medical treat-
ment. 197 One generally recognized exception to this duty is where the
urgency of the patient's medical condition does not permit the time
necessary to obtain the patient's informed consent (or that of his or
her designated representative). 198
A plaintiff may raise a claim based on the failure to provide in-
formed consent alone or concurrently with a claim that the defendant
192 See Proof of Facts, supra note 182, §7.
193 519 So. 2d231 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
194 Id. at 233.
19' Id. at 234.
196 For a comprehensive legal analysis of informed consent, including discus-
sion of informed consent and medical innovation, see generally Lars Noah, Informed
Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28
AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 377 n.82 (2002) (in addition to facing tort liability, failure to
provide adequate informed consent may result in disciplinary sanctions); Proof of
Facts, supra note 182.
1 See generally Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d
170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92
(N.Y. 1914). For a discussion of the evolution and ethical and legal underpinnings of
informed consent, see generally RuTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
'9' See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.54 (2001) (recognizing that
consent to emergency procedures is generally implied); Stafford v. La. State Univ.,
448 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (emergency exception applied in situation
where competent medical judgment would conclude that the patient was in a life
threatening situation, a person authorized to consent was not readily available, and
delay could reasonably have been expected to jeopardize the patient's life and health).
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failed to meet the standard of care.' 99 An informed consent claim can
succeed irrespective of whether the defendant deviated from the stan-
dard of care in performing the medical treatment.2 °0
In order to establish negligence for failure to provide informed
consent, generally a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1)
that the medical procedure carried a specific risk that was not dis-
closed, (2) that the physician violated the applicable standard of dis-
closure, (3) that the undisclosed risk materialized, and (4) that the
failure to disclose the information caused the patient's injury.20' The
physician's negligence thus lies in the inadequate disclosure itself, and
the damage claimed is derived from nondisclosure of risks incidental
to treatment that would have resulted in the patient's deciding against
the treatment.
The physician has a duty to communicate "material" informa-
tion.202 The courts have devised two different approaches to establish
the appropriate standard for. such disclosures. The physician-based or
professional practice standard, adopted in approximately half of the
states, requires expert testimony to establish what a reasonable practi-
tioner would have disclosed in a similar situation, in essence treating
the disclosure as a medical question.20 3 The patient-oriented standard
is becoming increasingly popular, and addresses criticisms that the
professional practice standard offered an overly favorable advantage
to physician-defendants. 204 The "reasonable patient" or objective pa-
tient standard allows the trier-of-fact (the judge or the jury, as appli-
cable) to determine whether a physician disclosed risks that a reason-
able person would find material, regardless of professional practice
standards.20 5 Only a few courts have applied a subjective patient-
199 See Hall et al., supra note 145, at 206 (claims for failure of informed con-
sent are rarely raised alone because of the limited damages that are generally recover-
able).
200 See id. at 223; Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 950 (Wash.
1999) (jury's finding that physician followed standard of care "did not preclude trier
of fact from finding liability under the informed consent statute").
201 HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 217.
202 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The scope
of the physician's communications to the patient ... must be measured by the pa-
tient's need, and that need is the information material to the decision"); Noah, supra
note 196, at 367 n.26 (citing Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir.
1978) ("holding that a surgeon did not need to disclose a 0.001% risk of permanent
loss of sensation in a small section of the plaintiffs face").
203 Noah, supra note 196, at 368; FURROW ET AL., supra note 81, at 267-68.
204 Noah, supra note 196, at 367 (the "'professional standard' came under
criticism for excessive paternalism and the effective immunity that it granted to de-
fendants in medical malpractice cases").
205 Id. at 368. The seminal case in this area is in fact a surgical case, Canter-
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oriented standard, focusing on the specific preferences of a particular
patient.2 °6 Expert testimony is still required when applying the patient
standard in order to characterize risks and alternative treatments, or to
establish that the physician should have been aware of the risk.207
In the consent process, at a minimum, the disclosure must include
the nature and purpose of the treatment or procedure, expected bene-
fits, foreseeable risks of treatment, reasonable alternatives, and fore-
seeable risks of forgoing treatment.2° Indeed, these elements of
proper disclosure have been litigated in informed consent actions in-
209
volving surgery. It is always necessary to prove that the undisclosed
risk actually materialized, and that the patient would not have chosen
to proceed with the procedure had he or she been informed of the risks
and nature of the procedure.210 Regardless of the materiality standard
applied, causation is a necessary element in an informed consent
claim. Most courts require proof that a reasonable patient would have
declined treatment had the physician disclosed the additional informa-
tion (i.e., applying an objective standard), while a few courts have
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. 1972) ("A risk is thus material when a rea-
sonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's posi-
tion, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy").
206 Noah, supra note 196, at 368 n.31 (citing Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d
1145 (Alaska 1993); Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lugebuhl
v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204 (Or.
2000)).
207 Id. at 368.
208 See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability
for Failure of Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or
Treatment, 38 A.L.R. 4th 900 (1985); W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Malpractice: Phy-
sician's Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79
A.L.R. 2d 1028 (1961).
209 See, e.g., Dawes v. Kinnett, 779 So. 2d 978, 984 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that physician failed to inform patient of material risks of shoulder surgery);
Goleman v. Orgler, 771 So. 2d 374 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (involving a patient who
was informed of particular risks associated with surgery while under the influence of
sedation, and holding that this failure to obtain valid consent supported a claim of
assault but not lack of informed consent); Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 331 (Pa.
1992) (holding that surgeons need not disclose all known information about a poten-
tial surgery to obtain informed consent, but are required to advise patient of those
material facts, risks, complications, and alternatives to surgery that a reasonable per-
son in the patient's position would consider significant in deciding whether to have
the operation).
210 See Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 958-59 (Wash. 1999) ("the
plaintiff must establish that 'a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances
would not have consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts").
See also FURROW ET AL., supra note 81, at 333.
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viewed causation from the perspective of the plaintiff-patient (i.e.,
applying a subjective standard).211
At least two areas of disclosure are of particular interest in in-
formed consent claims involving surgical innovation: the therapy's
innovative nature and the surgeon's experience with the procedure.
1. Disclosure of the Therapy's Innovative Nature
There are relatively few medical malpractice cases involving dis-
closure of the innovative nature of a medical or surgical therapy.1 2 A
review of available cases indicates that the innovative nature of a
practice or procedure and the attendant lack of knowledge about risks
constitute information that should be revealed to the patient during the
informed consent process (enhanced disclosure).213 This holds true in
211 Noah, supra note 196, at 368-69 nn.31-41.
212 In fact, as Holder notes, "there are very few malpractice case dealing with
research procedures or with "innovative therapy." She further opines on the reasons:
The paucity of case law on this subject may be indicative of one or both of
two factors: (1) That a patient in a clinical research center in a major medi-
cal center who is a participant in a well-designed, properly administered re-
search study is probably receiving better medical care than he would if he
were in the hands of a private physician administering standard therapy; in
short, there may be very few injuries in the course of true innovative ther-
apy; and (2) The plaintiffs attorneys may be unaware that the injury, in fact,
resulted from a research trial or innovative therapy, and that the treatment
was not the standard one for the patient's condition. Thus, the malpractice
suit may be brought and adjudicated on the basis of ordinary negligence
principles without reference to any innovative elements.
Proof of Facts, supra note 182, § 4.
213 See Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("Thus, we
also hold that when a physician contemplates a novel or investigational procedure he
must inform his patient of the novel or investigational nature of the procedure. Absent
this, he has committed a battery."); Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098 (10th
Cir. 1976); Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
consent obtained by surgeons failed to satisfy statutory requirements); Fiorentino v.
Wenger, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 227
N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 1967). See also Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.E. 762 (Mich. 1935).
Clemens v. Regents of the University of California, 87 Cal. Rptr. 108, 114
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970), involved juror conduct that resulted in an order for a new trial.
Clemens v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 97 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
Nonetheless, the facts of the case and the court's comments are worthy of mention. In
Clemens, the trial court issued a jury instruction that stated
a physician seeking consent to a 'new or experimental' procedure should in-
form the patient that it is new or experimental when seeking consent to it,"
and the jury found in favor of the physician. The physician testified that he
told the plaintiff that the "procedure was a 'new' one and described it in de-
tail [and] specifically informed appellant of the possibility of the precise
complication upon which [the patient] base[d] his lawsuit.
Clemens, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 114. It is interesting to note that in this case, the appeals
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jurisdictions applying the professional and patient-oriented disclosure
standards. A brief review of three of these cases reflects a range of
origins for the innovations: refinement of a surgeon's own inventive
technique despite the availability of standard therapy, surgery con-
ducted in reliance on one medical journal article, and surgery con-
ducted with very little information on risk.
In Fiorentino v. Wenger,214a fourteen-year-old patient died fol-
lowing an orthopedic surgical procedure intended to treat scoliosis
(spinal curvature).21 5 The child's mother successfully alleged that the
surgeon failed to disclose the experimental nature of the procedure:
the surgeon was the inventor of the procedure (the "spinal-jack" op-
eration); the surgeon had performed it thirty-five times before and
improved it over time; the surgery had resulted in one case of paraly-
sis, four cases of serious complications, and arguably one death; and
the technique was only used in this country by this one surgeon and
was not used commonly outside the United States. 216 Other standard
therapies were available. The appeals court upheld the jury verdict
finding the surgeon217 liable on this basis.218
In Ahern v. Veterans Administration,219 a surgeon used an ex-
perimental pre-operative radiation therapy without informing the pa-
tient and was found liable for lack of informed consent. 220 The patient
was admitted with carcinoma of the rectum, and the surgeon testified
that the increased radiation dosage (substantially above the recom-
mended dosage) used was based on a paper that a member of the sur-
court described the procedure as "new" but no longer "experimental," basing its dis-
tinction on the fact that it had been in use for three years at the institution where the
surgery was conducted. Id. at 112. Note that more than one plaintiff has attempted
unsuccessfully to treat a claim for failure to inform of the innovative nature of a sur-
gery as a fraudulent concealment claim to avoid the application of the shorter statu-
tory limitation period applicable to medical malpractice claims. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Arthur, 986 S.W.2d 874, 874-75 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999); Adams v. Arthur, 969 S.W.2d
598, 598, 608 (Ark. 1998) (consolidation of twelve similar claims).
214 272 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
215 Id. at 557-58.
216 id.
217 The focus of the case on appeal concerned the hospital's liability for the
surgeon's failure to inform. The Court of Appeals of New York found that the hospi-
tal in this case did not have an independent duty to assure adequate informed consent,
nor was it vicariously liable where the surgeon was an independent contractor.
Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 298 (N.Y. 1967).
218 Fiorentino, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 559 ("We are of the opinion that, . . . the
defendant physician was obligated to mark a disclosure to the parents of his ... [pa-
tient] that the procedure he proposed was novel and unorthodox and that there were
risks incident to or possible in its use.").
219 537 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1976).
220 Id. at 1098, 1102.
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gical team had heard at a medical conference.22' The experimental
dosage resulted in severe bums requiring removal of the patient's
bladder, testicles, lower sacrum, and coccyx, and the trial court
awarded $150,000 to the patient for lack of informed consent and neg-
ligent treatment. Although the defendants tried to argue that they tai-
lored the treatment to this patient's individual presentation,222 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the holding of the trial court, concluding that
"in order for a physician to avoid liability by engaging in drastic or
experimental treatment, which exceeds the bounds of established
medical standards, his patient must always be fully informed of the
experimental nature of the treatment and of the foreseeable conse-
quences of that treatment.
'
,
223
A later case, Estrada v. Jacques224 concluded similarly. In
Estrada, two radiologists and two surgeons were involved in the per-
formance of a "relatively new" procedure (known as percutaneous
steel coil embolization)225 on a patient who was diagnosed with a false
aneurysm 226 arising out of a bullet wound to his knee.227 Although the
221 Id. at 1100 n.2.
222 The patient's primary treating physician stated: .'[W]e felt we had a lim-
ited time in which to treat Mr. Ahem. We wanted to give him as much radiation as the
board and our consultants felt could be given with reasonable safety, realizing in-
creased risk, with the faster therapy dose, but still, to get it done as quickly as possi-
ble, because of his pending obstruction."' Id at 1099 (internal citation omitted).
223 Id. at 1102. In surgery involving FDA regulated products, some courts
have found that the lack of FDA-approval constitutes material information that should
be disclosed to the patient. See Noah, supra note 196, at 371-72. However, several
cases involving surgery using "off-label" or experimental use of FDA-approved de-
vices, have found that surgeons and hospitals are not required to disclose that FDA-
approved devices are being used for "off-label" purposes, where FDA status is not
determined to be a material risk. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (physicians were not required to inform patient that metallic
pedicle screws to be implanted in patient's spine had not been approved by the FDA
for the procedure in question, and that the FDA classified such screws as "experimen-
tal or investigational"); Southward v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 781 A.2d 101 (Pa. 2001)
(physician not required to disclose that screws used in spinal surgery were classified
by the FDA as experimental); Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15
S.W.3d 804 (Tenn. 2000) (hospital was not required to disclose that pedicle screws
were experimental devices, where screws were approved for off-label uses prior to
surgery, and patient did not demonstrate that off-label use was subject to federal study
or mandatory monitoring).
224 321 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
225 The procedures "involved insertion of a small steel coil into the weakened
artery upstream from the false aneurysm, thereby cutting off the flow of blood and
preventin2g a rupture." Id. at 243.
The opinion describes a false aneurysm as "a weakened spot in an arterial
wall." Id.
227 Id.
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surgeons discussed the procedure with the patient prior to its perform-
ance, the radiologists performed the actual procedure. It was unsuc-
cessful, resulting in hours of corrective surgery, and ultimately re-
sulted in the amputation of the patient's leg. The injured patient
brought, inter alia, an informed consent claim against the surgeons on
the basis that they had not informed him of the "highly experimental
nature" of the procedure. 228 The court found that the patient received
incomplete information about the risks of the procedure, noting that
few people involved in the patient's care understood the risks associ-
ated with this type of intervention.2 29 Apparently the description of the
surgery's risks was based on one article in a medical journal and the
limited experience of one of the radiologists, who had performed this
type of procedure only once before. 230 In addition, although evidence
existed that the risk of the procedure was low when used in certain
parts of the body, no evidence existed to suggest that this risk would
apply to the location where the procedure was performed on this par-
ticular patient.23' Ultimately the court held that the experimental na-
ture of a treatment must be revealed during the informed consent
process, 232 expressing its concurrence with "the majority of courts and
commentators which have considered the problem.,
233
The disclosure of the innovative nature of a procedure, thus, is in
addition to all of the other disclosures required for all medical
procedures.234 This higher standard of disclosure can be justified when
the procedure is "new and untested ' 235 because of the additional
228 Id.
229 Id. at 253.
230 Id. The court also noted that there was little indication that the radiologist
had communicated this information to the surgeons who were involved in obtaining
the patient's informed consent. Id.
231 Id. ("This omission is critical in light of the evidence that such arteries
presented additional difficult problems of size and accessibility.").
232 Id. at 254 ("[Wlhere the health care provider offers an experimental pro-
cedure or treatment to a patient, the health care provider has a duty, in exercising
reasonable care under the circumstances, to inform the patient of the experimental
nature of the proposed procedure."). One of the justifications provided by the Estrada
court for disclosure of the experimental nature of the procedure was the potential
conflict of interest that may arise when an experimental procedure is performed:
"[t]he psychology of the doctor-patient relation, and the rewards, financial and pro-
fessional, attendant upon recognition of experimental success, increase the potential
for abuse and strengthen the rationale for uniform disclosure." Id at 255. The Estrada
court, however, did not require specific disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Id.
233 Id. at 254. See also Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1974).
234 For example, a surgeon offering to use an innovative technique must not
only describe the risks and benefits of such technique, but must also explain the alter-
native, standard therapy, if one exists. Proof of Facts, supra note 182, § 2.
235 Estrada, 321 S.E.2d at 255.
HEALTH MATRIX
element of "unknown risks" that should be disclosed in addition to the
"known risks" that are normally disclosed.236 Note, however, a
surgeon is generally not required to disclose unchosen alternatives
that are experimental or innovative, as long as these alternatives are
not performed.237
Courts may distinguish failure to inform patients of the innovative
nature of a procedure from the intentional concealment of the innova-
tive nature. If determined to involve intentional concealment by a
physician or institution, the statutory period of time in which a patient
can bring a claim (statute of limitation) may be extended.238 An inten-
tional concealment requires something more than inadequate informed
consent, and the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant made
affirmative misrepresentations about the treatment.239 An example of a
misrepresentation in the context of innovation could be a surgeon's
assertion to the patient that the procedure was "not experimental. 24 °
236 Id. at 254.
With experimental procedures the 'most frequent risks and hazards' will
remain unknown until the procedure becomes established. If the health care
provider has a duty to inform of known risks for established procedures,
common sense and the purposes of the statute equally require that the health
care provider inform the patient of any uncertainty regarding the risks asso-
ciated with experimental procedures. This includes the experimental nature
of the procedure and the known or projected most likely risks.
Id.
237 See, e.g., Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (1lth Cir. 1993) (finding
that physician is not liable for failure to inform patient of ethylene diamine tetra acetic
acid chelation therapy (EDTA) as alternative to carotid endarterectomy surgery,
where evidence overwhelmingly suggested that mainstream medical community did
not recognize or accept EDTA as a practical alternative).
238 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.350(3) (West 2006). The Wash-
ington statute states:
[T]he time for commencement of an action is tolled upon proof of fraud, in-
tentional concealment, or the presence of a foreign body not intended to
have a therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, until the date the patient
or the patient's representative has actual knowledge of the act of fraud or
concealment, or of the presence of the foreign body; the patient or the pa-
tient's representative has one year from the date of the actual knowledge in
which to commence a civil action for damages.
Id.
239 See, e.g., Trantafello v. Med. Ctr. of Tarzana, 227 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that intentional concealment requires more than inadequate
informed consent in the instant case, where surgeon failed to tell a patient of use of an
innovative and experimental procedure involving an acrylic implant); Adams v. Ar-
thur, 969 S.W.2d 598, 598, 608 (Ark. 1998) (consolidation of twelve cases where
surgeon inserted innovative implant in orthopedic procedure without the knowledge
or consent of patients as to the innovation).
240 Adams, 969 S.W.2d at 612 ("The alleged representation that the material
was 'not experimental' goes beyond a mere opinion as to [the innovation's] efficacy,
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Although informing patients of the innovative nature of surgery
may provide a defendant with some protection from malpractice
claims, the surgeon can still be found negligent for medical malprac-
tice in the decision to perform the surgery or in the actual performance
of the surgery.24'
2. Disclosure of Surgeon's Experience with Procedure.
The number of times the surgeon has performed the procedure
242
may be a potential indicator of innovation. Most jurisdictions have
declined to take an expansive view of the duty to inform that would
include disclosure of a surgeon's experience. For example, in White-
side v. Lukson,243 a surgeon attended a two-day training course in
which he learned a new surgical procedure to remove the gall bladder
(laparoscopic cholecystectomy),24 practicing the procedure on three
pigs.245 The plaintiff-patient was subsequently injured by the sur-
geon's first performance of the procedure, sustaining injuries to her
bile duct.246 The Washington appeals court applied the "reasonable
patient" standard and declined to find that the surgeon's professional
experience should have been revealed to the patient as part of the in-
formed consent process.247 In a different case, a surgeon inaccurately
stated his experience in response to a patient query. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court still found that "evidence of a physician's personal
characteristics and experience is irrelevant to an informed consent
claim,, 248 but would allow an injured patient to pursue other remedies
249
at law, including damages for misrepresentation.
e.g., they had 'good results,' and is arguably a false representation concerning the
surgery.").
241 See generally Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989) (agreeing that "informed consent is an alternative method to impose
liability" and one may be present without the existence of the other); Bays v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 825 P.2d 319, 320 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that where physi-
cian has not diagnosed condition there is no duty to disclose risks associated with it,
but they may still be liable for medical negligence based upon a failure to diagnose).
242 It may also be evidence of an individual surgeon's lack of experience in
performing an established procedure or indicate a lack of training which may support
conduct falling below the standard of care.
243 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
244 The surgery was conducted in 1990, during early adoption of the innova-
tive procedure. See discussion of laparoscopic cholecystectomy, infra Part V.
245 Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1264.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 1265 ("[W]e conclude that a surgeon's lack of experience in per-
forming a particular surgical procedure is not a material fact for purposes of finding
liability predicated on failure to secure an informed consent.").
Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (In a case involving
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One jurisdiction, however, has interpreted the materiality re-
quirement for informed consent to require disclosure of the surgeon's
experience with a procedure. In Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor,250 the
plaintiff was rendered a partial quadriplegic following surgery to clip
an aneurysm in her brain. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied
the "reasonable patient" standard and held that a neurosurgeon should
have disclosed that his success rate with the surgery was substantially
different from other surgeons pursuant to a statutory requirement that
required disclosure of 'all of the viable alternatives and risks of the
treatment proposed' which would be material to a patient's deci-
sion., 251 A close reading of the case arguably suggests that this is a
case specific to the facts and interpretation of the relevant Wisconsin
statute.252 Here the defendant surgeon elected to explain the morbidity
and mortality risks from surgery to the plaintiff in statistical terms,
and dramatically understated them (at 2 percent versus nearly 30 per-
cent estimated by experts if the surgery were performed by this inex-
perienced surgeon, and close to 11 percent even if performed by the
most skilled neurosurgeon); further, he substantially "overstated" his
experience in performing the surgery in response to the patient's spe-
cific inquiries. 3 The surgeon's misleading introduction of statistics
allowed the statistics to enter into consideration in the final verdict.
surgical treatment for esophageal cancer, the court applied a reasonable patient stan-
dard, and reasoned that an injured patient has other avenues to pursue claims against
the surgeon, including breach of the standard of care and misrepresentation).
249 Id.
250 545 N.W. 2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
211 Id. at 507.
252 See id.
[W]hen different physicians have substantially different success rates with
the same procedure and a reasonable person in the patients position would
consider such information material, the ... court may admit this statistical
evidence.... [O]ur decision will not always require physicians to give pa-
tients comparative risk evidence in statistical terms to obtain informed con-
sent. Rather we hold that evidence of the morbidity and mortality outcomes
of different physicians was admissible under the circumstances of this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
253 "[W]hen the plaintiff questioned the defendant regarding his experience,
he replied that he had performed the surgery. .. 'several' times; asked what he meant
by 'several,' the defendant said 'dozens' and 'lots of times.' In fact, however, the
defendant had relatively limited experience with aneurysm surgery." Id. at 499. The
court stated further:
The plaintiff also presented evidence that the defendant understated the
morbidity and mortality rate associated with basilar bifurcation aneurysm
surgery. According to the plaintiffs witnesses, the defendant had told
the plaintiff that her surgery carried a two percent risk of death or serious
impairment and that it was less risky than the angiogram procedure she
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D. Institutional Liability
Many of the cases involving surgical innovation reviewed supra
involved allegations of malpractice against surgeons, but some also
included allegations of institutional liability as well. Under medical
malpractice law, generally an institution may be held vicariously li-
able for the acts of an employee-surgeon, including residents and in-
terns, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.254 A grant of staff
privileges is not in itself sufficient to hold an institution vicariously
liable.255 Although traditionally an institution will not be held liable
for the acts of independent contractors, courts have found health care
institutions vicariously liable for such acts under various exceptions,
including ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, inherent function,
and non delegable duties. 56 In addition, courts have found health care
institutions independently liable under general negligence 257 and cor-
would have to undergo in preparation for surgery. The plaintiffs witnesses
also testified that the defendant had compared the risks associated with the
plaintiffs surgery to those associated with routine procedures such as tonsil-
lectomies, appendectomies and gall bladder surgeries.
Id. The court commented on the plaintiffs expert testimony and evidence:
The plaintiffs neurosurgical experts testified that even the physician con-
sidered to be one of the world's best aneurysm surgeons, who had per-
formed hundreds of posterior circulation aneurysm surgeries, had reported a
morbidity and mortality rate of ten-and-seven-tenths percent when operat-
ing upon basilar bifurcation aneurysms comparable in size to the plaintiff's
aneurysm. Furthermore, information in treatises and articles which the de-
fendant reviewed in preparation for the plaintiffs surgery set the morbidity
and mortality rate at approximately fifteen percent for a basilar bifurcation
aneurysm. The plaintiff also introduced expert testimony that the morbidity
and mortality rate for basilar bifurcation aneurysm operations performed by
one with the defendant's relatively limited experience would be between
twenty and thirty percent, and 'closer to the thirty percent range.'
Id. Cf Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259.
254 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 81, at 376 (citing Shands Teaching Hosp.
& Clinics, Inc. v. Pendley, 577 So. 2d 632 (Fla. App. 1991)). The acts must be within
the "scope of employment." Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d
358 (Cal. 1995).
255 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 81, at 376 (citing Albain v. Flower Hosp.,
553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990)).
256 See id. at 376-81. For a detailed examination of liability of specific types
of health care institutions for the acts of a health care provider, see generally John D.
Hodson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitarium for Negligence of Physician
or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R. 4th 235 (1985) (providing a detailed examination of liability of
specific types of health care institutions for the acts of a health care provider), and
William E. Milks, Annotation, Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs)for Negligence of Member Physicians, 51 A.L.R. 5th 271 (1997) (providing a
detailed examination of liability of HMOs).
257 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 81, at 381. Hospitals have a duty to pa-
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porate negligence theories.258 Hospital duties have been held to in-
clude monitoring informed consent, supervising medical staff, and
properly selecting and retaining medical staff.259 Examples of cases
involving institutional liability for surgical innovation have included a
claim involving respondeat superior, 260 a claim for negligent creden-
tialing of an independent contractor surgeon, 26 1 an unsuccessful claim
of vicarious and independent duties to inform of the surgery's experi-
262mental nature,   an unsuccessful claim of negligent supervision
of an independent contractor surgeon.263 Nonetheless, subject to ap-
plications of state law, one can assume that vicarious liability and
corporate negligence theories may potentially be applied to surgical
innovation cases in the same manner that they are applied in other
malpractice cases.
tients to maintain facilities, provide and maintain medical equipment, hire, supervise
and retain nurses and other employees, and maintain proper procedures to protect
patients.
258 See id. at 391.
259 Id. at 389-91 (citing Doctors Mem. Hosp. v. Evans, 543 So. 2d 809 (Fla.
App. 1989) (duty on hospital to ensure patient consent is properly obtained); Darling
v. Charleston Comm. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965) (duty to supervise
medical staff); Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 582 (Pa. 1997) (duty to take reasonable
steps to insure the competence of members of its medical staff)). But see, e.g., Kelly
v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995) (declining to impose duty of
obtaining informed consent on hospitals).
260 Ahem v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1976) (government
employer liable for acts of employee physicians).
261 In Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 994 (Ohio 1993), the court permit-
ted a claim to proceed against a hospital for negligent credentialing of an independent
contractor surgeon. The case involved an extreme case of surgical malpractice for
vaginal reconstruction surgeries which the court labeled as "atrocities." Id. at 1009.
The plaintiff was prompted to sue when she saw a television news program docu-
menting the injuries and experiences of other women who had undergone the same
surgeries. At the same time, the court cautioned that "nothing in [the] opinion should
be read to stand in the way of the proper performance of progressive medicine." Id.
The dissent argued that the statute of limitations had expired because the cause of
action had accrued against the hospital when it advised the patient by form letter
delivered before surgery that the procedure was not "generally accepted" and was not
yet "duplicated by other investigators." Id. at 1012 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
262 Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 1967) (where surgeon was an
independent contractor, hospital did not have an independent duty to assure adequate
informed consent, nor was it vicariously liable for surgeon's failure to inform).
263 Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 331-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (directed
verdict upheld in favor of defendant hospital where plaintiffs negligence claims
included negligent supervision of the "conduct of the investigational procedure of
chemonucleolysis").
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E. Lessons for Surgical Innovation from Review of the Medical
Practice Pathway
What lessons can innovative surgery take from this review of the
Practice Pathway? First, the route down this pathway is only taken in
the event of a bad surgical outcome. Innovations that are successful or
are unknown to patients do not provoke legal scrutiny under this ap-
proach. Second, there may be judicial deference to physician judg-
ment to innovate in order to tailor a therapy to an individual clinical
presentation, even though an innovation is arguably by its very nature
a deviation from the generally accepted standard of care. The success
of the defense of clinical or therapeutic innovation is of course not
guaranteed, and depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
However, at some point after the first performance of the innova-
tion, it may have a greater likelihood of being characterized as an un-
acceptable deviation from the standard of care (or "breach" of the
standard of care). Some of the variables that appear to affect the ac-
ceptability of the deviation from standard practice are the severity of
illness or underlying condition in combination with the availability of
a standard therapy,264 and the surgeon's success and failure rate.265 It
is also relevant to note that in practice the reputation of the surgeon
will influence expert testimony.
When more than one surgical approach may be appropriate to ad-
dress a patient's medical condition, a surgeon may be able to use the
"respectable minority" defense in some jurisdictions. In this situation,
the surgeon will not be held liable for selecting one acceptable proce-
dure over another. The acceptability of the procedure is not proven by
surveying those who use the procedure, but rather obtained through
expert testimony supporting the plaintiff and the defendant regarding
standard practices under like circumstances. One can imagine that
264 Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1954). Baldor involved a patient
with a cancerous growth on his lip who was treated with certain injections rather than
radiation or surgery, where there was considerable conflict among the experts as to
whether the treatment was acceptable. The court took note that in this case there was
"no certain cure and... the physician did not indulge in quackery by representing he
had one." Id. at 659-60. Holder contrasts two orthopedic fracture cases, Davis v.
Wilmerding, 24 S.E.2d 337, n.50 (N.C. 1943) (where innovation held to be negligence
where it was a departure from a treatment known to be effective) and Miller v. Toles,
150 N.W. 118 (Mich. 1914) (where innovation held to be non-negligent where stan-
dard treatment was attempted and ineffective). Proof of Facts, supra note 182, § 9.
265 Adler ex rel. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 507 (Wis. 1996)
("When different physicians have substantially different success rates, whether sur-
gery is performed by one rather than another represents a choice between 'altemate,
viable medical modes of treatment."').
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where the surgical specialty area consists of only a handful of special-
ists this number could be quite small. Also, the availability of this
defense would seem to imply that rapid diffusion of the innovation
through the profession, regardless of the adequacy of its testing for
clinical effectiveness and safety, could work to the legal advantage of
surgeons who adopt the innovation: a rapidly adopted innovation
could become standard practice as attested by defense experts, thus
acting as a potential shield against liability. However, variation in
jurisdictional adoption also indicates that reliance on such a defense
generally deserves caution and close scrutiny.
The examination of informed consent underscores that surgeons
working in innovative areas, especially in nonemergency situations,
should be informing patients of the innovative nature of the surgery,
the foreseeable risks, and an acknowledgment that some risks are un-
known. This is particularly important in light of Reitsma and Mo-
reno's findings from their survey of surgeons. They state:
Most respondents to the full questionnaire (75 [percent])
claimed that their patients had been aware of the fact that they
underwent an innovative procedure, but in only one-third of
the cases (7 of 21) had this been specifically mentioned in the
informed consent form. This result raises some concerns
about the adequacy of consent forms used in these
procedures.266
The informed consent examination also underscores the differ-
ences in jurisdictional consideration of these issues, and the need for
surgeons and institutions to be aware of jurisdictional requirements
affecting informed consent practices, such as when the surgeon's
learning curve is considered material information. It is also important
to recognize that enhanced disclosure during informed consent will
not necessarily be exculpatory, as informed consent claims and due
care claims are separate bases of liability.
IV. THE RESEARCH PATHWAY
An innovative surgical approach that is characterized as research
instead of medical practice may encounter the legal system at two
points: (1) prior to its performance pursuant to federal human subjects
protection regulations (if the surgeon's affiliated institution or the
research project itself is subject to the pertinent regulations), and (2)
after its performance in the event that a human subject alleges injury
266 Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28, at 795.
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resulting from participation in an approved research project. In con-
trast to the Practice Pathway, participation in prospective review re-
quires an affirmative act by the researcher or the researcher's institu-
tion to subject it to such review. The two entry points are discussed
sequentially below following a discussion of the evolution of research
regulations and its implications for surgical innovation.
A. The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Human Subjects Research
in the United States
Regardless of the pathway chosen, all medical interventions will
ultimately be tested, whether formally or informally, on humans.267
The impetus for regulatory controls on research has its roots in the
Nuremberg war crimes trials and the responses to Nazi experimenta-
tion on prisoners of war during World War II. The Nuremberg Code,
issued in 1949, set forth ten ethical directives for the conduct of ex-
268perimentation on humans. Primary among them is the Code's re-
quirement of voluntary consent and informed decision-making. 269 The
Code further addresses appropriate risks and benefits, dictating, inter
alia, that the experiment yield "fruitful results for the good of soci-
ety, 270 that the risk to the individual not exceed the importance of the
problem intended to be solved by the experiment, 27' and that the ex-
267 "[N]o matter what steps may come first, medical investigations must ulti-
mately be put to the test with human subjects." Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at
217.
268 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949), available at
http://history.nih.gov/laws/pdf/nuremberg.pdf (outlining an international code of
ethics concerning human subject research).
269 The first directive of the Nuremberg Code states:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject mat-
ter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened de-
cision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirma-
tive decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and
means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards rea-
sonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
Id. l.270 Id. 2.
271 Id. 6.
periment avoid "unnecessary... suffering and injury."272 In 1964, the
World Medical Association promulgated similar principles that were
more specific to the conduct of medical research by physicians,
known as the Declaration of Helsinki.273
In the United States, the policy response to the Nuremberg Code
was not immediate,274 and decisions about research continued to be
vested in individual researchers without government intervention or
oversight.275 Two years after the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
opened its campus research hospital, the Clinical Center, the NIH is-
sued federal guidelines for research on humans.276 Those 1953 guide-
lines contained the first official requirement of committee review of
research studies, but only applied to research conducted at the Clinical
Center.277
Later revelations of research abuses would prompt policy atten-
tion at the highest levels, and indicate a need for explicit enforcement
provisions rather than general pronouncements.278 Indeed, the "devel-
opment of human subject protection policy in the United States was
driven by a history of exploitation of subjects, most notably by re-
272 Id. 14.
273 The Declaration of Helsinki was first adopted in 1964, and subsequently
revised four more times, most recently in 2000, with the addition of notes of clarifica-
tion in 2002 and 2004. World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964), available at
http://www.wma.net/E/POLICY/PDF/17c.pdf (providing the amended 2000 Declara-
tion, and the subsequent clarifications added in 2002 and 2004).
274 For a detailed discussion of the reaction of the U.S. medical community to
the Nuremberg Code and its impact on medical practice, see ACHRE, supra note 40,
at 74-96.
275 "[A]ccording to one historian, ... the events [including Beecher's publi-
cation] accomplished what the Nuremberg trials had not: to bring the ethics of medi-
cal experimentation into the public domain and to make apparent the consequences of
leaving decisions about clinical research exclusively to the individual investigator."'
Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 217 (citing David J. Rothman, Human Experi-
mentation and the Origins of Bioethics in the United States, in Soc. SC. PERSP. ON
MED. ETHICS (George Weisz ed., 1990)).
276 NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 15 (5th ed.
2004), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/GrayBooklet82404.pdf (summa-
rizing the foundations for NIH's policies and procedures, including relevant historical
background).
277 Id.
278 For a detailed policy history of the protection of human subjects from the
1940s through the present, see ACHRE, supra note 40. For an analysis of the evolu-
tion of federal policies from the 1960s though early 2000s, see Anna Mastroianni &
Jeffrey Kahn, Swinging on the Pendulum: Shifting Views of Justice in Human Sub-
jects Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May - June 2001, at 21 [hereinafter Mas-
troianni & Kahn, Swinging on the Pendulum].
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search on 'vulnerable' subject populations that came to light between
the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. ' ' 279 In 1966, Henry Beecher pub-
lished an influential article in a preeminent medical journal document-
ing ethical lapses in clinical research (some of which involved sur-
gery),280 including failures of consent. 281 And it was later in 1966 that
the Public Health Service issued a policy requiring institutional re-
view of all funded research.282 Other examples of unethical research at
that time included hepatitis vaccine research conducted on institution-
alized children at the Willowbrook State School2 83 and the injection of
cancer cells into elderly nursing home residents at the Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital. 284 Most infamous was the so-called Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, a forty-year study begun in 1932 that tracked the ef-
fects of untreated syphilis in a large group of impoverished African-
American men in rural Alabama.2 85 Not only were the men unaware
of their participation in a study, but extensive measures were taken to
ensure that these men did not receive treatment for the disease.286 A
scathing indictment of the study by an independent review panel ap-
pointed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
287(DHEW), set against the backdrop of the aforementioned studies,
ultimately resulted in Congressional passage of the National Research
Act of 1974.288 This Act created the National Commission 28 9 and laid
279 Id. at 21-22.
280 Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 217.
281 Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1354, 1355 (1966) (critiquing prior medical studies that placed patients at risk of
harm, often without the patients' consent for the experimentation).
282 ACHRE, supra note 40, at 100.
283 Id. at 101-03.
284 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1271, 1274 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining the
origins of the legal term "informed consent"); Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease
Hosp., 206 N.E.2d 338, 339 (N.Y. 1965) (holding as a matter of law, the director of
the hospital corporation could inspect hospital records to investigate possible, or
alleged, illegal or improper treatment of patients, specifically experimentation).
285 JAMEs H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1-15
(2d ed. 1993) (providing an overview of the Tuskegee Study, and its lasting negative
impact).
286 Id. at 5-10. See also Vanessa Northington Gamble, Under the Shadow of
Tuskegee: African Americans and Health Care 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773 (1997)
(analyzing how the Tuskegee experiments, as well as prior medical history, created
negative attitudes among African Americans towards the integrity of health care).
287 DHEW is the predecessor agency to the current U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services and the Department of Education. DHEW was the parent or-
ganization of the public health service, the sponsor of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.
288 National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974); 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs 2357 (3d ed. 2004) (documenting the initial regulations cre-
ated by Congress concerning research on human subjects).
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the foundation for formal regulatory oversight of federally sponsored
research involving human subjects. 290 The National Commission pub-
lished a series of highly influential reports, including the aforemen-
tioned Belmont Report, whose findings and recommendations were
incorporated into or influenced the drafting of many of the federal
human subjects regulations that are in place today.
Although Congress in 1974 had an opportunity to institute a
formal oversight mechanism for the protection of human subjects
involved in all government-supported research, it was forced to
compromise with a requirement of federal oversight of research
sponsored by DHEW, the largest government supporter of research at
that time.29' The DHEW regulations promulgated in 1974 included
requirements for ethics review of research protocols at the
institutional level and detailed procedural and substantive
29
requirements for informed consent. 92 DHEW later included
additional protections for fetuses, pregnant women, children and
prisoners, that included, inter alia, enhanced disclosure requirements
and limitations on the risks imposed on the subjects in light of the
potential benefits of the research.293 In 1981, a high-level advisory
body, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, recommended
consolidation of all federal protections for human subjects. 94 Once
initiated, the process of hammering out agreement among all the
federal agencies involved in human subjects research took nine years
(1982-1991).295 In 1991, sixteen federal departments and agencies
that support, conduct, or otherwise regulate human subjects research
agreed to adopt one common set of regulations, the Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects,29 6 which collectively are generally
289 See infra discussion on The Belmont Report in Part I.A; ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS, supra note 288.
290 ACHRE, supra note 40, at 104.
291 Id. at 98, 103-04.
292 See id. at 425-26 (providing a history of the Common Rule, which was the
adopted regulation of procedures protecting the rights and interests of human sub-
jects).
293 Id. at 425-26.
294 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RESEARCH
REGULATIONS 7-8, 132 (1983) (evaluating and summarizing the annual investigation
into human research regulations); Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 218.295 ACHRE, supra note 40, at 425.
296 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ,56 Fed. Reg. 28,002
(June 18, 1991) (discussing acceptance of the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, specifically notes and rules). See generally OFFICE FOR HUMAN
RESEARCH PROTS., IRB GUIDEBOOK (1993), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
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referred to as the "Common Rule. 297 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), a subsidiary agency of the Department of
Health and Human Services, did not adopt the Common Rule in its
entirety because of the need for specific provisions related to the
oversight of food, drugs, and medical devices, but made conforming
changes to its informed consent and institutional review regulations.298
Regulatory drafters were keenly aware of the need to allay public
suspicion of research resulting from the previously mentioned
publicized examples, cases that highlighted failures of informed
consent, reliance on vulnerable subject populations, exploitive subject
recruitment, and exposing subjects to risks where there was little
potential for direct medical benefit.299 Although innovation was
discussed by the National Commission in the development of The
Belmont Report, it was not explicitly referenced in the Common Rule.
Thus, the determination as to whether innovative surgery is subject to
the regulations rests on the regulatory definition of "research."
For purposes of examining the current practice of innovative sur-
gery, one important legacy of this history was the creation of
a system of local social control over medical research ...
[leading] us to place a large share of the responsibility for the
ethical conduct of clinical investigation on the shoulders of re-
searchers' close peers who sit on institutional review boards
(IRBs) in hospitals, medical schools, universities, and inde-
pendent research centers.
300
The relevant regulatory provisions allow for interpretation in imple-
mentation, and such interpretations are frequently left to local judg-
ment, which may vary among IRBs.30 1 For example, the baseline deci-
ohrp/irb/irb-guidebook.htm [hereinafter IRB Guidebook]. Each department and
agency adopting the Common Rule incorporates the regulation within its section of
the Code of Federal Regulations. For example, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) locates the Common Rule at 45 C.F.R. § 46, subpart A, and the
Department of Energy locates the regulation at 10 C.F.R. § 745. DHHS has additional
protections for subpopulations located in other subparts of 45 C.F.R. § 46: pregnant
women, fetuses, and neonates (subpart B); prisoners (subpart C); and, children (sub-
part D).
297 ACHRE, supra note 40, at 425-33.
298 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg.
28,002; Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,530 (Dec.
22, 1995); Standards for Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigations, 56
Fed. Reg. 28,025 (June 18, 1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 56). See gen-
erally IRB Guidebook, supra note 296.
299 Mastroianni & Kahn, Swinging on the Pendulum, supra note 278, at 22-
23.
30 Frader & Caniano, supra note 11, at 218-19.
301 See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, Bioethical Malpractice: Risk and Responsibil-
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sion about whether an innovative practice meets the regulatory defini-
tion of research will be decided by the local IRB, and judgments about
the very same practice may vary among IRBs.
This historical review also highlights that the reach of the current
system of federal regulatory oversight of human subjects protection is
limited-as discussed in more detail below, it has never applied to
research conducted in private settings that lacks a federal nexus (con-
tractual or otherwise), i.e., some private surgical clinics and other in-
stitutions where surgical innovation is performed are not subject to
any federal oversight. Further, this review points out that as early as
the Declaration of Helsinki, and in policies promoted at the National
Institutes of Health Clinical Center and in federal regulations created
in response to scandals, there was a recognition of the vulnerability of
patients-a vulnerability that required, inter alia, the protections of
external oversight and specific informed consent. This recognition and
the articulation of the vulnerability of the ill 30 2 continues to be refined,
both in understanding patients' desperation in light of the hope offered
by surgical innovation and the identification of potential conflicts of
commitment that arise when treating physicians also serve in the role
of researcher (or innovator) offering solutions with unknown risks.303
B. Prospective Regulatory Review Today
As indicated in the previous part, the U.S. system of federal regu-
latory oversight and prospective ethics review and approval was es-
tablished in response to well-documented abuses and misuses of hu-
man subjects in the past. The system was designed to prevent harm
and injury to research subjects to the extent possible and ensure that
the research is otherwise conducted in an ethical manner. The Office
of Human Research Protections (OHRP) is the federal agency within
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services charged with in-
terpreting, enforcing, and overseeing implementation of the Common
Rule.3 °4 The Common Rule applies to federally funded research and to
ity in Human Research, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 175, 185 (2004) ("[Tlhe regu-
lations leave some of the most difficult scientific issues unresolved, and they leave
important ethical questions to the discretion of IRBs, which may vary substantially in
their interpretation and application of the regulatory requirements.").
302 Baruch A. Brody, Research on the Vulnerable Sick, in BEYOND CONSENT:
SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 32 (Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., 1998).
303 See, e.g., id.; Mastroianni & Kahn, Swinging on the Pendulum, supra note
278, at 22; Jeffrey Kahn & Anna Mastroianni, Moving from Compliance to Con-
science: Why We Can and Should Improve on the Ethics of Clinical Research, 161
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 925 (2001); Nancy E. Kass et al., supra note 40.
304 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Human Research
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research conducted at institutions that have contractually agreed
through a Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) to apply the Common Rule
to all human subjects research regardless of the funding source.30 5 The
FDA has promulgated similar human subjects protection regulations
related to research involving experimental drugs, biological products,
and medical devices that will be marketed in the United States regard-
less of funding source.
306
The Common Rule does not apply to all research conducted in the
United States: research that is conducted without the use of federal
monies at a nongovernmental institution that does not hold a FWA
will not be subject to the Common Rule.30 7 This gap in coverage may
be particularly significant in the context of innovative surgery to the
extent that such innovations take place in hospitals and surgical clinics
that are unaffiliated with FWA institutions or the federal government
(e.g., Veteran's Administration hospitals are examples of federal
governmental institutions). Regardless, such privately conducted
research may fall within the purview of state laws on human subjects
protections.30 8
In addition to the federal nexus described above, in order for an
innovative surgical technique to be covered by the federal human sub-
jects protection regulations, it must meet the definition of research
found in the regulations. Under the Common Rule, research "means a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and
Prots. (OHRP), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ [hereinafter OHRP website]. Prior to June,
2000, the oversight body was known as the Office of Protection from Research Risks
(OPRR) and was situated within the National Institutes of Health, a constituent group
of institutes within the DHHS. See Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delega-
tions of Authority, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,136 (June 13, 2000).
305 See OHRP website, supra note 304.
306 FDA Protection of Human Subjects, 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.3(c), 56.102(c)
(2005).
307 Note, however, federal legislative initiatives to make the rule apply to all
research regardless of funding source or FWA. Human Research Subject Protections
Act of 1997, S. 193, 105th Cong. (1997); Protection for Participants in Research Act
of 2006, H.R. 5578, 109th Cong. (2006).
308 See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170 - 24179.5 (West 1978) (attempting to codify
the recommendations of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki); and
Protection of Human Subjects. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-2446.(McKinney
2002) (codifying protections specifically for human subjects used in medical and
scientific research). See also, e.g., Kevin L.J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of
Greenberg: Informed Consent and the Protection of Tissue Sources' Research Inter-
ests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 367-68 (2004) ("In addition [to the Common Rule], states have
statutory and regulatory regimes based on and augmenting the federal regulations.");
Alain Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analy-
sis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PIr. L. REV. 407 (1980).
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evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowl-
edge."309 As noted in the introduction to this article, innovative sur-
gery does not fit comfortably within this definition by its very nature
of progressive changes over time and its emphasis on the best interests
of the patient rather than future beneficiaries of the knowledge gained
from innovative applications.310 But for the definition of research,
there is regulatory silence on the treatment of innovation. Indeed,
Reitsma and Moreno have suggested that surgeons' narrow interpreta-
tion of "research" as requiring a formal protocol has allowed surgeons
to evade the additional scrutiny of outside review associated with hu-
man subjects protections.3 1
Research subject to the regulations must be independently
reviewed and approved by an institutional review board (IRB) prior to
the enrollment of human subjects. The criteria for IRB approval
include, inter alia, a determination that risks to human subjects are
minimized and are "reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits,"
"selection of subjects is equitable," informed consent will be sought
and "appropriately documented," and that there are "adequate
provisions" for data monitoring and protections for subject privacy
and data confidentiality.31 2 The regulations also provide for expedited
review for certain kinds of research, i.e., research involving no more
than minimal risk and where previously approved research is only
proposing minor changes. 31 3 Research that is funded by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is also subject to
additional regulatory protections related to risk and informed consent
when the research involves pregnant women or prisoners.314 Both
309 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2004). The FDA regulations apply to "clinical
investigations" and are not applicable to surgical innovation as defined in this article.
The definition is narrower than that of the Common Rule, and encompasses activities
that fall within the Common Rule's definition of research. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.3(c) &
56.102(c) (2005).
Clinical investigation means any experiment that involves a test article and
one or more human subjects and that either is subject to requirements for
prior submission to the Food and Drug Administration... or is not subject
to requirements for prior submission to the Food and Drug Administration
. . . ,but the results of which are intended to be submitted later to, or held
for inspection by, the Food and Drug Administration as part of an applica-
tion for a research or marketing permit.
21 C.F.R. §§ 50.3(c) & 56.102(c).
310 See supra Part I.A.
311 Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 48, at 49.
312 45 C.F.R. § 46.111.
313 45 C.F.R. § 46.110; 21 C.F.R. § 56.110.
314 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.207, 46.301-.306.(titling the sections "Additional
Protections for Pregnant Women, Human Fetuses and Neonates Involved in Re-
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DHHS-funded research and research involving FDA regulated
products involving children are also subject to additional regulatory
protections.315
An IRB must perform continuing reviews of approved studies at
least once a year, typically through paperwork reviews of adverse
event reports. 316 IRBs may review protocols that are determined to be
especially risky in light of the anticipated benefits on a more frequent
basis.3t 7 In addition, investigators are required to submit adverse event
reports, and the IRB determines whether the adverse event reports
require changes in the conduct of the study, including suspension or
termination of the study, revisions to the inform consent form, or pro-
tocol changes.318 The responsibility for IRB submissions and adverse
event reporting rests on the investigator; the IRB does not have the
power or resources to monitor the conduct and implementation of
each protocol in person.319 As a practical matter, it would be nearly
impossible for an IRB, especially one associated with a large institu-
tion or academic medical center, to identify work that should have
been submitted to review unless it is specifically brought to the atten-
tion of the IRB administrators. In the context of innovative surgery
intended to treat a medical condition or disease, in practice, the deci-
sion as to whether an innovation meets the definition of research thus
rests on the surgeon (and perhaps the affiliated department or clinic)
to submit a proposal to an IRB.3
20
While the federal regulations place the responsibility to review
and approve human subjects research on IRBs, they place the respon-
sibility to obtain informed consent directly on researchers. 32' The ba-
sic elements of informed consent specified in the regulations are com-
prehensively specified in the regulations and include, inter alia:
search" and "Additional Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search Involving Prisoners as Subjects").
315 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (titling the section "Additional Protections for
Children Involved as Subjects in Research"); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.50-56.
316 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e). See also Noah, supra note 301, at 184.
317 Noah, supra note 301, at 193. Also, the National Institutes of Health may
also require that certain funded studies have ongoing supervision by a data safety
monitoring board (DSMB). Id.
318 Id. at 194 n.84.
319 Id. at 194 ("The effectiveness of the adverse event monitoring system for
human subjects depends heavily on voluntary compliance with IRB and federal regu-
latory reporting guidelines, but recent reports suggest that many researchers routinely
fail to re 0ort injuries and deaths among their study patients.").
0 Margo, supra note 67, at 41.
321 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2005).
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" "A statement that the study involves research, and expla-
nation of the purposes of the research and the expected
duration of the subject's participation, a description of the
procedures to be followed, and identification of any pro-
cedures which are experimental
322
* "A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks" and
where appropriate, disclosure that some risks are "cur-
rently unforeseeable
3 23
" A description of "benefits to the subject or to others" that
are reasonably expected
3 24
" Disclosure of alternative procedures or courses of treat-
ment
3 25
" A description of applicable confidentiality procedures
326
" A "description of whether any compensation and
medical treatments are available if injury occurs" 327
* A "statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to
participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject
may discontinue participation at any time without penalty
or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise
entitled"
328
* A "statement that significant new findings developed dur-
ing the course of the research which may relate to the sub-
ject's willingness to continue participation will be pro-
vided to the subject" 329
It is worth highlighting that in both the Research Pathway and Prac-
tice Pathway, informed consent must acknowledge the experimental
nature of the intervention and that risks are unknown.330
Federal regulations also set forth narrow circumstances where the
requirements for informed consent can be altered or waived.331 With
respect to legal actions, the informed consent document may not
322 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(1).
323 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(a)(2) & (b)(1); 21 C.F.R §§ 50.25(a)(2) & (b)(1).
324 45 C.F.R § 46.116(a)(3); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(3).
325 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(4).
326 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(5).
327 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6).
32 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (a)(8); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8).
329 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(b)(5).
330 See supra Part I1I.B.
33' 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c)-(d); 21 C.F.R. § 50.23; 21 C.F.R. § 50.24.
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include exculpatory language that waives "any of the subject's legal
rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor,
the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.' 332 In
addition, the federal regulatory requirements for informed consent do
not preempt any federal, state, or local requirements for informed
consent.333
Thus, in contrast to the Practice Pathway, subjecting innovative
surgery to the human subjects protection system would offer the op-
portunity for independent prior review and approval of the ethics of
such approaches, and the potential to provide greater accountability
and prevent harm to patients. However, a significant barrier to access-
ing this system is the regulatory definition of "research." It is doubtful
that an already overburdened IRB system334 could or would voluntar-
ily take on the practice of innovative surgery without guidance on the
definition of research.
C. Retrospective Redress of Injury
When a human subject is injured in a research study, the regula-
tory system and the tort liability system offer some means of redress.
Although the federal regulations do not expressly provide for a cause
of action in negligence, OHRP (or the FDA in the case of a clinical
trial of a drug, biologic or medical device) is empowered to impose
sanctions on a regulated researcher and/or institution for failure to
abide by the regulations.335 Sanctions may include loss of federal
funding, restrictions or prohibitions on applying for future funding, a
halt on the conduct of all or some research at the institution, or failure
to obtain FDA approval.336 In addition, such sanctions may prompt
332 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20.
133 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(e); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(c).
334 See generally JAMES BELL ET AL., FINAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF NIH
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 491 OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT, MANDATING
A PROGRAM OF PROTECTION FOR RESEARCH SUBJECTS (1998), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/hspfinalrpt.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HEHS-96-72, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGILANCE CRITICAL TO
PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 17-20 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1996/he96072.pdf [hereinafter GAO, Continued Vigilance]; DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEw BOARDS: A
TIME FOR REFORM 6 (1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-
00193.pdf.
335 See ACHRE, supra note 40, at 432; 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.113, 46.123; 21
C.F.R. § 50.113.
336 Indeed, such sanctions can have significant ramifications for an entire
institution. For example, a twenty-four year old healthy volunteer died during an NIH
funded study at Johns Hopkins University. An OHRP investigation revealed deficien-
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federal prosecution of researchers and institutions for misuse of funds
under the False Claims Act. 337 Injured subjects may also be able to
receive compensation through a sponsor's compensation program if
any. The availability of such a program, if any exists, is required by
regulation to be included in the informed consent form.338 Among
U.S. academic research institutions, the University of Washington is
one of the few to have a formal self-insured compensation program
for research subjects. 339
Surgical innovation is rarely the subject of federal funding,340 but
if performed without IRB oversight at a FWA institution and subse-
quently determined to have met the regulatory definition of research,
the investigator and the institution could be subject to some of the
sanctions delineated above.
The discussion in Part III, supra, focused on cases involving inju-
ries caused by innovation or alleged of experimentation in the medical
treatment setting. As indicated, courts have generally applied a medi-
cal malpractice framework to such cases, but in many cases take into
account some of the differences from standard medical practice of-
fered by innovation, such as the need for enhanced disclosure during
informed consent. This part will focus exclusively on the legal treat-
ment of acts that involve formal research protocols that may or may
not be proceeding with IRB approval.341
When a human subject is injured during participation in a clinical
research study, the injured person is likely to pursue a negligence
claim.342 Researchers,343 and potentially their affiliated institutions and
cies in the IRB review process and ultimately led to a temporary suspension of all
federally funded research at the university. Report on a Research Death Faults Re-
view Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A16.
337 See, e.g., United States ex re. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d
402, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (concerning a medical researcher who failed to disclose in-
dustry funding on grant applications submitted to NIH); United States ex rel. Berge v.
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997) (reversing a prior
decision in favor of student, in which student claimed the university made false
statements to the NIH in its annual progress reports under a particular grant).
... 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6).
339 Larry D. Scott, Research-Related Injury: Problems and Solutions, 31 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 419, 420, 422 (2003).
340 See generally Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 28 (stating that "[t]here are
no clear federal regulations governing innovative surgery, even though general guide-
lines regulating research with human subjects do exist"); Reitsma & Moreno, supra
note 31.
341 This focus is justified in light of recommendations in the literature that
surgical innovation be subject to the federal regulations and review by an IRB.
342 FAY A. RozovsKY & RODNEY K. ADAMS, CLINICAL TRIALS AND HUMAN
RESEARCH: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 392 (2003). Other
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IRB members, 3" may be held liable for breach of standard of care
and/or failure to obtain informed consent.345 There are relatively few
reported cases involving research conducted as a formal clinical study
(or IRB-approved study), although litigation in human subjects re-
search is increasing.
346
Courts have applied medical malpractice law to many of such
cases alleging negligence,347 particularly where the facts involve pa-
tients (in contrast to healthy volunteers) in a clinical study. Those
theories that research subjects may use to recover damages may include: battery,
breach of confidentiality, infliction of emotional distress, fraud, breach of contract,
product liability (where the case involves use of marketed medications or medical
devices), violations of civil rights, and vicarious liability. Id. at 392-93. See also
Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research:
Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REv. 229, 231
(2003) (establishing why researchers owe human subjects a duty of care based on
informed consent and malpractice).
343 For a detailed examination of potential researcher liability, see generally
id.
344 For a detailed examination of potential IRB liability, see generally Noah,
supra note 301.
345 Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Re-
search, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40, 40-41 (2003).
346 Id. at 41-42 (historically, personal injury lawsuits by research subjects
against researchers have been rare, however, both the frequency and stakes of these
lawsuits are on the rise); Jansson, supra note 342, at 230. As discussed infra, how-
ever, courts have evaluated claims of experimentation outside of a protocol in terms
of medical malpractice. Indeed, many of the actions filed in the last ten years or so
have been well publicized in the news media and on law firm websites, and many of
them have resulted in settlements. See, e.g., Robertson, Silverstein Kohl Rose and
Podolsky Home Page, http://www.sskrplaw.com (news articles on the Gelsinger
lawsuit available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/gelsinger.html, and on the Robert-
son v. McGee case at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/robertson/news.html). From
these filings it is clear that plaintiffs are expanding their claims beyond negligence: a
lawsuit brought today may also include "allegations of defective products [where the
clinical trial involved testing of a drug, device or biologic], fraud, negligent conduct
and monitoring of the research, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of
patients' rights protected by state law, violation of federal regulations, and violation
of constitutional rights." Mello et al., supra note 345, at 41.
347 See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982) (holding the trial jury received the proper charge for determining
malpractice, and thus upheld the verdict against the physician and hospital); E. Haavi
Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a
Learning Curve, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 19-32 (2003) (discussing court
treatment of clinical research cases as malpractice) (citing Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 986 (1992); Kernke v.
Mennigner Clinic Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (Kan. 2001); and Heinrich v. Sweet, 308
F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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cases include patient-subjects who are informed 348 or uninformed349 of
their research participation.
Some courts, in contrast, do recognize a distinction between
medical practice and research.35 ° Some apply theories of ordinary
negligence rather than medical malpractice, 351 and at least one of
those cases involved patients undergoing medical care who became
unwitting research subjects.352 A few cases have explicitly distin-
348 Heinrich, 308 F.3d at 48. Kernke, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1347, allowed appli-
cation of Kansas medical malpractice law in a case where a patient-subject died dur-
ing preparation period necessary for participation in investigational psychiatric drug
trial (known as "wash out"). It further upheld summary judgment for defendants on
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation,
misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty because they arose out of "the same
series of events as the underlying malpractice claim." Id. at 1354.
... Moore, 793 P.2d at 479 (involving an unwitting subject of research). In
Moore, the court applied California medical malpractice law on informed consent and
breach of fiduciary duty where the patient underwent surgical removal of spleen as
treatment for hairy cell leukemia and physician-researcher used cells extracted during
surgery in research without his knowledge and consent. The researchers also had the
patient-subject return for further extraction of cells on many occasions solely for
research-related reasons. Id. See also Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 877, 880-81 (explain-
ing how the research study concerning administration of oxygen to premature chil-
dren began only days prior to the arrival of the premature child, and determining the
physicians should have obtained consent from the parents for participation in the
study).
350 For a comprehensive assessment of research litigation and negligence
advocating distinct treatment of medical and research injury claims, see Morreim,
supra note 347; E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice
Doctrines Versus Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHics 474, 384 (2004) (critiqu-
ing courts for "deeming research injuries as just a species of medical malpractice...
[and] largely fail[ing] to recognize crucial differences between clinical trials and
medical practice," and arguing that "human clinical trials need tort doctrines specifi-
cally adapted to the research setting").
351 Morreim, supra note 347, at 28-30 (citing Payette v. Rockefeller Univ.,
643 N.Y.S.2d 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (rejecting application of New York's statute
of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions in action against research
institution involving healthy volunteer's participation in nutrition study); Ande v.
Rock, 647 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied, 650 N.W.2d 840 (Wis.
2002), cert. denied sub. nom. Ande v. Fost, 537 U.S. 1107 (2003) (medical malprac-
tice claims fail for lack of physician-patient relationship in research involving new-
born screening for cystic fibrosis); Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 786
(M.D. Tenn. 1998)). Craft was an action against research institutions in which the
court held that the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice did not apply to
radioactive iron absorption studies conducted on pregnant patients with no therapeutic
purpose and without their knowledge or consent. "The medical malpractice statutes
only apply to a doctor's conduct where the challenged actions were taken in an effort
to benefit or cure the patient." Id. at 796.
352 See, e.g., Craft, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
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guished medical practice from research,353 and allowed constitutional
and civil rights claims to proceed.
1. Research Malpractice-Breach of Standard of Care
Although traditional medical malpractice can draw on statutes and
well-developed case law to define the standard of care in medical
malpractice, there is little case law discussing a distinct standard of
care applicable to a researcher in the context of a clinical study.354 In
the absence of a physician-patient relationship, courts in at least two
cases have characterized the researcher-subject relationship as a "spe-
cial relationship," a predicate for establishing a duty.355 Federal regu-
lations have not been used to establish a unique standard of care for
35635
researcher malpractice, except in some informed consent claims. 7
As revealed in the following two cases, where the research subject is
also a patient (as in surgical innovation), courts have easily estab-
lished the duty prong of negligence by implicit or explicit reference to
the physician-patient relationship.
353 Morreim, supra note 347, at 30-31 (citing Barrett v. United States, 689
F.2d 324, 329 (1982) (reversal of the district court's summary judgment for the de-
fendants in an action against the U.S. government and others under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the civil rights provisions of 42 USC § 1983); In re Cincinnati Radia-
tion Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 832 (Ohio 1995) (allowing plaintiffs' claims to proceed
for "violations of constitutional rights of substantive due process, procedural due
process, access to the courts, and equal protection as well as a claim for a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985")).
354 Jansson, supra note 342, at 238.
355 Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 806-07 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (finding a duty to warn research subject of research findings and holding that
"Dr. Schneider's position as the person in charge of the Program involved in research-
ing the effects of the radiation treatments and contacting patients who had been sub-
jected to them created the sort of 'special relationship' the Illinois Supreme Court
requires for a finding of duty in the absence of a physician-patient relationship."). See
also Grimes, supra note 7, at 3030 ("[r]esponsibility for this medical malfeasance lies
primarily with physicians").
356 Jansson, supra note 342, at 251-252.
Although the federal regulations are intended to protect the rights and safety
of human subjects, they do not impose specific requirements on researchers
beyond obtaining the subjects' informed consent and IRB approval. The
federal regulations place the responsibility of weighing risks and approving
research on IRBs, not on researchers. Thus, unlike in informed consent, the
federal regulations do not provide a specific standard of care for researcher
malpractice actions.
Id. at 251-52 (citations omitted).
357 See discussion on Research Malpractice-Failure of Informed Consent
infra Part IV.C.2.
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Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital3 58 involved the application
of medical malpractice law to a research study that had been designed
to challenge a long-standing medically accepted practice. In the early
1950s, many physicians believed that increased oxygen was important
in preventing brain damage and even death in premature newborns. At
the same time, some in the medical community believed that this ap-
proach contributed to a condition that caused blindness known as
retrolental fibroplasia. In 1953, one of the defendant physicians and
the hospital undertook a study to examine these conclusions, random-
izing prematurely born newborns into a research study without paren-
tal consent. The plaintiff was in a group receiving increased oxygen
and suffered blindness. The physician-investigator's argument that
increased oxygenation was standard practice failed. The court took
note of the fact that an earlier study by the investigator had concluded
that oxygenation was not recommended. The court also found con-
vincing that a two-to-one randomization decision (two patients receiv-
ing decreased oxygen for every one patient receiving increased oxy-
gen) disfavored a practice that the defense had argued was standard of
care.359 In addition, the court duly noted that the defendants had failed
to remove the plaintiff-patient from the study when he first showed
signs of eye damage and that the attending physician, who had or-
dered a reduction in oxygen, had not been consulted before the infant
was entered into the clinical study. The court ultimately found that the
physician-investigator was accountable for the actual superior knowl-
edge that she had gained from her previous study concerning the risk
of injury that might result from the study.360 This case could poten-
tially be interpreted to suggest that physician-researchers may be held
to a higher standard of care based on actual knowledge of clinical
study results. Indeed, it is worthy of note that at least one jurisdiction
has imposed a duty on "nontreating physicians in charge of ... re-
search programs... to warn the former patients of risks discovered in
... research.
361
358 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
319 "[WJe find it difficult to believe that any reputable institution would per-
mit two out of three of its patients to receive unusual treatment, which might result in
death or brain damage, unless it was fairly convinced that the conventional wisdom
no longer applied." Id. at 880.
6 "A physician should use his best judgment and whatever superior knowl-
edge, skill and intelligence he has." Id. at 880.
361 Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
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Heinrich v. Sweet3 62 raises issues arguably analogous to surgical
innovation, but in the context of a research protocol: use of patients to
benefit future patients but also presumably with some prospect of
medical benefit to the patient-subject as well,363 and refinement of
therapy over time. The case was brought by families of two deceased
patients who were treated in the early 1960s in a clinical trial of an
experimental therapy known as Boron Neutron Capture Therapy
(BNCT), a post surgical combination of chemotherapy and radiation.
The research was conducted in leading medical institutions by promi-
nent surgeons and other medical personnel and funded by the U.S.
Government's Atomic Energy Commission. Earlier trials on patients
in the 1950s had proved unsuccessful, but researchers continued at-
tempts to further improve BNCT, resulting in the clinical trial at issue,
which involved nineteen patients. One of the patient-plaintiffs under-
went BNCT in what appears to be "last resort" circumstances: after
surgical removal of the tumor and conventional treatment failed to
prevent the recurrence of the malignancy. The other patient-subject
was treated with BNCT a short time following surgery. The court ap-
plied state malpractice law and allowed expert testimony to establish
the standard of care applicable to a researcher, 6 finding that the phy-
sicians did not breach the standard of care.365 The court found that
prior approval of the research by four committees was "very compel-
ling evidence" that the research was conducted in compliance with the
standard of care at that time.366
Heinrich involved research performed before federal regulatory
requirements for IRB approval were implemented. But Heinrich sug-
gests that independent review by an IRB or similar committee may
offer a potential partial defense to malpractice, at least in the context
of research.367 Such approval may be used to demonstrate that an in-
dependent group determined that the research met regulatory require-
362 Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48-49 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the "use of
experimental boron neutron capture therapy (BNCT) to treat patients' terminal brain
cancer").
363 Earlier decisions that formed the basis for this appeal had concluded that
there was no potential for therapeutic benefit to the patient subjects. Id. at 69-70. The
case on appeal found instead that the physician-investigators and other defendants did
not know at the time that the procedure offered no prospect of medical benefit. Id.
364 Id. at 63 (applying a malpractice standard, stating "[t]he standard of care
for medical doctors is not static or rigid. It is a standard that changes depending on
many factors, including a doctor's specialty, the resources available, and the advances
of the medical profession at the time of the alleged negligent act.").
365 Id. at 65-67.
366 Id. at 69.
367 Jansson, supra note 342, at 254.
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ments, including appropriate balancing of risks and benefits, informed
consent, and equitable subject selection.368 Nonetheless, such review
is not dispositive, however, as at least one court has allowed negli-
gence actions against researchers and the research institution to pro-
ceed even though the researchers obtained IRB approval, and indeed
was scathing in its critique of the IRB's judgment.369
2. Research Malpractice-Failure of Informed Consent
There are a number of reported cases involving research studies
dating back to the 1950s that involve the use of human subjects with-
out their knowledge or consent. 370 Some of those research studies
were supported with federal funding, including funding from the mili-
tary,37 and some involved patients receiving care that they believed
was standard medical treatment.372 In the cases involving military
research funding, courts have generally relied on constitutionally-
guaranteed interests in the right to bodily integrity in order to advance
the informed consent claims.37 3 In other contexts, courts have reached
368 See supra Part IV.B.
369 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 813 (Md. 2001).
370 Morreim, supra note 347, at 6-13.
371 Military sponsored studies include: Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324
(2d Cir. 1982) (the U.S. Army used individuals as test subjects for a chemical warfare
experiment without their consent); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (plaintiffs alleged they were unknowingly exposed to large amounts
of radiation as a part of Human Radiation Experiments conducted at Cincinnati Gen-
eral Hospital with funding and authorization from the U.S. Department of Defense's
Nuclear Agency); Stadt v. Univ. of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (a
military doctor allegedly injected plaintiff's decedent with plutonium without her
consent in order to study its effects). In all three of these cases, informed consent was
an issue addressed by the court. However, the court evaluated these claims by assert-
ing the right to bodily integrity rather than using the informed consent analysis seen in
traditional medical malpractice cases. Barrett, 689 F.2d at 331; In re Cincinnati Ra-
diation Litig., 874 F. Supp. at 819; Stadt, 921 F. Supp. at 1027.
372 See, e.g., Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(physicians gave DES to pregnant women for prevention of miscarriage alleging
daughters were at increased risk of cancer); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 986 (1992) (physician uses patient's
cells from therapeutically removed spleen to develop potentially lucrative cell line
and removes tissue samples for research purposes only during follow up visits); Bur-
ton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (physicians
treated premature infants with high levels of oxygen causing blindness); Friter v.
IOLAB Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (physician, under approval of the
hospital's Institutional Review Board, implanted an intraocular lens into patient's eye
as a part of an experimental study without obtaining his consent).
373 See, e.g., Barrett, 689 F.2d at 331; In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F.
Supp. at 819; Stadt, 921 F. Supp. at 1027. Contra, e.g., Wright v. Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1295 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (explicitly
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various conclusions on the application of a cause of action for lack of
informed consent for research. For example, some courts have held
that if a patient is completely unaware of their participation in the
study, the proper cause of action is battery rather than informed con-
sent.374 Other courts, however, have upheld such a cause of action
even though the law at the time had not recognized the duty to obtain
informed consent from research subjects. 75 This duty has even been
extended to hospitals under the theory that they assume such a duty by
participating in a research study due to the requirements of the federal
376regulations. Some courts have extended the duty to one where a
physician must disclose even personal interests unrelated to the pa-
tient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the phy-
sician's medical judgment.3 77 Thus in cases where a patient, such as
one undergoing innovative surgery, is not aware that he or she is in a
research study, that patient may either have a cause of action for vio-
lation of his or her constitutional rights (if the experiment is funded by
the government) or for lack of informed consent for any injury caused
by their participation in the study.
An informed consent claim in the Research Pathway will proceed
similarly to that of traditional medical malpractice, with the need to
establish all the elements of such a cause of action. However, some
accommodation for research circumstances has been acknowledged in
case law. For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals took another
approach, tailoring the duty prong to research circumstances in an
action involving allegations of inadequate informed consent in so-
called "nontherapeutic" research. Specifically, the court found that
researchers may owe research subjects a distinct duty of care based on
a special relationship that can be derived from various sources,
including the informed consent agreement and implied duties arising
out of the federal human subjects protection regulations.378 However,
multiple courts have used the federal regulations to set the standard
against which informed consent in human subjects research will be
compared where the case involved inadequate informed consent. For
example, Whitlock v. Duke University379 adopted the Common Rule's
rejecting constitutional claims in the research context and distinguishing the foregoing
cases in which the "true nature of the experiments" were hidden by the defendants).
37' E.g., Mink, 460 F. Supp at 717.
37 E.g., Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81.
371 E.g., Friter, 607 A.2d at 1114, 1116 (applying 21 C.F.R. § 813.66(a)(6)).
377 Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
378 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
379 Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. N.C. 1986), aftd, 829
F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987) (involving an experiment researching high pressure nervous
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informed consent requirements as the standard and held that there is a
heightened duty for disclosure of foreseeable risks as compared to the
medical context.38 More recently, the 1997 case Daum v. SpineCare
Medical Group38' held that the FDA regulations provided the standard
for informed consent in spinal surgery using an experimental device.
The Daum court held that violation of the regulatory requirements for
informed consent could support a jury instruction for negligence per
se.3 82 Other courts have held that the FDA regulations set the standard
for informed consent in cases involving the implantation of
experimental medical devices.383 Note further that at least one court
reviewing an informed consent claim in the context of a research
protocol has declined to follow the lead of the Moore court, discussed
supra, holding that there is no duty to disclose a researcher's
economic interest.
384
In one recent experimental surgery case, however, the court in its
review of the deceased plaintiffs informed consent claim applied the
informed consent requirements delineated in state malpractice law
rather than relying on those set forth in the federal regulations. In
Goodman v. United States,385 the Ninth Circuit held that the federal
regulations do not apply to the liability of the United States in actions
by human subjects against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).386 In Goodman, an experimental surgical proce-
dure was performed at the NIH for liver cancer.387 The husband of the
deceased patient sued under the FTCA, alleging that his wife died
syndrome in deep sea diving).
380 Id. at 1471.
381 Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
382 Id. at 271.
383 See., e.g., Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 917 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ind.
1996); Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (I1l. App. Ct. 1995) (suit
against hospital for faulty medically implanted lenses); Southard v. Temple Univ.
Hosp., 781 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Pa. 2001) (declining to apply FDA disclosure require-
ments and the revelation of the investigational nature of a surgically implanted device
where the surgeon was not participating in a formal clinical investigation subject to
FDA refulation).
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp, Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1070-71 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Indeed, it is interesting to note that the court distin-
guished Moore because of the Moore physician's therapeutic relationship with the
patient. Id. at 1070 (In Moore, "[t]he doctors did not inform their patient that they
were using his blood and tissue for medical research." "The allegations in the Com-
plaint are clearly distinguishable as Defendants here are solely medical researchers
and there was no therapeutic relationship as in Moore.") (citations omitted).
385 Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002).
386 Id. at 1054 n.6.
387 Id. at 1050-51.
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from a toxic reaction to the medicine used in surgery, and asserting a
claim for failure to obtain informed consent.388 The court declined to
apply the federal human subjects regulations stating that "[u]nder the
FTCA, the liability of the United States is determined 'in accordance
with the law of the place where the [allegedly tortious] act or omission
occurred,' 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)," and applied Maryland malpractice
law on informed consent.389 The court further noted that:
[I]n the battle against deadly diseases, progress often will be
made only when medical experimentation is permitted. Doc-
tors must give fair warnings of risks that are known or that
reasonably should have been known by them. However, here,
the NIH doctors were not required to warn JoAnn Goodman,
as she embarked bravely on an experimental procedure that
might have helped her and others, of an unperceived risk of
which they reasonably were not aware.39°
The Goodman court held that the physicians adequately informed
the patient of known material risks associated with the experimental
surgery (which included the possibility of death), basing its conclu-
sion on undisputed expert testimony at the trial level. The court also
determined that the informed consent form did not need to be supple-
mented to explain that three earlier NIH patients had experienced
complications when they underwent the same procedure, stating, "[t]o
hold that the signed consent form was inadequate would require the
NIH to update its already detailed consent form every time a patient
experiences any sort of complication from an experimental proce-
dure.",39 1 This is a potentially surprising result in light of federal regu-
lations that require that informed consent includes, where appropriate,
"a statement that new findings developed during the course of the
research which may relate to the subject's willingness to continue
388 Id. at 1048.
389 Id. at 1054 n.6.
311 Id. at 1058.
391 Id. See also the findings of the FDA regarding the 1999 death of Jesse
Gelsinger in a gene transfer research trial. An FDA compliance letter to Penn in-
cluded the accusation that the researchers did not amend the informed consent docu-
ment following adverse effects experienced by test subjects. The letter states that
"[t]hese were 'significant' adverse events.... Nevertheless, despite this important
evidence of increased risk, [the researchers] failed to provide potential subjects ...
with information about this possible risk of participation." Letter from Steven A.
Masiello, Dir., Office of Compliance & Biologics Quality, Ctr. for Biologics Evalua-
tion & Research to Mark L. Batshaw, Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr. (Nov. 30, 2000),
available at http://www.fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/n14l.pdf.
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participation will be provided to the subject., 392 The tone of the opin-
ion, yet again, may be interpreted as judicial accommodation to physi-
cian innovation in the face of a serious and life-threatening medical
condition (liver cancer).
Because of the comprehensiveness and specificity of the regula-
tory requirements for informed consent, discussed earlier, a higher
standard of disclosure would appear to apply to research than to medi-
cal practice. At the same time, the medical malpractice framework
discussed supra generally requires disclosure in the informed consent
process that a particular therapy is innovative and carries unknown
risks. Thus it appears that in retrospective redress of injury, the Prac-
tice Pathway appears to, at least partially, use a comparable standard
of disclosure in the area of medical or surgical innovation. Indeed, at
least one recent legal commentator has highlighted innovative thera-
pies in particular to support his argument that the medical practice-
research dichotomy in informed consent is indeed a distinction with-
out a difference.393
D. Institutional Liability and Sanctions
Based on the examination of malpractice law, discussed supra at
Part III.D, institutional liability claims arising in research where medi-
cal malpractice law is applied are likely to be viable on the same
bases.394 In Burton, discussed supra, where malpractice law was ap-
plied, the hospital was held liable, but the basis for liability (vicarious
liability or breach of an independent duty) was not expressly articu-
lated.395 In Goodman, discussed supra, the researchers were NIH em-
ployees, and thus the law implicitly applied respondeat superior to the
informed consent claim. 396 Courts have also found independent insti-
tutional duties to research subjects. 397 As noted supra, at least one
392 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5).
393 Noah, supra note 196, at 407-08 (challenging the distinct applications of
informed consent rules in experimental and standard therapies, and arguing that the
area of clinical innovation, in particular, deserves careful attention in this area).
394 See discussion supra Part III.D regarding institutional liability of health
care institutions.
395 It is unclear whether it was an independent or vicarious basis for liability.
The hospital was unsuccessful in its attempt to claim exemption from liability based
on charitable immunity, a theory which was eliminated in the seminal case of Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.Y.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
396 See generally Goodman v. United States, 298 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002).
397 Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 720 (N.D. I11. 1978), involved
patients who had taken DES as part of a clinical study without their knowledge or
consent and alleged increased risk of cancer to themselves and their children. The
court held that the university hospital had a
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court has held that the federal regulations (i.e., the FDA regulations)
impose a duty of informed consent on a research hospital in the con-
text of a research study.398 Researcher or institutional failure to apply
relevant federal research regulations may also result in sanctions
against the institution.
E. Lessons for Surgical Innovation from Review of the Research
Pathway
There are some general observations that can be derived from re-
view of the Research Pathway. The federal regulations, where appli-
cable, require IRB review and approval before the research protocol
proceeds. In this sense, the federal regulations are prospective in na-
ture, and unlike the retrospective remedies offered by the Practice
Pathway, the review mandated by the regulations offers the opportu-
nity to prevent unreasonably risky or unwise innovative surgical pro-
cedures, thereby protecting patient-subjects and promoting greater
duty to notify the plaintiff patients of the risk inherent in DES treatment
when they became aware of should have become aware of the relationship
between DES and cancer ... The University's duty to notify is simply an
extension of duty of physician to warn their patients of the risk inherent in
treatment.... When the University hospital became aware or should have
become aware of facts which would induce a reasonable physician under
the same circumstances to warn patients of the risk involved in treatment, a
duty to notify arose. The fact the knowledge of the risk was obtained after
the patient was treated does not alter the obligation. If the defendant fails to
notify the patient when the risk becomes known, he has breached this duty.
Id. at 720. In Blaz v. Michael Reese Hospital Foundation, F. Supp. 2d 803, 806 (N.D.
Ill. 1999), the court followed Mink and found that the hospital had a duty based on
agency theory. Id. at 806 ("The agent to whom the hospital delegates the direction of
such research has an obligation to inform the patients subjected to such treatments of
the results of that research if it indicates that there is a foreseeable risk."). In Payette
v. Rockefeller Univ., 643 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), a previously
healthy volunteer in a nutrition study was not barred in bringing a cause of action
against a research institution alleging "the careless, unskillful and negligent design,
prescription, supervision and control of a dietary regimen" in a research study. The
court held that the statute of limitations for ordinary negligence applied rather than
the limitation applicable to medical malpractice actions. Id. at 80.
398 E.g., Friter v. IOLAB Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (referencing 21 C.F.R. § 813.66(a)(6)).
[T]he hospital, as a participant in a clinical investigation for the FDA, spe-
cifically assumed a duty to ensure that an informed consent was obtained by
any patient participating in the study. In particular, under applicable federal
regulations, Wills Eye Hospital had an affirmative duty to '[a]ssure that the
rights of human subjects are properly protected, that legally effective in-
formed consent is obtained, and that the methods of obtaining consent
properly informs the human subject of the significant aspects of the study.'
21 C.F.R. § 813.66(a)(6) (2005).
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accountability. At the same time, subjecting surgical innovation to the
formal regulatory process raises challenges. A central problem is de-
fining the situations in which surgical innovation meets the regulatory
definition of research. No guidance currently exists. With reliance on
individual investigators to bring these events to the attention of the
IRB and review taking place at the local level, such guidance is not
currently forthcoming.
399
As in the Practice Pathway, retrospective legal scrutiny initiates
when a patient-subject is injured. From an institutional standpoint, a
FWA institution will be subject to scrutiny from federal regulators,
and negative findings may result in sanctions that affect the future
career of a federally-funded investigator, the reputation of the institu-
tion, and potentially the conduct of all unrelated research at the insti-
tution. Although the stakes are high from an institutional perspective,
the intention is to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects. A
benefit however may accrue to the institution and innovator through
IRB review. This review process provides an opportunity for inde-
pendent parties to evaluate the risks and benefits of the research, and
otherwise ensure that the research is ethical and that informed consent
is appropriate. Indeed, the independent review offered by an IRB may
provide some protection against potential liability. As one legal com-
mentator has noted:
Peer review cannot be substituted for proof of standard prac-
tice where innovation is used, but well-documented peer re-
view of a written research protocol is, at least, evidence that
other physicians and community representatives found the in-
399 Note however that there is some federal precedent for creating powerful
programs that subject activities with a therapeutic intention to federal regulatory
oversight but otherwise do not meet the precise definition of research. The FDA's
Parallel Track program "is intended to make promising investigational agents avail-
able as quickly as possible to patients with AIDS and other HIV-related diseases."
RozovSKY & ADAMS, supra note 342, at 358 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (Apr. 15,
1992).
A Treatment IND/IDE is a procedure whereby the FDA allows investiga-
tional drugs or devices to be administered to very ill patients earlier in the
development process.... .'The purpose ... is to facilitate the availability of
promising new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug devel-
opment process as possible (before marketing begins) and to obtain addi-
tional data on the drug's safety and effectiveness'. . . .Treatment IND stud-
ies require prospective IRB approval....
Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
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novation to be reasonable to use on patients with a specific
type of problem in terms of risk-benefit ratio.4 °0
A review of the case law related to alleged injuries occurring in
the context of research protocols reveals far fewer cases than in medi-
cal malpractice generally. There have been relatively few reported
cases since the institution of IRB review requirements pursuant to the
federal regulations, but at the same time there have been well publi-
cized reports of case filings and related settlements, so case law still
may be developing in this area.401
From the reported case law, there appears to be a tendency to ap-
ply medical malpractice principles to research malpractice claims, but
some courts and commentators are recognizing distinct differences
between research and therapy. One case in particular arguably holds
physician-investigators to a higher standard of knowledge and skill.
40 2
In the area of informed consent, there appears to be a general ten-
dency to rely on the regulatory requirements where applicable. As
noted earlier, however, the specificity of the elements of informed
consent in research are drawing closer to that required in medical
practice, particularly in the area of medical innovation, so this may be
a distinction without a difference.
V. A CASE STUDY IN INNOVATION AND
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY: LAPAROSCOPIC
CHOLECYSTECTOMY
This part examines one example of surgical innovation in depth in
an attempt to understand its legal treatment during its evolution and
diffusion into standard practice. This particular innovation stimulated
a wave of surgical malpractice claims in the 1990s. 40 3 Laparoscopic
cholecystectomy is the use of a minimally invasive technique to treat
gallstones by removing the gall bladder.404 This innovation combines
400 Proof of Facts, supra note 182, § 1.
401 Mello et al., supra note 345, at 40.
402 Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880-81 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1982).
403 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 23-27. Trial lawyers are well aware of the
injuries that may result from laparoscopic surgical techniques. See, e.g., Association
of Trial Lawyers of America, Laparoscopy Litigation Group, Pretrial Issues in
Laparoscopic Negligence Cases, 1 ATLA Ann. Convention Reference Materials 685
(2001), (available on Westlaw as "1 Ann.2001 ATLA-CLE 685 (2001)").
404 "[The laparoscopic approach to surgery] has been around since the early
fifties, in use primarily by gynecologic surgeons. Laparoscopic surgery allows the
surgeon to make a very small incision right below the navel and introduce an instru-
ment called a laparoscope. The laparoscope is a long tube with a lens at one end and a
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a technique that had been accepted in other surgical areas (laparo-
scope) with an established treatment (gall bladder removal). Previ-
ously, the standard approach for gall bladder removal (known gener-
ally as "open cholecystectomy") required major abdominal surgery,
with a large incision and significant healing time,405 but had a low risk
of complications.40 6 In comparison, the innovative technique offered
the opportunity for smaller incisions and quicker recovery times.
407
The introduction of this technique also increased the rate of surgical
removals of the gall bladder as a treatment for gallstones.4 8 Indeed,
patients readily acquiesced to the innovation, with a 15-20 percent
refusal rate for open cholecystectomy dropping to 1 percent with the
laparoscopic version.40 9
The procedure was first performed in the United States in 1988 by
41 411Dr. J. Barry McKernan, a 1° and rapidly diffused into practice. Unfor-
tunately, a number of surgeons unaccustomed to working with "less
visibility and unfamiliar instruments 412 caused secondary injuries to
patients during their initial adoption of the technique. These injuries
included, inter alia, damage to the common bile duct, liver, bowel,
iliac artery,413 and renal aorta.414
miniature video camera at the other. The laparoscope enables the physician to see the
desired organ. Several more tiny incisions are made to allow for the passage of in-
struments to be used to cut and clamp off the operative organ." Gillespie, supra note
168, § 1.
405 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 28.
406 De Ville, supra note 119, at 205.
407 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 23, 27.
408 See A.P. Legorreta et al., Increased Cholecystectomy Rate After the Intro-
duction ofLaparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 270 JAMA 1429 (1993).
409 Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 938.
410 j. Barry McKernan, Origin of Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy in the USA:
Personal Experience, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY 332 (1999). J. Barry McKeman per-
formed the first laparoscopic cholecystectomy in the U.S. on June 22, 1988. Dr.
McKeman's account of his first performance of this procedure indicates that he was
aware of potential medicolegal issues. He further states that "industry played a major
role in pushing laparoscopic cholecystectomy .... We surgeons initially played a
distant role.... Without the participation and encouragement of industry the revolution
would have taken decades. It also had to be multinational." Id. at 333. The procedure
was first performed outside of the United States in 1985 by Erich Muhe in Germany.
It is interesting to note that Dr. Muhe's license was "revoked shortly thereafter." Id. at
333. Note, however, that another author states that the surgery originated in France.
Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 938.
411 Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, 938.
412 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 28.
413 Id. at 28-29.
414 Fusilier v. Dauterive, 779 So. 2d 950, 952 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (case on
remand for reassessment of damages).
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A. IRB Review and Informed Consent
Dr. McKernan's first performance of this procedure did not un-
dergo IRB review.415 In a personal account, he discusses his informed
consent encounter with the patient:
We found a patient, and I told her we had a 10 [percent]
chance of removing the gallbladder the first time. She got a
second opinion from a surgeon who told her she was "out of
her mind." She conferred again with me, and I told her he was
probably right but she was going to have to have it removed
by an open procedure anyway. She decided to try the laparo-
scopic approach.4 16
The early adoption of this procedure by surgeons did not stimulate
IRB oversight in most instances.41 7 This reportedly was because sur-
geons did not characterize it as research.418 It also may have been at-
tributable, at least in part, to the fact that surgeons in private practice
constituted the vast majority of the early adopters, 419 and research
conducted in these settings is not necessarily subject to the reach of
the federal regulatory regime. As mentioned supra, even insurers did
not consider the procedure to be research: while the surgical approach
was novel, the procedures themselves had known risk and benefits.
420
Later randomized controlled trials comparing open cholecystectomy
to laparascopic cholecystectomy clearly met the definition of research
and underwent IRB review.421
Strasberg and Ludbrook undertook a review of this procedure and
two other innovative procedures422 in part to assess whether injuries
could have been detected earlier and whether preventive measures
could have been taken to prevent patient injuries. As part of this
assessment, they evaluated the value of IRB review. The randomized
415 See McKeman, supra note 406.
416 See id.
417 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 93 8-39 ("The performance of
cholecystectomy by laparoscopy in patients who had clear indications for cholecys-
tectomy did not seem to many surgeons to fit the definition of research. To these
practitioners, there was no indication or compulsion to seek approval from a regula-
tory body such as an IRB.").
418 Id. at 938.
419 McKernan, supra note 402.
420 Gleeson, supra note 82.
421 Id.
422 The other two innovative procedures they examined were radiofrequency
ablation of metastatic colorectal tumors in the liver and live donor right hemiliver
transplantation. Id. at 939.
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trials, reported as early as 1992, were conducted at single institutions
and lacked the statistical power to detect the differences in "relatively
infrequent events," such as the injuries mentioned above.423 The
profession instead was alerted to these events by a registry operated
by the state board of medicine, a registry run by a surgical association,
and journal publication of case series that reported increased referrals
for complications resulting from laparoscopic cholecystectomy.
424
Retrospective review indicated that injuries were caused by two
factors: (1) "inadequate training and credentialing," and (2)
"fundamental flaws in the procedure as it was initially conceived and
practiced. ' '425 In their comprehensive review of this and two other
innovative procedures, Strasberg and Ludbrook concluded that
patients are not assured of adequate protection from the inherent
uncertainties of significant innovative procedures "by any formal
compulsory regulatory system.
' 4 26
B. Malpractice Claims
Injuries from laparoscopic cholecystectomy were amplified by the
large number of procedures performed and resulted in a significant
increase in malpractice claims and awards compared to the time pe-
riod before the innovation was available.427 Indeed, one insurance
association documented such an increase in a survey of its member
companies as follows:
From 1990 to 1994, before minimally invasive techniques en-
tered widespread use, [the Physician Insurers Association of
America (PIAA)] received 750 claims relating to gallstone
surgery, and made indemnity payments of approximately $42
million. In 1995-1999, the number of claims rose to 1,426,
with indemnity payments of around $104 million. In the latter
period, 60 [percent] of claims involved allegations of improp-
erly performed cholecystectomies, which PIAA attributes to
both higher numbers of cholecystectomies being performed
and a greater risk of complications from the laparoscopic
technique. Tellingly, the rate of paid claims involving chole-
cystectomy (50 [percent]) vastly exceeds PIAA's overall rate
423 Id. at 939.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 943.
427 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 29. De Ville reports a 500 percent increase in
medical malpractice suits arising out of surgical gallbladder removal. De Ville, supra
note 119, at 205.
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of paid claims (31 [percent]), and the average indemnity pay-
ment is 26 [percent] higher.428
The injuries and litigation that resulted from the performance of
laparoscopic cholecystectomies attracted the attention of surgeons as
well. In one study, reported in a 1997 medical journal article, re-
searchers affiliated with a major department of surgery examined
medical records associated with forty-six malpractice cases involving
common bile duct 429 injuries related to procedures performed between
1990 and 1996.430 The purpose of their study was to "increase aware-
ness" among surgeons about this particular type of injury and "edu-
cate surgeons about the consequences of these injuries.,,A31 The re-
searchers characterized the medical factors that appeared to affect
decisions to litigate. The most significant factors were health compli-
cations resulting from delays in identifying injuries and poor treat-
ment of immediately identified injuries.432 The researchers also exam-
ined and dismissed previously published assertions that the injuries
were the result of the "learning curve," concluding instead that "no
surgeon is immune from the risk of bile duct injury, and no case is
simply routine. 433 In their study, plaintiffs prevailed by verdict or
428 JACOBSON, supra note 68, at 29-30 (citing PIAA, LAPAROSCOPIC
PROCEDURE STUDY (1994) & PIAA, LAPAROSCOPIC INJURY STUDY (2000)). Jacobson
concludes:
One reason for these results is that the procedure has a higher severity index
than the conventional procedure (4.25 to 3.94 in the 1994 survey, rising to
4.9 for all claims in the 2000 report, rising to 5.19 for all paid claims). The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) publishes the se-
verity index, with codes from 1 (emotional injury) to 9 (death). A severity
index of 4 is classified as a major temporary injury without permanent ef-
fects. In the laparoscopic studies, the severity index means that many in-
jured patients require an additional surgical procedure that results in no life-
long debilitation.
Id.
429 The "common bile duct.., is the common excretory duct of the liver and
gallbladder. It is about three inches in length, of the diameter of a goose-quill, and
formed by the junction of the cystic and hepatic ducts." GRAY'S ANATOMY 926 (15th
ed. 1995).4e 0 B.J. Carroll et al., Common Bile Duct Injuries During Laparoscopic
Cholecystectomy that Result in Litigation, 12 SURGICAL ENDOSCOPY: ULTRASOUND &
INTERVENTIONAL TECHNIQUES 310, 310 (1998).
431 Id.
432 Id.
43 Id. at 312 ("[O]ther investigators have noted an ongoing problem well past
the learning period. Nine injuries in this study occurred after the surgeon's 50th case,
and five of these were after the 100th case ... ") (citations omitted).
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settlement in 86 percent of the cases examined, with an average award
of $214,000. 434
C. Reported Legal Cases
There have been at least fifty reported legal cases involving surgi-
cal malpractice claims for injuries arising during performance of a
laparoscopic cholecystectomy.435 Cases include claims for failure of
inadequate informed consent as well as claims of substandard care.
For example, Whiteside v. Lukson, discussed supra, was an informed
consent claim based on one of the earliest performances of the proce-
dure reported in a legal case, 1990. The basis of the claim was the
materiality of the surgeon's nondisclosure of his experience where he
had never performed the procedure on a patient before. The availabil-
ity of alternatives, particularly the more established procedure of open
cholecystectomy, was not a litigated issue.436
An examination of three cases from one jurisdiction provides
some insight regarding the diffusion of a surgical innovation from a
legal perspective, particularly the impact on the standard of care and
on informed consent. It also underscores the fact-specific nature of
malpractice cases, and highlights the critical role expert witnesses
play in malpractice cases involving surgical innovation.437
Fusilier v. Dauterive438 involved one of the earliest performances
of the surgery that resulted in a reported legal case.439 The surgery was
434 Id.
435 Searches conducted in Westlaw: LAPROSCOP! /p (MALPRACTICE
INJUR!) /p CHOLECYSTECTOMY (July 21, 2005). Search conducted in Westlaw:
GALL /p BLADDER /p SURG! /p (MALPRACTICE INJUR!) & ((STANDARD s
CARE) ("INFORMED CONSENT")) (July 22, 2005). I eliminated duplicate cases,
unpublished cases, and cases where surgical malpractice was not the direct subject of
litigation (e.g., malpractice of anesthesiologist; malpractice as basis for state discipli-
nary action) (July 21, 2005) (results on file with author). Whiteside v. Lukson, dis-
cussed supra, for example, was an informed consent claim based on surgery per-
formed in 1990. The experience of the surgeon was at issue, while the availability of
alternatives, particularly the more established procedure of open cholecystectomy,
was not at issue. Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
436 Whiteside, 947 P.2d at 1265.
437 Indeed, the testimony of expert witnesses is central in all medical malprac-
tice cases. See, e.g., Jones v. Hernandez, 880 So. 2d 245, 248 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
("The assistance of expert testimony is needed to establish the applicable standard of
care, whether the standard of care was breached by the defendant doctor's conduct,
and whether that breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff.") (citing Edwards v. Raines,
799 So. 2d 1184 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Pugh v. Beach, 722 So. 2d 442 (La. Ct. App.
1998)).
438 Fusilier v. Dauterive, 764 So. 2d 74 (La. 2000).
439 Id.
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conducted in 1990 when the technique was in the early stages of adop-
tion.440 The case was brought in Louisiana and ultimately reviewed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, which issued its opinion in 2000.44 1 In
Fusilier, the patient brought a malpractice claim alleging that the sur-
geon had breached the standard of care when he injured three organs
during the gall bladder surgery, and two more in his attempts to treat
the original injuries." 2 The original complaint included allegations
that that surgeon had "'deviated from the accepted standards of medi-
cal practice' by breaching the standard of care, lacking appropriate
training and experience, and failing to provide appropriate informed
consent. 443 The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that expert
testimony had established that no national standards existed in 1990
for the performance of laparoscopic cholecystectomies. 444 The court
thus implicitly acknowledged the innovative nature of the surgery,
and, overturning a jury verdict in favor of the surgeon, found that the
lack of an established standard of care under the particular circum-
stances of the case did not excuse the surgeon from liability for mal-
practice." 5 In this case, testimony from plaintiff and defense wit-
nesses directly conflicted on whether the patient's injuries would have
occurred "in the absence of substandard care" by the surgeon. 446 Sig-
nificantly, the court found that none of the defendant's experts offered
an adequate explanation for the injuries; the assertion by defense ex-
perts that the injuries were "unfortunate 'complications"' was deemed
insufficient." 7 In addition, the court rejected the defense's unsup-
440 See discussion of PIAA report supra Part V.A.
" Fusilier, 764 So. 2d at 74.
442 Id. at 77.
443 Id. Allegations in the original complaint included assertions that the sur-
geon "'deviated from the accepted standards of medical practice ... ' [having, inter
alia] [flailed to comply with the appropriate standard of care; [flailed to have the
proper training and experience . . . ; [flailed to secure informed consent; [flailed to
wam of, recognize or properly treat medical risks and emergencies." Id at 77.
"4 Id. at 81.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 79.
44' Id. at 81.
None of the experts testifying at the trial offered any plausible explanation
for the injuries plaintiff suffered. The perforations of plaintiffs aorta,
duodenum, and mesentery were all dismissed as unfortunate
'complications' of the procedure. The only explanation offered by
defendant for perforating plaintiffs aorta, duodenum, and mesentery, is an
unsupported allegation that plaintiffs aorta must have been displaced.
However, the operative report does not reflect that observation, and none of
plaintiffs medical records support defendant's contention that plaintiff had
any anatomic abnormality or variation. The only logical conclusion is that
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ported claim that the patient's unique anatomical configuration was
the reason for the injuries.448
A factor that one would expect to be raised in claims arising dur-
ing the diffusion period is the quality and extent of the surgeon's
training. The court noted that the adequacy of training was the subject
of conflicting expert testimony at trial: six months before attempting
the surgery, the surgeon participated in a two-day training course and
had only used the technique on pigs.449 The court explicitly rejected
the defense argument that a surgeon comports with the standard of
care if he recognizes and addresses complications that arise during the
course of surgery.45 ° Clearly, if that contention had been accepted, it
would have aided any defense of a standard of care breach related to a
newly introduced surgical technique.
Jones v. Hernandez451 involved the performance of the same sur-
gical technique nine years later in 1999.452 This case was also brought
in Louisiana and reviewed by the Louisiana Court of Appeals (Second
Circuit), which issued its opinion in 2004, four years after Fusilier.
Here, the plaintiff had suffered injury to the common hepatic duct.
The court distinguished Jones from Fusilier by explicitly acknowledg-
ing that a national standard for performance of laparoscopic cholecys-
tectomy had emerged in the nine years since the plaintiff in Fusilier
had undergone the procedure.453 Five of the six experts agreed upon
Dr. Fusilier negligently inserted the needles, either by location or angle, and
perforated Mrs. Fusilier's aorta, duodenum, and mesentery.
Id.
448 Id.
449 The defense expert, Dr. J. Barry McKernan, had performed the first
laparoscopic cholecystectomy in the United States, and "stated that the training the
defendant [surgeon] had received prior to performing the surgery was probably more
extensive than most doctors received at that time." Id. at 80. The defense expert ap-
peared to contradict his own published opinion that a surgeon's preparation prior to
the first performance of the procedure should include, inter alia, twenty-five to fifty
supervised procedures, a position supported by the plaintiff's expert. Id. at 79-81.
450 Id at 81 ("We repudiate the contention that the standard of care is met
when a physician, who negligently causes injuries, takes measures to correct them.").
5. 880 So. 2d 245 (La. Ct. App. 2004), writ denied, 888 So. 2d 203 (La.
2004).
452 id.
413 Id. at 254-55.
In Fusilier, the claimant underwent laparoscopic cholecystectomy surgery
in 1990. The expert testimony was unequivocal that, at that time, there were
no national standards for physicians to follow regarding the performance of
a laparoscopic cholecystectomy .... [The surgeon] performed laparoscopic
surgery on Jones more than nine years after the surgery in Fusilier. During
that period of time [expert medical testimony showed that] national stan-
dards for surgeons to follow in performing laparoscopic cholecystectomies
430 [Vol. 16:351
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and articulated the standard of care.454 Here, the plaintiff's injury was
considered to be a "known and accepted risk of the procedure. ' '45 The
decision was rendered in favor of the surgeon despite expert testimony
that the surgeon had performed the surgery incorrectly: "[T]he inten-
tional placement of a surgical clip on the common hepatic duct is not
within the applicable standard of care; however, injury to the common
duct, whether by an inadvertently placed clip or subsequent scar tissue
formation, is a known and accepted risk of the procedure."
In contrast to Jones, in 2005 the Louisiana Appeals Court (Fifth
Circuit) in Walker v. Corsett"56 also considered Fusilier in a case
involving surgery performed in 1998. However, the court drew ex-
press analogies between the facts of Fusilier and Walker, overturned
the jury verdict in favor of the defendant, and found the surgeon liable
for injuries to the patient's common hepatic duct, common bile duct,
and hepatic artery.457 The court refused to accept the defense argu-
ment that it was "simply a case of a recognized complication. '4 58 The
court was particularly persuaded by the admission by the surgeon that
"he [had] made a series of misidentifications during the [proce-
dure]."459 Like Fusilier, the court also noted the lack of support from
experts regarding the surgeon's belief that the patient's anatomy was a
reason for the misplacement of certain surgical clips (including clips
on the common hepatic duct, as in Jones).460 It also took into account
expert testimony concerning the surgeon's lack of response to the
patient's excessive blood loss.
461
From the previous two cases, it certainly can be argued from a de-
fense perspective that there may be a potential benefit for surgeons
and their affiliated institutions if known complications are rapidly
identified.462 Indeed, this would support a policy recommendation for
the development of policy mechanisms that can identify early compli-
cations arising in surgical innovation.
were developed .... [The court finds that there was] sufficient evidence
presented [to] show[] that Jones' injuries could have occurred without any
negligence on the part of [the surgeon].
Id
454 Id
455 Id
456 900 So. 2d 991 (La. Ct. App. 2005), writ denied, 904 So. 2d 700 (La.
2005).
457 See id.
418 Id at 996.
459 Id.
460 See id.
461 Id at 94-95.
462 See supra Part III.A. See also Duff, supra note 169, § 2[b].
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D. Lessons for Surgical Innovation from Case Study Review
This brief review of the evolution and diffusion of one surgical
innovation indicates that registries may be a useful strategy for detect-
ing problems with a surgical procedure during its development and
refinement. This is especially true for those innovations like laparo-
scopic cholecystectomy that are rapidly diffused into practice and
applied to large numbers of patients in diverse settings. Such registries
can help spot issues that may be inherent in the procedure as well as
issues that may originate from corresponding training. From a patient
safety standpoint as well as a defense perspective, case law supports
the need for rapid identification of potential injuries once the proce-
dure emerges out of early development and is introduced to the surgi-
cal community. For patients, such a need is vital to prevent injury.
From a defense perspective, a surgeon may benefit from the acknowl-
edgment among peers that a particular injury is a known or accepted
risk of the procedure.463 Such a need can be addressed with registries
and a system of coordination among them.
But this review does not reveal any guidance on how to properly
address the very early development of a surgical technique, and how
to ensure that patients are properly protected and informed of their
participation in the development of a surgical innovation. This proce-
dure evaded IRB review from the outset because the innovating sur-
geon and early adopters did not characterize it as research, or were not
within the reach of federal regulatory requirements. Randomized con-
trolled studies conducted with IRB review missed detecting the criti-
cal injuries. Also, study results were not reported until four years after
the procedure's first performance, when the procedure was already
being performed by many and already stimulating legal claims.
The medical literature surrounding laparoscopic cholecystectomy
reveals accolades and honors for the surgical innovator, Dr. McKer-
nan.464 Although Dr. McKernan's claims record is not publicly avail-
able, there are no reported legal cases involving him or his perform-
ance of this procedure. 465 Further, there is an approximate two-year
delay between his first performance of the surgery and the procedure's
463 See JONES, supra note 285, at 7; discussion on known or accepted risk of
the procedure infra Part VI.
464 See, e.g., W. Peter Geis, J. Barry McKernan, MD, PhD--A Profile, 8 J.
Soc'Y LAPAROENDOSCOPIC SURGEONS 399 (2004); Michael S. Kavic, Editorial, A
Decade ofLaparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 2 J. Soc'Y LAPAROENDOSCOPIC SURGEONS
319 (1998).
465 Indeed, at least one early case indicates his appearance as an expert for the
defense. See, e.g., Fusilier v. Dauterive, 764 So. 2d 74 (La. 2000).
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performance by another surgeon that prompted a reported legal case.
All that is readily available for any assessment during this two-year
void is the doctor's personal accounting of the informed consent proc-
ess for the first time attempt of the procedure. From that account, one
can sense the trust of patients in the expertise of a well-regarded sur-
gical innovator and the willingness of some patients to try new ap-
proaches even in the face of contrary medical opinions. Thus, for this
early critical period before diffusion into the broader surgical commu-
nity, for the benefit of patient safety, one must consider other solu-
tions, which are introduced below.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
An ideal system of oversight and control for surgical innovation
would ensure an appropriate balance between two goals: (1) the pro-
tection of the rights and welfare of patients, including protection from
both unintentional or unconsented harm, and (2) encouragement of
innovation to enhance the possibility of the best health outcomes for
individual patients and the advancement of medicine for the benefit of
all patients.466 Currently, surgical innovation will follow one of two
pathways through the legal system, treated either as research or prac-
tice. Each pathway is supported by historical roots that clearly indi-
cate an intention to address the aforementioned goals, but in practice
have been found deficient in adequately balancing them. Each path-
way, however, has certain commendable qualities that are worthy of
replication in some form in efforts to achieve such a balance. For ex-
ample, at a minimum, one can conclude from both legal pathways that
prior review of scientific merit and ethical concerns, including in-
formed consent that acknowledges the innovative nature of the ther-
apy and associated unknown risks, not only meets the requirements of
federally regulated research, but may potentially provide a partial de-
fense in an action for research or medical malpractice action. At their
core, these actions have the effect of enhancing patient safety and
encouraging innovation while safeguarding the trust of patients in
medicine and research.
What is the appropriate policy response to surgical innovation?
Many commentators in the medical and ethics literature have
advocated for increased attention to and oversight of innovative
surgery. 467 Below, I briefly summarize from a legal perspective first
466 Inherent within these goals are many sub-goals, including ensuring the
financial viability of institutions to continue support for the development of innova-
tions designed to advance human health.
467 E.g., Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 31, at 107; Gillett, supra note 96, at
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the challenges of retaining the current approach and second, the
challenges of subjecting surgical innovation to the federal research
oversight system. I conclude with a recommendation for an approach
tailored to surgical innovation, which includes three components: (1)
monitoring through registries designed to evaluate surgical outcomes,
(2) institutional oversight and review, and (3) educational initiatives
for surgeons.
A. Maintaining the Status Quo 468
If no changes are sought in the current approach to surgical inno-
vation, from a legal perspective innovative surgery will in most cases
default to the Practice Pathway and the malpractice system. As dis-
cussed supra, this may be attributed to, inter alia, the following cir-
cumstances: decisions to subject an innovation to regulatory oversight
are made by the surgeons who perform the innovative surgery in the
context of the institutional and legal culture in which they practice;
the ambiguity surrounding the definition of research, both in the fed-
eral regulations themselves and the understanding of surgeons; and
the inherent limitations in reach of the federal research regulations,
specifically the failure to cover some research that is privately funded
and conducted.
There are significant problems associated with reliance on the
Practice Pathway (the malpractice system) to prevent injuries and
protect the rights and welfare of patients. First, any review of the pro-
cedure for safety or effectiveness is post hoc, and there is little oppor-
tunity for prevention of injury and protection of patient interests. Liti-
gation is not a good substitute for the scrutiny of scientific review by
898; Casler, supra note 29; Jones, supra note 109, at 399-400; Lyon, supra note 34;
Ward, supra note 1; Editorial, supra note 22; Bunker et al., supra note 5; Strasberg &
Ludbrook, supra note 10; Scott, supra note 339, at 425; Dossetor, supra note 4; Spo-
dick, supra note 20; Margo, supra note 67; Rutan et al., supra note 47; Francis D.
Moore, Ethical Problems Special to Surgery: Surgical Teaching, Surgical Innovation,
and the Surgeon in Managed Care, 135 ARCHIVES SURGERY 14 (2000); Martin F.
McKneally, Ethical Problems in Surgery: Innovation Leading to Unforeseen Compli-
cations, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY 786 (1999); Statements on Emerging Surgical Tech-
nologies and the Evaluation of Credentials, AM. C. SURGEONS BULL., June 1994, at
40; Rosamond Rhodes, An Innovative Paradigm for Clinical Research, 3 AM. J. BIo-
ETHICS 59 (2003); Michael D. Sussman, Ethical Requirements that Must Be Met Be-
fore the Introduction of New Procedures, 378 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED
RESEARCH 15 (2000).
468 A small number of medical commentators have defended the current ap-
proach to surgical innovation typically in response to published articles advocating
change. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 25, at 1353; Bonchek, supra note 2, at 45 ("The
referring physician is thus the surgeon's Food and Drug Administration.").
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peers. Also, the Practice Pathway offers no opportunity for outcomes
evaluation beyond the individual result that is the subject of litigation.
Indeed, the Practice Pathway can only address the alleged bad out-
comes that have reached the level of legal scrutiny, and the deterrent
effect of malpractice litigation on physician behavior and negligence
prevention is generally thought to be questionable.469
Second, the malpractice system essentially rests on a standard of
care which is established by peers. The history described herein sup-
ports that reliance on this level of review could result in the propaga-
tion of unvalidated procedures. Third, and maybe most important, to
leave innovative surgery in the realm of practice or routine health care
does not reflect reality, i.e., such innovations are treated as routine
health care, but in reality it may instead be health care with less cer-
tainty about the outcome and benefits, and significant unknown risks.
The legal review herein has shown that as a matter of legal risk man-
agement, informed consent should routinely reveal the procedure's
innovative nature and the possibility of unknown risks where appro-
priate. This is especially important where the innovation constitutes a
significant departure from standard practice and is not simply a justi-
fied adaptation to the individual's anatomical configuration. Empirical
data support that this disclosure has not been integrated into practice,
which provides more evidence of the inability of the tort system to
rectify professional practice standards. Fourth, it has been well-
documented that the medical malpractice system is an inefficient tool
for adverse event compensation.47°
B. Subjecting Surgical Innovation to the Research Pathway471
Relatively few surgical innovations currently undergo review pur-
suant to the federal regulations. The benefits of subjecting innovative
surgery to the Research Pathway are relatively straightforward: the
Research Pathway provides opportunities for the collection of com-
469 See Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient
Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375, 388 (2005).
470 David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283
(2004) ("Commentators lament the 'lawsuit lottery,' which provides windfalls for
some patients, but no compensation for the vast majority of patients injured by medi-
cal care."); Mello et al., supra note 469, at 388 ("Although a number of studies have
concluded that the system does a fairly good job of directing compensation to plain-
tiffs with valid claims, other studies have determined that many cases in which com-
pensation is awarded lack evidence of negligence, a cognizable injury, or both.").
471 Some commentators have pointed out benefits of treating surgical innova-
tion as research. See, e.g., Margo, supra note 67; Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note
10.
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parative information; it offers clearer direction on the quality of in-
formed consent; and, it generally provides opportunities to prevent
unvalidated procedures from proceeding without appropriate patient
protections by using processes such as prospective review and fully
informed consent. These actions increase the likelihood that harm to
patients will be prevented and potentially decrease liability exposure
for providers and their respective institutions.472
Numerous legal and practical challenges arise in attempts to apply
the federal research framework to surgical innovation. Surgical inno-
vation would have to clearly meet the regulatory definition of "re-
search" to fall within the purview of federal oversight. When and if it
does is not clear, and such determinations are made on a case-by-case
basis at the local level. At that level, like all research, participation in
prospective review requires an affirmative act by an investigator as
IRBs have no way to monitor compliance directly. In surgical innova-
tion, the surgeon or the surgeon's institution has this decision-making
authority. The numerous complaints about the functioning of the pro-
spective review system by those who are required through federal
regulation to submit their research projects to such reviews-
complaints such as timeliness of approval, lack of expertise, and vari-
ability in implementation of the regulations among IRBs4 73-are
likely to discourage surgeons from submitting their projects to such
review unless it is clearly an institutional or regulatory requirement.
Arriving at an appropriate mechanism to compel surgeons to
submit surgical innovation into the Research Pathway is an onerous
task. Broadening the Common Rule's definition of research, for ex-
ample, is daunting, especially in light of the nine-year process in-
volved in the regulation's creation. It may also have unintended ef-
fects in other areas of medicine, the assessment of which are beyond
the scope of this article. More practically, the regulatory definition of
research could be interpreted more expeditiously in OHRP guidance
documents to encompass surgical innovation or aspects thereof, but
would suffer the deficiency in legal force of informal administrative
action. Such an official interpretation would likely be respected by
472 Practically speaking, any attempt to further refine the definition of re-
search to include surgical innovation (or particular aspects) may not affect a court's
interpretation as research or practice. Legal decisions show that many courts, espe-
cially in actions involving patients, may ignore such definitions and apply medical
malpractice law. However, the increase in litigation involving research and the will-
ingness of judges to second guess the decisions of IRBs, such as in Grimes v. Ken-
nedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 813 (Md. 2001), may limit the impact of
this approach on liability exposure.
473 See, e.g., GAO, Continued Vigilance, supra note 334.
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institutions and providers, and could lay out a process or flow chart
for determining whether and when surgical innovation meets the defi-
nition of research. Regardless, federal regulations will not reach sur-
gical innovation that lacks a federal nexus, e.g., novel procedures
conducted in private clinics.
Required regulatory oversight for surgical innovation would in
some cases lead to controlled trials of new techniques. Clinical trials
are expensive, however, and there are few sources of support for sur-
gical trials. Further, as discussed in Part I, supra, there is significant
disagreement in the surgical community about the benefits, risks, ap-
propriate timing and use of randomized controlled trials.
Perhaps the most significant disincentive for generally categoriz-
ing surgical innovation as research is its potential impact on reim-
bursement. Insurers typically deny reimbursement for experimental
procedures, 474 so such a classification potentially jeopardizes the fi-
nancial standing of surgical institutions and providers who may face
challenges recouping payments from patients who are otherwise fi-
nancially unprepared to pay the large sums associated with surgery.475
Notwithstanding the potential benefits accruing to individual pa-
tients, this approach has obvious negative impacts on the aforemen-
tioned goal of encouraging innovation. These impacts emanate par-
ticularly from the additional time and costs of entering the federal
research bureaucracy which may work directly or indirectly to stifle
innovation. Overall this approach has significant implications for sur-
geons and institutions, both in time and dollars spent in monitoring,
compliance and documentation, and dollars lost from reimbursement
denials and collection efforts. It also may affect the financial status of
sick patients who are unable to obtain reimbursement for needed sur-
gical treatment.
C. Developing a Unique System of Oversight
The "status quo" approach and the "research" approach have
commendable qualities but, as highlighted above, significant
limitations as well. In the alternative, numerous commentators have
suggested various strategies that considered together could be the
474 See discussion on insurance reimbursement supra Part I.B.
475 Margo, supra note 67, at 42 ("The fear that formal preliminary testing of
innovative surgeries might not be reimbursed by third party payers may be a strong
disincentive for academic medical centres to police seriously the area of informal
research.").
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basis for development of a system of oversight tailored to surgical
innovation.476
This article suggests a three-pronged approach to surgical innova-
tion: (1) use of registries to detect and evaluate outcomes and adverse
events; (2) local institutional attention and oversight to address in-
formed consent and additional review; and (3) educational initiatives.
Any innovation which clearly meets the definition of research and is
subject to the federal regulations should continue to be treated as such.
Registries have proven to be valuable in documenting outcomes
as surgical innovations are introduced and diffused into practice. For
example, state, institutional, and surgical society registries were criti-
cal in the detection of the increased rate of bile duct injuries in laparo-
scopic cholecystectomy, which prompted evaluation and review of
training procedures.477 In contrast, early RCTs comparing laparo-
scopic to the more invasive open cholecystectomy did not identify
these problems, and even if they had, clinical trial results were not
available until well past the stage of more widespread adoption of the
procedure. The experience with laparoscopic cholecystectomy further
reveals a gap in time and oversight between the first performance of
the innovation and the detection, assessment and reporting of the rate
of recurring injuries. Some form of mandatory state or national report-
ing would increase the likelihood of identifying and addressing prob-
lems in their early stages, including those related to the procedure
itself or to training and credentialing of providers. This is especially
the case where, as in laparoscopic cholecystectomy, the condition
being treated affects numerous people throughout the country and the
rate of complication is a relatively infrequent occurrence from a popu-
lation perspective. 478 For procedures that are more controlled or lim-
ited in diffusion, institutional data gathering may be appropriate.479
Potential models exist for registries. For example, the National
Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP) was established by
the U.S. government's Veteran's Administration Health System in
1992 and has a documented track record in outcomes evaluation. a0
476 These include prior review. E.g., Reitsma & Moreno, supra note 31;
Casler, supra note 29; Jones, supra note 109; Ward, supra note 1. These also include
enhanced disclosure in informed consent. E.g., Jones, supra note 109; Strasberg &
Ludbrook, supra note 10; McKneally, supra note 467; Moore, supra note 467. These
also include monitoring. E.g., McKneally, supra note 467; Scott, supra note 339, at
421, 425; Am. Coll. of Surgeons, supra note 78; Dossetor, supra note 4; Strasberg &
Ludbrook, supra note 10.
477 See Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 946.
478 See id. at 945.
479 See id.
480 Jones, supra note 109, at 399-400.
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The American College of Surgeons, with government funding, has
developed and recently piloted a comparable program intended to
serve the private sector.481 In addition, surgical specialty societies
have created effective registries.48 1 Strasberg and Ludbrook advocate
instituting mandatory registries, but doing so with "care and selectiv-
ity" for many reasons: high costs of data collection and analysis,
483
need for patient confidentiality protections, reporting burdens on busy
practitioners, and the continuing need for well-designed research trials
to answer questions that cannot be addressed through registries.484
Thus, a mechanism needs to be created and criteria developed to
prompt the creation of such registries where appropriate.
Institutional efforts at prospective data collection, while not rising
to the level of formal registries, could prove valuable in the detection
of adverse events.48 5 Such data could be collected as a part of routine
quality improvement (QI) efforts. In addition, institutional QI experi-
ences could be important resources in the development of the afore-
mentioned criteria for registry creation.
Although registries are equipped to identify adverse events and
prompt additional studies, they cannot address potential legal and
ethical issues arising in the earlier stages of development, such as in-
formed consent, the appropriate balancing of risks and benefits, and
selection of patients.
Based on the preceding legal review, enhanced disclosure during
informed consent and prospective review are two factors that may
assist in serving the twin goals of improved patient safety and encour-
agement of innovation, all operating within the culture of innovation
and independent decision-making that are hallmarks of surgery and its
history of tremendous medical advances. These factors may assist in
managing liability exposure of providers and institutions involved in
surgical innovation, as well as addressing important concerns raised in
the literature. Institutional controls could be introduced to manage and
oversee innovation to ensure appropriate prior review and informed
consent, as well as other important ethical issues. This approach
481 Id.
482 The Society for Cardiac Angioplasty and Interventions has created an
effective registry. Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 946.
483 The authors make a compelling cost argument, however, in favor of regis-
tries. Using laparoscopic cholecystectomy as an example, they compare the average
cost of injuries to potential savings from early detection of adverse events, and sug-
gest that registry funding could be borne by adding a few cents to all insurance poli-
cies. Strasberg & Ludbrook, supra note 10, at 946.
484 Id.
485 Id.
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would provide opportunities to protect patients and could also inform
risk management strategies. Potential models exist for institutional
control mechanisms. In 2001, Boston Children's Hospital introduced
a voluntary program of institutional oversight specific to surgical in-
novation.48 6 The policy defines innovative therapy and defines the
conditions under which it should be considered research that is subject
to review and approval by the local IRB.487 It further provides for a
distinct intermediate level of review and oversight for innovative sur-
gery that (1) "represents a significant increase in risk, above the alter-
native approaches [that [sic]] could have been offered," or (2) "when
,,488the procedure is so novel that the risks and benefits are unknown.
The system of oversight includes: independent peer review by de-
partmental members not affiliated with the patient care team, in light
of the clinical situation of the patient and available alternatives, with
an emphasis on assuring patient safety; informed consent review and
486 Susan Kornetsky, Children's Hosp., Boston, Children's Hospital: Guide-
lines, Concepts and Procedures for Differentiating Between Research and Innovative
Therapy (2001) [hereinafter Children's Hospital Guidelines] (unpublished policy) (on
file with author); Telephone Interview with Susan Kornetsky, Dir. Clinical Research
Compliance, Children's Hosp., Boston, in Boston, Mass. (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
Telephone Interview with Susan Kometsky, Mar. 15, 2005]. Institutional representa-
tives prepared a manuscript for publication discussing the guidelines. SUSAN KORNET-
SKY, INNOVATION VERSUS RESEARCH: GUIDELINES, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES FOR
DIFFERENTIATION (2006), http://www.childrenshospital.org/cfapps/research/data
admin/Site2206/Documents/cipp_081 015 innovation vs rsrch.doc (last visited Apr.
3, 2006). Telephone Interview with Susan Kometsky, Dir. Clinical Research Compli-
ance, Children's Hosp., Boston, in Boston, Mass. (Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Tele-
phone Interview with Susan Kornetsky, Sept. 6, 2005].
487 Children's Hospital Guidelines, supra note 486.
Innovative therapy occurs when a practitioner proposes to use a treatment,
procedure or intervention in a way that deviates from commonly accepted
practice in a clinical encounter. Innovative therapy can be characterized by
one or more of the following principles: a) A non-standard treatment or
approach that is used solely to attempt to enhance the well being of an
individual patient. b) A change from a currently accepted practice by the
medical community that is based on scientific observations and explicit
rationale. c) The modification of commonly accepted procedures in small
incremental steps. d) Whenever innovative therapy differs significantly
from routine practice it should be viewed as experimental. In all such cases
the need to evaluate the therapy/procedure by a scientifically sound
methodology under a formal research protocol should at least be considered
although the fact that the procedure is novel does not automatically place it
in a category of research. However, when new procedures are used
repeatedly, they should be made the object of formal research at an early
stage, in order to determine whether the innovation is both safe and
effective.
488 id.
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approval at the administrative level of the IRB (not full committee
review); and documentation of peer review and informed consent
processes. 489 The policy further provides guidance on distinguishing
between innovative therapy and research and provides illustrative
examples of each of the three resulting categories: (1) research, (2)
"[i]nnovative [t]herapy with [o]versight," and (3) "[i]nnovative
[t]herapy without [s]pecial [p]rotections. ' '490 Ambiguous cases are
decided by the department chair, and a mechanism has been instituted
to assist surgeons in identifying procedures that should be character-
ized as research, prompting consideration under formal procedures for
IRB approval. The success of this 2001 program has not yet been fully
evaluated, but it serves as a model for locally-based attempts to reign
in the uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding surgical innovation,
in an attempt to enhance patient safety while encouraging innovation.
Educational initiatives491  by institutions and professional
associations will be important in assisting surgeons in identifying the
circumstances under which surgical innovation constitutes research or
otherwise requires additional disclosure to patients. This is especially
important in light of the empirical data showing confusion and
misunderstanding among surgeons about when surgical innovation
should be treated as research. Educational initiatives could also point
out the benefits of independent review. If combined with training,
credentialing, and monitoring related to the introduction of new
procedures into the clinic setting, more patients may be protected
from the "risks of the 'learning curve."'' 492 Such initiatives could go
far in broadly influencing surgeons' understandings of the appropriate
standard of care for surgical innovation.
At core, a failure to recognize the need for increased attention to
surgical innovation is a failure to acknowledge the vulnerability of the
patient and the risk to the physician-patient relationship.493 In his as-
sessment of surgical innovation, Margo states it as follows: "The most
likely threat to patients may not be that an untested treatment is un-
safe, but that the trust of patients in their physicians may be compro-
489 See id.
490 Id.
491 Commentators include educational initiatives in their recommendations.
See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 467, at 21; Rutan et al., supra note 47; Jones, supra
note 109.
492 Jones, supra note 109, at 401. Note also that the American College of
Surgeons has stressed the importance of credentialing as well. Am. Coll. of Surgeons,
Statement on Emerging Surgical Technologies and the Evaluation of Credentials, 79
AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. 40 (1994).
493 Margo, supra note 67, at 41.
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mised .... , Once such trust is undermined, the public's willingness
to allow professional self-regulation and deference to physician judg-
ment can be replaced by aggressive regulation and oversight. Such a
response risks chilling innovation at the expense of present and future
health benefits to patients, creating an imbalance in the goals of pa-
tient safety and encouragement of innovation.
494 Id.
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